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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

JAMES W. MOONEY, a.k.a. JAMES
W.F.E. MOONEY; LINDA T.
MOONEY; and OKLEVUEHA
EARTHWALKS NATIVE
AMERICAN CHURCH OF UTAH,
INC.,

:

Defendants/Appellants.

Case No. 20000637-SC

:
:

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from an interlocutory order denying defendants' motion to dismiss the
information. Defendants were charged with one count of engaging in a pattern of unlawful
activity/racketeering, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1603
(1999); and twelve counts of possession of a controlled substance in connection with a
criminal enterprise, all first degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-378(l)(a)(iv) (1998) (R. 5-1 ) (statutes attached in Addendum A).

'Defendant/appellant Oklevueha Earthwalks Native American Church of Utah,
Inc., was not charged with the count alleging the engagement in a pattern of unlawful
activity/racketeering, and defendant/appellant Linda T. Mooney was charged with only

This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(h)
(2002).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1. Did the trial court provide the only constitutional interpretation of the federal
regulatory peyote exemption in determining that, to the extent the exemption was
incorporated into Utah law, it did not apply to non-Indians?
This is a question of statutory interpretation, reviewed on appeal for correctness,
giving no deference to the trial court. See State v. Schofield, 2002 UT 132, TJ 6, 463 Utah
Adv. Rep. 75; State v. Burns 2000 UT 56, % 15,4 P.3d 795; State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355,
1357 (Utah 1993).
2. Did the trial court violate defendants' First Amendment right to freedom of religion
or Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection under the federal constitution when it
determined that bona fide religious use of peyote is exempt under state law only for Indianancestried NAC members?
The constitutionality of a statute presents a question of law reviewed on appeal for
correctness, giving no deference to the trial court. See State v. Gomez, 2002 UT 120, K 11,
452 Utah Adv. Rep. 8. The Court resolves all reasonable doubts in favor of constitutionality.
See Whitmer v. City ofLindon, 943 P.2d 226, 228 (Utah 1997).

three counts involving the criminal enterprise (R. 5-1). The State dismissed two of the
twelve racketeering counts at the preliminary hearing, leaving defendants facing ten
counts of racketeering (R. 182).
2

3. Should this Court reach the merits of defendants' challenge to the trial court's
determination that bona fide religious use of peyote is exempt under state law only for
Indian-ancestried NAC members and that the exemption does not violate defendants' state
constitutional rights to freedom of religion, freedom of expression, and equal operation of
the laws where defendants failed to adequately raise these issues below?
No standard of review applies to this issue because defendant failed to properly raise
the issue in the trial court, thereby preventing its presentation on appeal. See State v.
Holgate, 2000 UT 74, f 11, 10 P.3d 346.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following relevant state and federal statutes are attached as noted:
In Addendum A:
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-3 (1998)
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-4 (1998)
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1998)

Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1603 (1999);
21 U.S.C. §812(1994).

In Addendum C:
21 C.F.R. § 1307.31.

In Addendum D:
42 U.S.C. 1996;
42 U.S.C. 1996a.

The following federal constitutional provisions are also relevant to this
interlocutory appeal:
United States Constitution, amend. I:
[Religious and political freedom.]
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances.

3

United States Constitution, amend. XIV:
Section 1.
[Citizenship - Due process of law - Equal protection,]
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an interlocutory appeal. Defendants have not been convicted on the charged
offenses and retain the presumption of innocence.
Defendants James and Linda Mooney and the Oklevueha Earthwalks Native American
Church of Utah were charged by information with one count of engaging in a pattern of
unlawful activity, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1603
(1999), and twelve counts of engaging in a "controlled substance criminal enterprise," all
first degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1 )(a)(iv) (1998) (R. 5-1).2
The charges arose from defendants' conduct in acquiring, disseminating, and using peyote
in conjunction with the operation of the church (id.).
On May 16, 2001, defendants filed a motion to dismiss with a supporting
memorandum, arguing that their conduct was not punishable under Utah law because their
activities were limited to members of a Native American church and, hence, fell within a

2

Of the first degree felony charges, defendant James Mooney was named in all
twelve counts; his wife was named in three of those counts; and the church was named in
the remaining nine counts (R. 5-1).
4

statutory exception to the criminal use of peyote (R. 269, 175-13). At the beginning of the
preliminary hearing on May 17,2001, the district judge and the prosecutor noted that because
they had just received their respective copies of the motion, they were not prepared to
address it (R. 287: 6-12). Consequently, the preliminary hearing went forward, and further
briefing and argument was set on defendants' motion (id.).
After full briefing and oral argument, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss (R.
269-62) (in Addendum B). The judge ruled that, while Utah law provided for an exception
for the use of peyote in bona fide religious services related to members of any Native
American church, the exception encompassed only those individuals who had ancestral ties
to a federally-recognized Indian tribe (id.). The court concluded that because it had been
presented with no credible proof that either the defendants or those to whom they provided
peyote were Indian-ancestried, defendants' conduct did not fall within the recognized
exception (id.). Add. B.
Defendants timely sought permission to file an interlocutory appeal of the lower
court's decision denying the motion to dismiss, and this Court granted that motion and
accepted the interlocutory petition on October 3, 2001 (R. 273).
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS3
Oklevueha Earthwalk Native American Church ["OENAC"] was established by James
Mooney in the home he shared with Linda Mooney in Benjamin, Utah (R. 245: R. 287: 183

The facts are taken from the preliminary hearing testimony and the trial court's
ruling on defendant's motion to dismiss.
5

21, 29-32, 37-38, 41, 48, 56, 94-95). Throughout the period charged in the information,
defendants repeatedly and regularly met with groups averaging between four and thirty
people (R. 287: 21-23, 32, 39-40, 48, 58, 65, 73, 81, 89). The meetings took place at
defendants' home, and those in attendance were offered peyote during the meetings (R. 287:
18-21,23-24,29-33,37-38,41,47-48,52-53,56, 59,62-63,65-66,71-72,74,78-79,81,83,
87, 89-90, 94-95).
The State called ten people who had attended one or more such meetings to testify at
the preliminary hearing. The members found out about the meetings largely from friends,
family members, or associates—only one of whom was identified as being Indian—or simply
knew of them through "common knowledge" (R. 287: 33,48-49, 52, 58-59, 72, 74, 89,93).
Peyote was given to all who wanted it, even those attending for their first time (R. 287: 4748, 52-54, 23-24, 29-31, 33, 47-48, 52-53, 59, 62-63, 65-66, 71-72, 74, 78-79, 81, 83, 87,
89).4 Indian ancestry of any kind was not a prerequisite to attending or participating in
ceremonies, as none of the ten who testified were shown to be of Indian descent (R. 287: 25,
34, 42, 75, 84, 90). In fact, when asked if he was enrolled as a member of any Indian tribe,

4

The State claims to have information that defendants provided church members
with "maintenance dosages" of peyote to take with them from the ceremony-a practice
seemingly considered sacrilegious in the Native American religion and outside any scope
of the peyote exemption (R. 10). See 21 C.F.R. § 1307.31 (exempting from criminal
liability the use of peyote by NAC members "in bona fide religious ceremonies"); see
also Olsen v. Drug Enforcement Administration, 878 F.2d 1458, 1464 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(recognizing that peyote use in the NAC takes place in a "precisely circumscribed ritual,"
and that use of peyote outside the ritual is sacrilegious"); United States v. Boyil, 11A F.
Supp. 1333, 1335 (D.N M. 1991) (noting that "It is considered sacrilegious to use peyote
for nonreligious purposes").
6

one person said that he was enrolled in "[t]he tribe here today ran by James Mooney" (R.
287: 53, 59). Another confessed, "I don't know what that exactly means. I have a card that
identifies me of Oklevu[e]ha Earthwalks Native American Church" (R. 287: 66). When
asked about any other tribal affiliation, the witness said he had none (id.).
Participants were not required to accept the OENAC religious philosophies to the
exclusion of any other religious beliefs (R. 287: 74, 76, 53, 59, 66, 25, 34, 42, 75, 84, 90).
In fact, the Mooneys had established another organization called Earth Medicine Foundation
"primarily to assist individuals who had positive experiences with the church and wished to
make donations to the church but were inclined to want to make another donation outside of
their own religion" (R. 287: 102). Defendants intended to use those donations "to purchase
sacred Peyote lands in Texas and then to hold those lands in trust" (id.).5

defendants claim the existence of extensive "undisputed" facts which were not
found by the trial court and urge their adoption by this Court. Br. of Aplts. at 12-13, n.4.
These include that OENAC has, at all times, been recognized as a bona fide Native
American Church, that defendant James Mooney was legally authorized to obtain peyote
in Texas pursuant to authority from the Texas Department of Public Services, and that
defendant James Mooney is of Indian ancestry. Id. at 13-15. These claims were not
litigated below but stem from self-serving defense affidavits (R. 246-37). The document
adduced in support of his claim of authority to obtain peyote is Texas establishes only
that as of August 2000, the Texas authorities had the name and address of defendant
OENAC, the name of a contact person, and had received correspondence from the
church—it does not establish the validity of the church or defendant Mooney's authority
to obtain peyote (R. 136). The claimed "facts" were not entirely credible in the opinion
of the trial judge, who noted that defendants recited no facts in their opening
memorandum in support of their motion, that defendants failed to take issue with the facts
recited in the State's written response, and that defendant James Mooney's affidavitbased claims of Indian ancestry were not "official evidence . . . to show that the
Defendants are legitimately of Indian heritage . . ." (R. 262-63; R. 286: 3).
The State therefore reserves the right to dispute the validity of defendants' claimed
7

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Point I: Defendants' distribution of peyote to non-Indian members of OENAC is not
exempted from criminal prosecution under Utah's statutes prohibiting the possession and use
of peyote. Although Utah law incorporates the Federal Controlled Substances Act, it does
not incorporate the regulatory provision which provides that the Act "does not apply to the
nondrug use of peyote in bona fide religious ceremonies of the Native American Church[.]"
21C.F.R. § 1307.31.
Even assuming incorporation of the regulatory exemption into Utah law, defendants'
conduct remains illegal because the exemption does not extend to the possession and use of
peyote by non-Indians. Both Congress and the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs
(the agency which promulgated the federal peyote exemption) interpret the term "Native
American Church" as including only Indians. The American Indian Religious Freedom Act
Amendments, enacted twenty-five years after the regulatory peyote exemption, make clear
that the government has established a peyote exemption that extends only to Indian members
of the Native American Church who are affiliated with a federally-recognized tribe.
Comments made on behalf of Congress and the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs
at the time each of the two exemptions was enacted demonstrate that the peyote exemption
was always intended to apply only to that particular group of Indians. Federal case law
reaffirms that intent. Nothing in Utah's laws suggest that, to the extent the regulatory

"established" facts should these issues ultimately become determinative of this case. For
purposes of this appeal only, the State assumes the NAC status of defendant church.
8

exemption was incorporated, it was to be given any broader interpretation than that provided
by the federal government. Hence, defendants' conduct in distributing peyote to non-Indian
members of OENAC does not fall within the scope of the peyote exemption at issue,
permitting their criminal prosecution under state law.
Point II: The trial court properly rejected defendants' claim that limiting the peyote
exemption to Indians associated with federally-recognized tribes violates the federal Equal
Protection provision and the First Amendment freedom of religion clause. Because the
exemption constitutes a federal regulation concerning Indian affairs, it is reviewed under a
"rational relationship" analysis, not the "strict scrutiny" test normally applied to an Equal
Protection challenge. The government possesses a unique duty and responsibility to legislate
on behalf of Indians that arises from a history of treaties and the assumption of a "guardianward" status between the two groups. So long as the government legislates on behalf of
members of federally-recognized tribes, it is seen as professing a "political" preference, not
a "racial" one. So long as the legislated preference can be rationally tied to the fulfillment
of the unique obligation held by the government, the legislation will not be disturbed as an
unconstitutional preference.
Neither does the regulatory exemption in this case violate the defendants' freedom of
religion rights under the First Amendment. The application of the exemption to Indians is
the least restrictive means of serving the government's valid compelling interests of (1)
protecting tribal Native Americans and preserving their culture and self-government, and (2)
protecting society from illegal drug use. Both interests are served by exempting from
9

criminal prosecution only those to whom the government's duty is owed. This permits
accepted use of the scheduled drug by the smallest number of acceptable individuals possible
while still permitting the government to meet its unique and special duty toward those
individuals. Defendants have not established any similar duty owing by the government to
non-Indians. Further, defendants' extension of the exception to anyone who attends a Native
American Church impairs both compelling interests because it drastically increases the
number of individuals who may legally use the dangerous drug and creates the possibility of
abuse by those joining the church for the sole purpose of using peyote. At the same time, it
does nothing to further the government's ability to meet its duty to Indians. Consequently,
the trial court's application of the regulatory peyote exemption to Indians alone violates
neither the First nor the Fourteenth Amendments.
Point HI: This Court should decline to review defendants' state constitutional claims
because they were not properly preserved below. Defendants' brief mention of the state
constitution in the trial court and inclusion of quotes therefrom in their written memoranda
did not raise the claims u to a level of consciousness" that permitted the trial judge to consider
and rule on that basis. Moreover, once the ruling issued without any reference to the state
constitution, defendants failed to remedy the omission by means of a rehearing, a
clarification, or an amended ruling. Consequently, this Court should find those claims to be
unpreserved and should refuse to reach their merits.

10

Further, the failure of defendants to include on appeal claims of plain error or
exceptional circumstances prevent appellate review of their unpreserved state constitutional
claims.
ARGUMENTS
POINT I
UTAH LAW DOES NOT INCORPORATE THE FEDERAL
REGULATORY PEYOTE EXEMPTION, BUT EVEN IF IT DOES, THE
TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT IT DOES NOT
EXTEND TO EXEMPT DEFENDANTS FROM CRIMINAL
RESPONSIBILITY FOR THEIR DISTRIBUTION OF PEYOTE TO
NON-INDIANS
Defendants argued below that their possession and distribution of peyote to defendant
OENAC members are exempt from criminal prosecution under the federal exception found
in 21 C.F.R. § 1307.31 and that this exception is incorporated in Utah Code Ann. § 58-374(2)(a)(iii) (R. 171-69, 253-52). The trial court held that to the extent the federal exception
listed in 21 C.F.R. § 1307.31 was applicable to the State, it did not extend to exempt "nonIndian members of the NAC" from criminal prosecution by the State (R. 267-66).
Consequently, the court determined that "the protection from prosecution of non-Indians,
regardless of whether they are members of the NAC, is not a 'specific exception' within the
meaning of § 58-37-4" (id.).
Because the trial court interpreted the C.F.R. as excluding non-Indians, the peyote
exemption did not permit defendants to legally distribute peyote to their non-Indian
members. Add. B. Defendants argue on appeal that the trial court's ruling is contrary both
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to the plain language of the C.F.R. as well as to the history and tradition of the Native
American Church "as it bears on the legislative history of the federal exception[.]" Br. of
Aplts. at 23-34. They conclude with the claim that the lower court's decision should be
reversed "[i]n the absence of any legislative history indicating that the Utah Legislature
intended the statutory exemption" to be read as the trial court interpreted it. Id. at 34. The
following background information should aid in understanding the issue on appeal.
A.

Relevant State And Federal Law
1. Utah law and the federal peyote exemption
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1998) prohibits possession of controlled substances

(attached in Addendum A). A controlled substance is defined as all substances listed in
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-4 or in the federal Controlled Substances Act ["CSA"] at 21 U.S.C.
§ 801 et seq. (both attached in Addendum A). Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-3 (attached in
Addendum A). Peyote is specifically listed as a controlled substance in Utah Code Ann. §
58-37-4(2)(a)(iii)(Q), which sets out the various schedules of controlled substances and
provides that the listed substances are deemed to be controlled substances "[u]nless
specifically excepted or unless listed in another schedule . . . . " Add. A. The CSA, enacted
in 1970, conditionally lists peyote in schedule I. See 21 U.S.C.A. § 812 (1994). Add. A.
Schedule I reflects findings that the drugs listed therein, including peyote, have "a high
potential for abuse,'* "no currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United States,"
and "a lack of accepted safety for use of [the drugs] under medical supervision." 21 U.S.C.
§ 812(b)(1). Add. A.
12

The Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs ["BNDD"], the predecessor agency
to the Drug Enforcement Administration ["DEA"], promulgated regulations to implement
the CSA. The BNDD promulgated 21 C.F.R. § 1307.31 in 1965 and presented it to Congress
in 1970 (attached in Addendum C). The regulation states that "[t]he listing of peyote as a
controlled substance in Schedule I does not apply to the nondrug use of peyote in bona fide
religious ceremonies of the Native American Church, and members of the Native American
Church so using peyote are exempt from registration. . . . " 21 C.F.R. § 1307.31. Add. C.
2. The United States' government's duty to tribes
In 1974, the United States Supreme Court issued Morton v. Mancari, All U.S. 535
(1974). In Morton, a group of non-Indian employees of the Bureau of Indian Affairs raised
a Fifth-Amendment challenge to the agency's hiring preference for Indian employees. Id.
at 539. The Court rejected the Morton plaintiffs' claim that the preference amounted to
"invidious racial discrimination." Id. at 553. The Court noted in its opinion "the unique
legal status of Indian tribes under federal law" and "the plenary power of Congress, based
on a history of treaties and the assumption of a 'guardian-ward' status, to legislate on behalf
of federally recognized Indian tribes." Id. at 551.
The opinion lists numerous examples of instances in which the United States Supreme
Court "specifically has upheld legislation that singles out Indians for particular and special
treatment," and it stated that "[a]s long as the special treatment can be tied rationally to the
fulfillment of Congress' unique obligation toward the Indians, such legislative judgments
will not be disturbed." Id. at 554-55. The Court emphasized that it was not sanctioning a
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"racial" preference where the BIA hiring "preference is not directed towards a 'racial' group
consisting of 'Indians....'" Id. at 553, n.24. Instead, the preference was "only to members
of 'federally recognized' tribes," making the preference "political rather than racial in
nature." Id.
3. The American Indian Religious Freedom Act
As part of its obligation to legislate on behalf of federally-recognized tribal Indians,
Congress enacted The American Indian Religious Freedom Act (42 U.S.C. §
1996)["AIRFA"] in 1978 (attached in Addendum D).6 AIRFA demonstrates Congress'
recognition that traditional Native American culture and religion are inseparable. AIRFA
formalizes a government-wide
policy of the United States to protect and preserve for American Indians their
inherent right of freedom to believe, express, and exercise the traditional
religions of the American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut, and Native Hawaiians,
including but not limited to access to sites, use and possession of sacred
objects, and the freedom to worship through ceremonials and traditional rites.
42 U.S.C. § 1996. Add. D. The preamble to AIRFA reflects Congress' finding that
The religious practices of the American Indian (as well as Native Alaskans and
Hawaiians) are etn integral part of their culture, traditions and heritage, such
practices forming the basis of Indian identity and value systems.
See alsoLyngv. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass >z., 485 U.S. 439,454-55 (1988).

6

Generally, Congress has the authority under the Indian Commerce Clause of the
United States Constitution, art. I, §2, cl. 3, to legislate on behalf of and for the benefit of
Indian tribes. Indian tribes are "distinct,. . . political communities" that possess "natural
rights . . . ." Worchester v. Georgia, 31 US (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832).
14

4. Amendments to AIRFA
Several years after AIRFA, the United States Supreme Court issued its opinion in
Employment Division, Dep 't ofHuman Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
In that case, the two claimants' use of peyote in connection with their membership in a
Native American Church led to their termination from a drug rehabilitation organization and
subsequent denial of unemployment compensation. Id, at 872. The United States Supreme
Court determined that the free exercise clause did not prohibit application of an Oregon law
drug law that was found to proscribe sacramental peyote use, thereby permitting the state to
deny the claimants unemployment compensation for work-related misconduct based on their
peyote use. Id. at 890.7 The Smith Court reiterated, however, that the federal government
has broad legal authority, via legislation and related implementing executive action, to
protect Indian culture and religion, including Indian use of peyote for religious purposes. Id.
Smith also held that states could pass generally applicable laws not aimed at promoting or
restricting religious beliefs that prohibit the religious use of drugs, and that states could, but
need not, permit an exception for a religious use of the prohibited drugs. Id. at 890.
In response to Smith, Congress amended AIRFA in 1994, to specifically and expressly
protect Indian use of peyote for traditional, bona fide Indian religious purposes because such
protection is rationally tied to the United States' obligation to protect Indian religion, culture,

7

The Court also rejected the claim that, at the least, the government has to show a
compelling interest in forbidding the religious use of peyote to survive a free exercise
challenge. 494 U.S. at 882-85.
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and self-determination. See American Indian Religious Freedom Act Amendments, 42
U.S.C. § 1996a ["AIRFAA"] (attached in Addendum D). In doing so, Congress preempted
states from regulating in this area. Id. at § 1996a(b)(l). Add. D. AIRFAA provides that
"[notwithstanding any other provision of law, the use, possession, or transportation of
peyote by an Indian for bona fide traditional ceremonial purposes in connection with the
practice of a traditional Indian religion is lawful, and shall not be prohibited by the Untied
States or any State." Id. (emphasis added). Add. D. "Indian" is defined in AIRFAA as "a
member of an Indian tribe." 42 U.S.C. § 1996a(c)(l). Add. D.
In drafting the amendments, Congress drew on the trust responsibility described in
Morton, stating that "for many Indian people, the traditional ceremonial use of the peyote
cactus as a religious sacrament has for centuries been integral to a way of life, and significant
in perpetuating Indian tribes and cultures." 42 U.S.C. §1996a(a)(l); see also H.R. Report
103-675, 1994 U.S.C.C. A.N. 2404 (attached in Addendum D). In a section of the House
Report discussing the constitutionality of the proposed bill, the Report notes that "[bjecause
Indians and Indian tribes occupy a sui generis legal status in Federal law under the U.S.
Constitution and enjoy a special political relationship with the United States Government,
separate Indian legislation has consistently been upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court under the
legal principles set forth mMorton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551-55 (1974)." H.R. Report
103-675,1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2404,2410. Add. D. The report also quotes extensively from
Peyote Way Church of God v. Thornburgh, 922 F.2d 1210 (5th Cir. 1991). Peyote Way
involved a church that "subscribes to many tenets similar to those of the NAC" and that had
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a majority of non-Indian members. Id. at 1213. In Peyote Way, the Fifth Circuit Court
upheld the exclusion of the non-Indian "peyote" group from protection under the same
C.F.R. exemption at issue here. Id. at 1213-16. The Court reasoned that the peyote group,
the Peyote Way Church of God, was not similarly situated with the NAC, and that the
group's use of peyote was not rationally related to the legitimate governmental objective of
preserving Native American culture. Id. at 1216. The Court noted that
the federal NAC exemption allowing tribal Native Americans to continue their
centuries-old tradition of peyote use is rationally related to the legitimate
governmental objective of preserving Native American culture. Such
preservation is fundamental to the federal government's trust relationship with
tribal Native Americans. Under Morton, Peyote Way's members are not
similarly situated to those of the NAC for purposes of cultural preservation and
thus, the federal government may exempt NAC members from statutes
prohibiting peyote possession without extending the exemption to Peyote
Way's membership.
Id. (emphasis added). Because of Morton, and the fact that the "record conclusively
demonstrates that NAC membership is limited to Native American members of federally
recognized tribes," the Court held that the federal government could constitutionally exempt
NAC members from statutes prohibiting peyote possession without extending that exemption
to Peyote Way. Id.
Based largely on the analysis in Peyote Way, the House Report expressed confidence
"that the granting of a statutory religious exemption for the sacramental use of peyote solely
by American Indians presents no equal protection or establishment clause problems." H.R.
Report 103-675, 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2411. Add. D.
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B.

The Pevote Exemption Should Not Be Deemed Incorporated Into Utah's Statutes
Under AIRFAA, the State cannot criminalize peyote use by Indians for bona fide

religious use. See 42 U.S.C. § 1996a; see also H.R. Rep. No. 103-675, reprinted in 1994
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2404,2411. Add. D. Defendants essentially ignore AIRFAA, both below and
on appeal, and the trial court focused primarily on the C.F.R.8 Defendants argue for
incorporation of the C.F.R. apparently because the narrow exception carved out by AIRFAA
does not help these defendants. As stated, no evidence presented below showed that the
members to whom defendants provided peyote were Indian or had any tribal affiliation.
Defendants focus on the C.F.R. because its language appears to be broader than AIRFAA.
However, because the exemption should not be deemed incorporated into the Utah
statute, the "broader" interpretation urged by defendants does not apply here. Utah's statute
provides that it is illegal to possess any listed controlled substance "[u]nless specifically
excepted or unless listed in another schedule . . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-4. Add. A.
Peyote is listed both in Utah's schedule I and in the federal schedule. See Utah Code Ann.
§ 58-37-4(2)(A)(III)(Q); see also 21 U.S.C.A. § 812. Add. A. Nothing in either law
"specifically except[s]" peyote. The exception defendants argue for exists in a federal
administrative regulation which is not binding on State courts. Cf. Batterton v. Francis, 432

AIRFAA is necessary to this appeal as it represents, through its language and
legislative history, a clear demonstration of congressional and BNDD/DEA intent behind
the C.F.R. at issue. See Point I, infra. It also demonstrates Congress' understanding of
the government's duty to legislate only on behalf of Indians who are members of
federally-recognized tribes in order to avoid constitutional conflicts.
18

U.S. 416, 424 (1977) (federal courts need not give administrative regulations controlling
weight). Hence, the plain statutory language does not provide for incorporation of the C.F.R.
peyote exemption, leaving untouched Utah's prohibition against peyote use by anyone except
those covered by AIRFAA.
C.

Even Assuming Incorporation. The Exemption Does Not Encompass The Use Of
Peyote By Non-Indians, Permitting The Instant Prosecution For Distribution To
Non-Indians
Even assuming incorporation of the exemption, it would not prevent the instant

prosecution because the exemption does not read any broader than AIRFAA and, hence, does
not apply to the religious use of peyote by non-Indians.
By its terms, the federal exemption applies "to the nondrug use of peyote in bona fide
religious ceremonies of the Native American Church, and [to] members of the Native
American Church[.]" 21 C.F.R. §1307.31. Add. C. Defendants argue that the plain
language of this exemption, the absence of any qualifying language in Utah's statute, and the
determination by Chief Judge Buciagafromthe New Mexico federal district court that Native
American Churches have historically opened their doors to non-Indians, combine to require
that the peyote exemption applies to any and all members of any Native American church.
Br. of Aplts. at 23-34. The question then is whether members of the Native American
Church, as used in the C.F.R., includes non-Indians.9

defendants argue that they have established themselves as a valid NAC. Br. of
Aplts. at 13-14, 18-19. However, there has been no litigation in this case to date to
establish a definition of NAC or to determine whether defendants fit within it, not only
because the motion to dismiss was addressed only after the preliminary hearing and was
19

1. BNDD/DEA and Congress
Defendants argue that the Utah legislature's intent dictates the scope of the C.F.R.'s
exemption. Br. of Aplts. at 27-29. However, the legislature simply incorporated the
Controlled Substances Act without any language suggesting that the federal Act or any
enabling regulations was to be interpreted any differently than it is applied by the federal
government. Moreover, because defendants rely on a federal exemption, they should be
bound by the federal interpretation of that exemption.
"It is well established 'that an agency's construction of its own regulations is entitled
to substantial deference.'" Martin v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm 'n, 499
U.S. 144,150 (1991) (quoting Lyng, 476 U.S. at 939). Where "'the meaning of [regulatory]
language is not free from doubt,' the reviewing court should give effect to the agency's
interpretation so long as it is 'reasonable,' Ehlert v. United States, 402 U.S. 99,105,91 S.Ct.
1319, 1323,28 L.Ed.2d 625 (1971), that is, so long as the interpretation 'sensibly conforms
to the purpose and wording of the regulations.'" Martin, 499 U.S. at 150-51 (quoting
Northern Indiana Pub. Serv. Co. v. Porter County Chapter of Izaak Walton League of
America, Inc., 423 U.S. 12,15(1975)). Because the definition of "Native American Church"
in 21 C.F.R. § 1307.31 is not entirely free from doubt, attention must turn to evidence of the
intent behind the regulation.

submitted without an evidentiary hearing, but also because the prosecutor did not need to
litigate the issue because he can prevail on the charges by establishing that defendants
distributed peyote to non-Indians, regardless of the validity of the church. Moreover, the
issue is the intent behind the C.F.R., not the definition to be established by this trial court.
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Both Congress and the BNDD, the agency which promulgated 21 C.F.R. § 1307.31,
interpret the term "Native American Church" as including only Indians. This is evident by
the fact that when the House Subcommittee on Native American Affairs held hearings on
AIRFAA in 1994, the DEA provided a statement for the record relating to the C.F.R. at issue
in this case. Gene R. Haislip, Deputy Assistant Administrator of the DEA's Office of
Diversion Control, remarked that:
Almost 25 years ago when Congress began hearings pertaining to the
Controlled Substances Act (CS A) they decided that the traditional, historic use
of peyote by members of the Native American Church (NAC) as a sacrament
in traditional religious ceremonies warranted a specific exemption. Congress
determined, to be consistent with past Federal practice, this exemption should
be specified in regulation rather than in law. Consequently, an exception was
createdfor the NA C to use peyote for religious purposes. A Ithough the NAC
is not defined in the subject regulations, the members of this church are
required to be Native American.
H.R. Report 103-675, 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2415 (emphasis added). Add. D. In expressing
qualified support for the proposed legislation, Mr. Haislip also noted that "[although we at
DEA feel that the regulation that has been in place for almost 25 years has worked well, we
would prefer a statutory exemption over an administrative exemption." H.R. Report 103675, 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2416. Add. D. Congressional Representative Bill Richardson
voiced the same belief in introducing AIRFAA. He stated that the proposed law would
"make statutory the protection now provided by Federal regulation and the laws of 28 States
for the religious use of peyote by Indian practitioners." 140 Cong. Rec. E686-03,1994 WL
132859. The quoted comments make it clear that both Congress and the DEA viewed the
new law as a statutory version of the existing regulation and contemplated that both made
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an exception only for Indians. Had either Congress or the DEA interpreted the earlier
regulation to apply to both non-Indian and Indian church members, as do defendants, the
enactment of the statutory exemption in AIRFAA-which expressly extends only to members
of Indian tribes-would have marked a significant departure from the regulatory policy,
contrary to the quoted comments. See also United States v. Boyll, 11A F. Supp. 1333, 1335
(D.N.M. 1991) ("The United States adopts a racially restrictive reading of 21 C.F.R. §
1307.31, arguing that the protection contained therein applies only to members of the Native
American Church who are American Indians.")
2. Federal courts9 interpretation
In 1991, the Fifth Circuit Court examined the ethnic makeup of the NAC, stating, "We
must look to the evidence to determine whether NAC membership presupposes tribal
affiliation and Native American ancestry, and thus effects a political classification under
Morton." Peyote Way Church of God v. Thornburgh, 922 F.2d 1210, 1215 (5th Cir. 1991).
The court then found "that the record conclusively demonstrates that NAC membership is
limited to Native American members of federally recognized tribes who have at least 25%
Native American ancestry, and therefore represents a political classification." Id. at 1216.
See also Morton, 417 U.S. at 559 n.24; United States v. Warner, 595 F. Supp. 595, 600
(D.N.D. 1989); State v. Whittingham, 19 Ariz. App. 27, 504 P.2d 950, 951 (1973), cert,
denied, 417 U.S. 946 (1974) (recognizing that the NAC is "primarily an 'Indian religion' by
reason of its origins and in the context that substantially all of its members are American
Indians").
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3. Defendants9 reliance on United States v. Bovll
Defendants rely on United States v. Boyll, 114 F. Supp. 1333 (D.N.M. 1991), to
support their interpretation of "Native American Church" in the exemption. Br. of Aplts. at
27,29-34. Boyll was a non-Indian who claimed membership in an NAC and was prosecuted
for his religious use of peyote. 774 F.Supp. at 1334-35. The district court in Boyll interpreted
the exemption to encompass all NAC members, regardless of race, and that to hold otherwise
would be to sanction a racially-biased, unconstitutional regulatory interpretation. Id. at 133639. Boyll represents the sole opinion of a New Mexico federal district judge. It is a unique
opinion which runs contrary to federal appellate court decisions without recognizing that
fact. The court made no attempt to reconcile its position with any other court's contrary
position and, despite professing to look at the history of the church, failed to recognize its
Native American origins.
More important, the Boyll judge purported to undertake what he deemed an "essential"
examination of the history and present structure of the peyote religion, the Native American
Church, and 21 C.F.R. § 1307.31 before rendering his ruling. 774 F. Supp. at 1335.
However, a close review of the court's opinion reveals that it gave the matter only cursory
and selective treatment. The court in Boyll did not reach the Morton Equal Protection
principles that control disposition of defendants' equal protection claim here.
The court's selective analysis is readily seen in its reference to the testimony of an
official from the BNDD at a hearing in 1970. The Boyll court quoted the following passage
in support of its determination that the regulatory peyote exemption was intended to apply
23

to all members of the NAC: "We consider the Native American Church to be sui generis.
The history and tradition of the church is such that there is no question but that they regard
peyote as a deity as it were, and we will continue the exemption." 774 F.2d at 1339
(emphasis by court).
The full testimony by Mr. Sonnenreich of the BNDD, and the original question posed
by Congressman Satterfield of Virginia, reveals the opposite intent—that the regulation was
intended to include only Indians within its protection.
[By] Mr. Satterfield. I have one other question. I recall when we were
discussing dangerous drugs a few years ago, the question came up about the
Native American Church involving Indians in the west who use and have for
centuries used peyote in connection with religious services. It is my
understanding that they enjoy an exemption under the current law.
[By] Mr. Sonnenreich. In the first instance, Mr. Satterfield, the Native
American Church did ask us by letter as to whether or not the regulation,
exempting them by regulation, would be continued and we assured them it
would be because of the history of the church. We presently are involved in
another hearing regarding another church that is a non-Indian church that is
seeking the exemption and the order is going to be published[J I believe,
either today or tomorrow denying them the same exemption as the Native
American Church. We consider the Native American Church to be sui generis.
The history and tradition of the church is such that there is no question but
that they regard peyote as a deity as it were, and we will continue the
exemption.
[By] Mr. Satterfield. You do not see anything in the Senate bill that would
make this impossible?
[By] Mr. Sonnenreich. No. Under the existing law originally the Congress was
going to write in a specific exemption but it was then decided that it would be
handled by regulation and we intend to do it the same way under this law.
[By] Mr. Satterfield. Thank you. I have no other questions.
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Drug Abuse Control Amendments of 1970, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Public
Health & Welfare of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, House of
Representatives, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 117-18 (1970) (emphasis added).
The foregoing exchange evinces a clear intent on the part of both the DEA and
Congress at the time the CSA was enacted to deny protective status to non-Indians who
attempt to use peyote for religious reasons. See also Warner, 595 F.Supp. at 598.
In addition, Boy 11 preceded Congress' enactment of AIRFAA in 1994, which clarified
that the peyote exemption has its roots in the unique trust relationship between the federal
government and Indian tribes. 42 U.S.C. § 1996a. The State has found no federal court
opinions issued after AIRFAA's enactment which have extended the federal peyote
exemption to non-Indians.
Thus, contrary to the Boy 11 court's interpretation, the regulation is not plainly intended
to include non-Indians within its protection.

Instead, as originally conceived and

implemented in 1965, and as represented to Congress in 1970, it was intended to apply only
to the bona fide religious use of peyote by tribal Indians.
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POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT THE
REGULATORY EXEMPTION DOES NOT VIOLATE THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION
Defendants challenge the federal constitutionality of the trial court's interpretation of
the C.F.R. under both the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment10. Br. of Aplts. at 59-65. Under the
appropriate tests, the trial court's restriction of the regulatory exemption violates neither
federal constitutional provision.11
A.

Limiting The Exception To Indians Associated With Federally-Recognized
Tribes Does Not Violate Federal Equal Protection Provisions
Defendants contend that the trial court's interpretation of the federal peyote exemption

subjects similarly-situated members of the NAC to different legal consequences based solely
on their race and political status, in violation of federal equal protection rights. Br. of Aplts.
at 60-65. They argue that no justifiable basis exists for extending the exemption to Indian-

1

defendants' establishment clause argument is presented on appeal as a state
constitutional argument only. Br. of Aplts. at 37-38. Defendants made no federal
establishment clause argument below and present none on appeal.
ll

The State has renumbered the issues raised in defendants' brief, presenting in
Point II its response to defendants' federal constitutional claims set forth in Point III of
defendants' opening brief. The State has moved its discussion of defendants' state
constitutional claims to Point III because defendants did not preserve those claims for
appeal, and the State's waiver argument adds nothing of merit to the claims addressed in
Points I and II herein.
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ancestried NAC members tied to federally-recognized tribes while excluding all other NAC
members from legally practicing their chosen religion. Id.
The Equal Protection Clause "is essentially a direction that all persons similarly
situated should be treated alike." City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, A13 U.S. 432,
439 (1985) (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982)). The United States Supreme
Court has explained that "equal protection analysis requires strict scrutiny of a legislative
classification . . . when the classification impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a
fundamental right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class." Massachusetts
Board of Retirement v. Murgia, All U.S. 307, 312 (1976). Defendants argue that "strict
scrutiny" applies because the trial court's interpretation of the peyote exemption interferes
with fundamental religious rights and operates to the disadvantage of a similarly-situated
suspect class (i.e., "non-Indian members of the Native American Church"). Br. of Aplts. at
60-65.
This case represents an exception to the "strict scrutiny" test because the regulation
of Indian affairs stands in a unique position when subjected to an equal protection analysis.
The United States Supreme Court has determined that equal protection challenges to
regulations involving Indian affairs are reviewed under a "rational relationship" analysis, not
under "strict scrutiny." See Morton, 417 U.S. at 554. That test provides that so long as the
challenged regulation is rationally related to the government's unique duty and responsibility
toward the Indians, it will not violate equal protection. See Morton, 417 U.S. at 554; Rupert
v. Director\ US Fish and Wildlife Service, 957 F.2d 32, 33 (1st Cir. 1992). That duty arises
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from a history of treaties and the assumption of a "guardian-ward" status by the government
toward tribal Indians. See Morton, 417 U.S. at 552. The Court in Morton explained that to
apply the normal formalistic reasoning of strict scrutiny would ignore both the history and
the purposes behind the preference and the unique legal relationship between the federal
government and tribal Indians. Id. at 550.
Morton was the BIA case explained in Point I, supra, in which the United States
Supreme Court rejected the plaintiffs' Fifth Amendment challenge to the BIA's hiring
preference for Indians, including the plaintiffs' claim that the preference amounted to
"invidious racial discrimination." Id. at 551. In explaining its decision, the Court took note
of "the unique legal status of Indian tribes under federal law" and of "the plenary power of
Congress, based on a history of treaties and the assumption of a 'guardian-ward' status, to
legislate on behalf of federally recognized Indian tribes." Id. The Court stated that "[a]s
long as the special treatment [given such Indians] can be tied rationally to the fulfillment of
Congress' unique obligation toward the Indians, such legislative judgments will not be
disturbed." Id. at 554-55. Because the preference at issue was "not directed towards a
'racial' group consisting of'Indians'" but rather "only to members of'federally recognized'
tribes[,]" the Court's holding did not sanction a "racial" preference but a "political" one. Id.
at 553, n. 24. To hold otherwise, the Court said, would be to effectively erase Title 25 of the
U.S. Code (dealing with Indian tribes, reservations and tribal Indians living on or near
reservations), thereby jeopardizing the solemn commitment of the government toward the
Indians. Id. at 552-53.
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In other words, Congress may not legislate on behalf of specific religions or specific
races, even the Indian race; but it may legislate on behalf of those to whom its recognized
unique responsibilities are owed—i.e., Indians belonging to federally-recognized tribes. In
that case, congressional acts are deemed "political rather than racial in nature" and will be
deemed valid. See Morton, 417 U.S. at 555; Warner, 595 F. Supp. at 600-01.

The

exemption at issue here fits within this category.
Defendants recognize the political distinction in Morton and insist that the distinction
between members made in this case is racial as opposed to political. Br. of Aplts. at 63-65.
They claim that while Morton involved "issues of Indian self-government and tribal
sovereignty," this case involves the "free exercise rights ofNative American Indian members
of the Native American Church." Id. at 64-65.12 Consequently, they contend, the Morton
analysis is inapplicable. Id.
Defendants' brief attempt at distinguishing the "factual context" of this case from
Morton includes a footnote acknowledging that their argument is based, in part, "on a panel
decision of the Tenth Circuit, In the Matter of Saenz, No. 00-2166 (2001 WL 892631) (10th

1

defendants suggest in a footnote that the U.S. Supreme Court has limited Morton
solely to issues concerning the BIA. Br. of Aplts. at 64-65, n.20 (quoting from Rice v.
Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 519-20 (2000)). However, Rice seems to assume the continued
validity of Morton. While it refers to the Morton exception as "limited," the Rice court
lists Morton, together with other cases, as establishing the proposition that "Congress may
fulfill its treaty obligations and its responsibilities to the Indian tribes by enacting
legislation dedicated to their circumstances and needs." Rice, 528 U.S. at 519-20.
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Cir. 2001).13 Br. of Aplts. at 65, n.21. In that decision, the Tenth Circuit Court determined
that Saenz was entitled to the return of eagle feathers the government had taken from him.
That decision has no application here for several reasons. First, Saenz was a Native
American, albeit from a non-federally-recognized tribe. See United States v. Hardman, 297
F.3d 1116, 1119 (10th Cir. 2002). In this case, only one of the named defendants has made
such a claim, although the trial judge found it to be less than credible on the evidence before
him (R. 245, 269-62).
Second, Saenz was before the court because of his own use of the eagle feathers in the
practice of his own religious beliefs. 297 F.3d at 1119-20. Defendants here are charged with
distributing peyote to non-qualifying church members: none of the OENAC members who
testified at the preliminary hearing was Native American. Consequently, this matter does not
involve the rights of only "Native American Indian members of the Native American
Church[,]" as defendants claim. Br. of Aplts. at 64-65.
Third, the ultimate holding in Saenz on rehearing was "extremely narrow" and was
based on statutory grounds alone, permitting the court to avoid the constitutional issues
raised in that case (free exercise and equal protection). See Hardman, 297 F.3d at 1124,

u

Saenz was subsequently vacated, reheard, and decided by the Tenth Circuit, en
banc, with two other cases, in United States v. Hardman, 297 F.3d 1116, 1118 (10th Cir.
2002).
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1127-31, 1135-36. Moreover, the statute that served as the basis for the decision, the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act ["RFRA"], is not at issue in this case.14
Finally, it is well-settled that the regulation of the religion practiced by the tribal
Native Americans to whom the government owes its special duty necessarily involves issues
of "Indian self-government and tribal sovereignty." Br. of Aplts. at 64-65. As Congress has
recognized, religion is an integral part of the Indian existence, culture and self-government.
There is a unique linkage between the religious, cultural, and ceremonial life of Indian people
and the survival of their communities as separate self-governing people. Indian culture and
religion are central to tribal community cohesion and the Indian sense of tribal identity,
political autonomy, and, therefore, the very sovereignty of Indian tribes. See AIRFA
preamble ("[T]he religious practices of the American Indian (as well as Native Alaskans and

l4

In ruling in favor of Saenz, the court noted that it was unable to "give weight to
[the government's] persuasive authority [that 'the regulations at issue are the least
restrictive means of advancing the government's interests'] . .. given the poorly
developed record[.]" 297 F.3d at 1131-32. The court then went on to fault the
government's failure to show that "limiting permits for eagle feathers only to members of
federally recognized tribes is the least restrictive means of advancing the government's
interest in preserving eagle populations and protecting Native American culture." Id.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reached the opposite decision in United States
v. Antoine,
F.3d
, 2003 WL 203114 (9th Cir. 2003), disagreeing with the Tenth
Circuit's analysis. There, the Ninth Circuit determined, on a record "no less extensive"
than that in Hardman, that RFRA does not require the showing required by the Hardman
court, and that "the consequences of extending eligibility are predictable from the nature
of the repository program" at issue. Id. at HN 4. The Court noted that the defendant was
not excluded from the permit program based on his religion but because he was not a
member of a recognized tribe, that "there is certainly a rational basis for the [federallyrecognized tribe] membership requirement^" and that "[t]he government has a
compelling interest in eagle protection that justifies" its allocation decision where any
"reconfiguration would necessarily restrict someone's free exercise." Id. at HN 6.
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Hawaiians) are an integral part of their culture, traditions and heritage, such practices
forming the basis of Indian identity and value systems."); 42 U.S.C. §1996a(a)(l) ("[F]or
many Indian people, the traditional ceremonial use of the peyote cactus as a religious
sacrament has for centuries been integral to a way of life, and significant in perpetuating
Indian tribes and cultures."); 42 U.S.C. § 1996(a)(5) (referencing Congressional declarations
that AIRFAA was enacted because "the lack of adequate and clear legal protection for the
religious use of peyote by Indians may serve to stigmatize and marginalize Indian tribes and
cultures, and increase the risk that they will be exposed to discriminatory treatment"). In
order to foster Indian self-government and sovereignty, Congress must also protect the
religious, ceremonial, and cultural lives of those Indians. Without the use of peyote, the
Indian religion will not survive. See, e.g., Warner, 595 F. Supp. at 601 (recognizing that the
"use of peyote is necessary to the survival of Indian religion"); Peyote Way Church of God,
Inc., v. Smith, 556 F. Supp. 632,637 (N.D. Tex. 1983) (acknowledging the same as set forth
in ARFRA).
Moreover, federal courts have found Morton principles to be applicable in the area of
religion. See Rupert, 957 F.2d at 34-35; Peyote Way Church of God, 922 F.2d at 1216;
United States v. Rush, 738 F.2d497, 513 (1st Cir. 1984), cert, denied, 470 U.S. 1004 (1985);
McBride v. Shawnee County, Kansas Court Services, 71 F. Supp. 2d 1098,1102-03 (D. Kan.
1999) (discussing a state-law peyote exemption and noting that Native American religion
"allows Native Americans to bond spiritually and encourages a sense of community, which
is essential to tribal self-government" and "cultural integrity"); Warner, 595 F. Supp. at 601
32

('The United States is following the policy of preserving the Indians' dependent nation and
culture by granting an exemption to Indians for the use of peyote in the religious ceremonies
oftheNAC").
The court in Rupert explained why the rational basis analysis applied to an Indianrelated law involving Indian tribes' religious use of bald eagle feathers:
In a series of equal protection cases involving laws attacked as treating
Native Americans in ways that created racial classifications, the Supreme
Court has "repeatedly held that the peculiar semisovereign and constitutionally
recognized status of Indians justifies special treatment on their behalf when
rationally related to the Government's 'unique obligation toward the Indians.'"
Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass V?.,
443 U.S. 658, 673 n.20, 99 S. Ct. 3055, 3068 n.20, 61 L.Ed. 2d 823 (1979)
(emphasis added and citation omitted). See also United States v. Antelope, 430
U.S. 641, 645-46, 97 S. Ct. 1395, 1398, 51 L.Ed. 2d 701 (1977) (upholding
federal jurisdiction over crimes committed by Native Americans on
reservations); Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes of Flathead
Reservation, 425 U.S. 463,479-81, 96 S. Ct. 1634, 1644-45, 48 L. Ed. 2d 96
(1976) (striking down state's attempt to tax property and sales on reservation);
Morton v. Mancari, 411 U.S. at 54,94 S. Ct. at 2484-85 (upholding statute and
regulation that gave preference to Native Americans in hiring and promotions
at Bureau of Indian Affairs.)
The principles affirmed in these cases "point . . . broadly to the
conclusion that federal regulation of Indian affairs is not based upon
impermissible classifications," United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 646,
97S.Ct. 1395,1399,51 L.Ed.2d701 (1977)), and we therefore see no reason
not to use the "rational relationship" analysis here, where the government has
treated Native Americans differently from others in a manner that arguably
creates a religious classification.
Rupert, 957 F.2d at 34-35.
The Fifth Circuit Court in Peyote Way Church of God similarly applied the Morton
principles to the religious use of peyote. The Fifth Circuit upheld the exclusion of a non-
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Indian "peyote" group from protection under the exemption, reasoning that the differential
treatment is attributable to the federal government's "constitutional role as protector of tribal
Native Americans" and that an exemption for non-Indians is not entitled to any such
justification. 922 F.2d at 1217. The Court emphasized that "the federal NAC exemption
allowing tribal Native Americans to continue their centuries-old tradition of peyote use is
rationally related to the legitimate governmental objective of preserving Native American
culture. Such preservation is fundamental to the federal government's trust relationship with
tribal Native Americans." Id. at 1216 (quoting Morton, 417 U.S. at 535, 554-55).
Defendants' attempt to distinguish Morton because this case involves religious
freedom and not a duty to further Indian self-government fails. Br. of Aplts. at 64-65. The
government's duty to Indians as a political group is the sole reason a peyote exemption can
exist. The government does not owe any similar duty to these non-Indian defendants. There
is no evidence that defendants stand to suffer the same potentially cultural devastating effects
attributable to tribal Indians should they be unable to partake of peyote.
Morton essentially holds that Congress may legislate for the benefit of the narrow
group of Indians who are members of a federally-recognized tribe based on the unique duty
owed by the government to those tribes, without running afoul of the federal constitution.
It does not permit Congress to regulate the entire religion or to legislate to ensure a religion's
continued existence merely because it owes a duty to some practitioners of that religion.
Neither does the fact that peyote is at the core of NAC beliefs and practices alone permit
Congress to regulate the entire religion. It is the use and importance of peyote in the religion
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coupled with the overwhelming importance of the religion to the culture and continued
existence of the federally-recognized tribes to whom the government owes the unique duty
and responsibility that permits regulation by Congress in this area.
To read the C.F.R. as broadly as defendant requires would condemn the exemption,
rendering it unconstitutionally broad in reaching beyond the narrowly identified group
recognized in Morton and thereafter in AIRFAA to amount to legislation on behalf of an
entire religion regardless of the Indian affiliation of its members. Defendants' interpretation
changes the exemption from a permissible law rationally related to the government's unique
responsibilities toward tribal Indians into a religion-based preference that has no justification,
in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Defendants provide no authority permitting
Congress to regulate the entire NAC as a religion, absent which defendants' claim that the
scope of the C.F.R. extends beyond those to whom the government's special duty is owed
is untenable.
Defendants argue that because the NAC considers peyote to be a deity, the inability
to legally use peyote prevents all individuals not encompassed within the scope of the peyote
exception from joining the church. Br. of Aplts. at 39-41. First, there is no evidence that
non-qualifying individuals cannot be included within the church and benefit from the
experiences of those who can legally use peyote in the religious ceremonies. Second,
defendants' concern that the trial court's interpretation of the exemption directly affects
membership of the NAC does not defeat the government's responsibility to legislate on
behalf of tribal Indians. Congress has not legislated with the goal of ensuring continuation
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of the NAC, nor can it. It has legislated to permit tribal Indians to participate in their chosen
religion if they so choose without risking criminal sanctions. That is as far as their
responsibility extends. Congress has repeatedly refused to sanction the use of controlled
substances by other individuals and religions, and to do otherwise in this case for these
defendants would amount to an unjustifiable religious preference. See, e.g., Peyote Way, 922
F.2d at 1211-20 (refusing to grant to defendants, worshippers of peyote but not part of the
Native American Church, the peyote exemption enjoyed by NAC members); Olsen v. Drug
Enforcement Administration, 878 F.2d 1458, 1464 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (denying the Ethiopian
Zion Coptic Church an exemption for their use of marijuana which would be similar to the
exemption utilized by the NAC); McBride, 71 F. Supp. 2d at 1101 (refusing relief to a
religious order centered on marijuana who sought the same treatment as the NAC and their
use of peyote).
Under federal law, therefore, the trial court's determination that the preference given
to tribal Indian NAC members is "clearly not racial in nature, but political" is correct (R.
265). Given the importance and integral nature of Indian religion to Indian life and selfgovernment, and the importance and integral nature of peyote (a deity) to Indian religion {see
42 U.S.C. §§ 1996 & 1996a), the special and particular treatment given Indians in the form
of the peyote exemption should not be disturbed, but should be deemed rationally tied to the
fulfillment of the government's unique obligation toward the Indians. Hence, defendants'
federal equal protection challenge fails. See Morton, 417 U.S. at 554-55 ("As long as the
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special treatment can be tied rationally to the fulfillment of Congress' unique obligation
toward the Indians, such legislative judgments will not be disturbed.").
Thus, as the trial court recognized, the proper test is the "rational relationship" test.
The trial court correctly found that "the preference given to Indians in the application of 21
C.F.R. § 1307.31 is tied rationally to the fulfillment of the State's unique obligation toward
the Indians and does not violate Defendants' rights to equal protection" (R. 265).
B.

Limitation Of The Peyote Exemption To NAC Members Associated With
Federally-Recognized Tribes Does Not Violate The First Amendment Freedom
Of Religion Clause
Defendants claim that their possession and distribution of peyote in conjunction with

bona fide religious ceremonies of the NAC is an activity protected in its entirety under the
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Br. of Aplts. at 59-60. They contend that they
established below that, to the members of the OENAC, "the worship of peyote as a deity and
sacrament is the heart" of their religious worship.15 Id. at 39. Thus, defendants claim, the
trial court's ruling that only Indian members of a federally-recognized tribe escape criminal
liability for religious use of peyote necessarily burdens the remaining members' free exercise
of their religious beliefs. Id. at 39-40. They argue that the broad language of the C.F.R.
permitting peyote use by members of the NAC evidences an overriding compelling interest
in protecting the free exercise of religion for all members of the NAC, irrespective of tribal
membership. They assert that the State has failed to prove that religion-related use of peyote

15

Again, this claim is based solely on defendants' self-serving affidavits and
involves a fact on which the trial court has not yet ruled. See footnote 5, supra.
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by non-Indian NAC members and by Indian members without a federally-recognized tribal
affiliation poses more of a threat to public health, safety, and welfare than the religious use
of peyote by those NAC members included within the trial court's ruling. Id. at 44-45. In
other words, defendants contend that the State failed to prove that the trial court's
interpretation of the C.F.R. was the least restrictive means of achieving any compelling
interest of the State. Id. at 60.
"When presented with a constitutional challenge to a law, [the appellate court]
presume[s] the law is valid." Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234,1248 (Utah 1998), cert, denied,
526 U.S. 1130 (1999). "A party mounting such a challenge bears a heavy burden to
overcome this presumption, and "'we resolve any reasonable doubts in favor of
constitutionality.'" Id. (quoting Dennis v. Summit County, 933 P.2d 387, 389 (Utah 1997)
(additional quotations omitted)).
Traditionally, an inroad on religious liberty may be justified under the Free Exercise
Clause upon a showing that it is the least restrictive means of achieving some compelling
governmental interest. Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security
Division, 450 U.S. 707,718 (1981); see also Semeco Industries, Inc. v. Auditing Division of
the Utah State Tax Comm 'n, 849 P.2d 1167, 1186 (Utah 1993). Defendants advocate, and
the trial court used, this traditional "compelling interest" test, which requires a determination
of whether the government's action in fact creates a burden on the Defendants' religion and,
if so, whether there is a compelling reason for the government's action. Id. at 47-48, 59-60.
It also requires a showing that the governmental action is the least restrictive means of
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accomplishing the desired end (R. 266). Br. of Aplts. at 42-43,59-60; see also Thomas, 450
U.S. at 718; Warner, 595 F. Supp. at 599.
Recent United States Supreme Court Free Exercise Clause cases impose a less rigid
test and provide that "a state law that incidentally burdens the exercise of religion is not
unconstitutional so long as the law is not intended to burden free exercise, is of generally
applicability, and is otherwise valid." Jeffs, 970 P.2d at 1249. In Employment Div. Dept. of
Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), the United States Supreme Court stated that it
had "never held that an individual's religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an
otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate." Id. at 878-79,
reh g denied 495 U.S. 913 (1990). The Court noted its consistent rulings "that the right of
free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a ' valid and
neutral law of generally applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes)
conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes) [.]'" Id. at 879 (quoting United States v.
Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 253 n.3 (1982)).
While the less rigorous test of Smith appears to apply to this case, this Court need not
decide the issue because defendants' argument fails even under the more rigorous compelling
state interest test.
There are two valid compelling interests behind the challenged exemption in this case.
First is the State's and the federal government's legitimate and compelling interest "in
protecting society from illegal drug use," including the use of peyote by non-exempted
individuals (R. 266-65). The other is the government's "constitutional role as protector of
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tribal Native Americans" and its trust relationship with tribal Native Americans that requires
the government's active participation in preserving the Native American culture and selfgovernment. See Peyote Way Church of God, 922 F.2d at 1216-17; see also Mancari, 417
U.S. at 535, 554-55.
The main objective of the Controlled Substance Act of 1970 is to comprehensively
deal with the growing menace of drug abuse in the United States. See H.R. Rep. No. 911444, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1970 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 4566,4567.
See also Warner, 595 F. Supp. at 598-99. The CSA evinces Congress' intent to protect the
American public from the obvious dangers of drugs. See 21 U.S.C. § 801(2). The CSA lists
peyote as a Schedule I drug, making no distinction between or comparison of the relative
dangers of peyote versus any other listed drug. 21 U.S.C. § 812 (c). Under the framework
of the CSA, the placement of peyote in Schedule I reflects that peyote "has a high potential
for abuse," that peyote "has no currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United
States," and that "[t]here is a lack of accepted safety for use of [peyote] under medical
supervision." 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1); see also Warner, 595 F. Supp. at 598. At a minimum,
it reflects that peyote may present a substantial and detrimental effect to the health and
general welfare of the American public. See 21 U.S.C. § 801(2). Nothing in the CSA
suggests that peyote is worthy of any lesser concern than any other drug listed in the
schedules. Utah's statute also lists peyote as a Schedule I drug, reflecting the State's
agreement that peyote poses a substantial threat to the public and should be regulated. See
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-4(2)(a)(iii)(Q).
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Congress' compelling interest in controlling the use of dangerous drugs has been
widely recognized and does not lessen even when the drugs are used for religious purposes.
See Warner, 595 F. Supp. at 599; United States v. Middleton, 690 F.2d 820, 825 (11th Cir.
1982), cert, denied, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983) (citing United States v. Hudson, 431 F.2d 468,469
(5th Cir. 1970), cert, denied, 400 U.S. 1011 (1971) (the use of drugs as part of religious
practice is not constitutionally privileged)). Utah's interest in controlling the use of Schedule
1 drugs is no less compelling, especially where the language of our relevant criminal statutes
echoes the federal prohibitions and named drugs.
The existence of the exemption in 21 C.F.R. § 1307.31 does not lessen that
compelling interest. The language of the exemption itself demonstrates that Congress did
not intend to grant a broad exemption for the religious use of peyote to everyone, but instead
sought to limit the exemption only to Indians. Also, BNDD officials expressly informed
Congress that the administrative exemption applied only to the NAC and that they were
about to deny an exemption to a non-Indian church because of the absence from that church's
background of the same unique history and tradition regarding peyote use that existed behind
the NAC. See Hearings on H.R. 11701 and H.R. 13743 before the Subcomm. on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce 117-18 (1970); see also Warner, 595 F. Supp. at 598.
The government's interest in meeting its trust relationship with tribal Native
Americans is equally compelling. See generally subpoint IIIA, supra; see also Peyote Way
Church of God, 922 F.2d at 1216 ("[T]he federal NAC exemption allowing tribal Native
Americans to continue their centuries-old tradition of peyote use is rationally related to the
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legitimate governmental objective of preserving Native American culture.

Such

preservation is fundamental to the federal government's trust relationship with tribal Native
Americans.") (quoting Morton, All U.S. at 535, 554-55). No such relationship or trust
responsibility exists between the government and non-Indians or Indians having no affiliation
with a federally-recognized tribe. As stated, none of the members of the OENAC who
testified at the preliminary hearing were Indian, let alone Indians with a federally-recognized
tribal affiliation. Some defined their tribal affiliation as the OENAC, evincing the absence
of the sort of integral relationship between the religious beliefs of the church and the culture
and definition of the tribal existence for which the government has legislated. Many testified
that they heard about the meetings, showed up, and were given peyote, suggesting that they
were not required to subscribe to the sacred beliefs of the church before being allowed to
become a member of OENAC. These individuals clearly would not suffer the same
culturally-damaging effects as would tribal Indians if denied the benefit of the peyote
exemption.
The Supreme Court has recognized that because of the religious diversity in America,
religious accommodations must vary in kind and degree. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668
(1984), reh 'g denied, 466 U.S. 994 (1984). Religious accommodations need not be equal if
there are "neutral, secular reasons," not based on religious favoritism, for distinguishing
among religions. See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972) (Buddhist prisoner denied equal
treatment in terms of chapel access and religious instruction); Gillette v. United States, 401
U.S. 437,458 (1971) (upholding a law exempting religious conscientious objectors from all
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war but not those who object to only some wars), reh g denied, 402 U.S. 934 (1971). The
same may be said of distinguishing among practitioners of a single religion.
The NAC exemption for the religious use of peyote meets this test. As explained,
Congress' interest behind the exemption is not in guarding and perpetuating the religion
practiced by the NAC by ensuring a broad membership base, but in perpetuating the ability
of Indians affiliated with a federally-recognized tribe to practice their chosen religion, which
religion is integral to their existence, their self-government, and their tribal identity. As the
exemption advances the neutral, secular objective of preserving Native American culture, it
is not based on religious favoritism. Because there are valid, neutral and secular reasons for
Congress' and the Executive Branch's accommodation of the religious use of peyote by tribal
members of the NAC, the singling out of tribal Indians for special treatment is proper and
constitutionally permissible pursuant to the United States' responsibility to protect Indian
culture and self-determination
In light of the dual compelling interests in this case, the trial court's reading of the
exemption is the least restrictive means of achieving the required balance between the
interests. The State is not free to restrict the reading of the exemption in light of AIRFAA,
which preempts the States from criminalizing the religious use of peyote by Indians affiliated
with a federally-recognized tribe. 42 U.S.C. § 1996a. Add. D. Even if a more restrictive
reading were possible, it would better serve the government's interest in protecting society,
but would defeat the government's responsibility toward federally-recognized tribes.
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Without access to the lawful use of peyote, the established deity of the religion, the religion
would not survive, and an integral part of the Indian culture and identity would cease to exist.
On the other hand, broadening the exemption to include Indian NAC members who
enjoy no affiliation with a federally-recognized tribe would do nothing to further the
government's responsibilities toward tribal Indians, and would lessen the government's
protection of the public from dangerous drug use by allowing more individuals to use peyote.
In any event, such a reading would be of no consequence in this case because defendants
have been charged with the distribution of peyote to individuals who, from the present
record, are non-Indians.
To broaden the exemption even more to include non-Indian NAC members would also
do nothing to achieve the government's purpose of furthering its solemn commitment toward
tribal Indians. At the same time, it would lessen even more the State's ability to protect the
public from use and possible misuse of a Schedule I drug by permitting its lawful use by a
larger number of people in the name of protecting a particular religion. With no compelling
reason for the broader interpretation, this result rings of religious favoritism and should be
rejected.
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POINT III
THIS COURT SHOULD DECLINE TO REVIEW DEFENDANTS'
UNPRESERVED STATE CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENTS
BECAUSE THEY NEITHER RAISED THEM BELOW NOR ARGUE
ANY EXCEPTION TO THE PRESERVATION RULE ON APPEAL
The majority of defendants' appellate brief is devoted to claiming that the trial court
erred in not including in its ruling any mention of the alleged violation of defendants' rights
under the state constitution. Br. of Aplts. at 35-59. Specifically, they claim violation of: the
religion-related provisions of Article I, sections 1 and 4, and Article III, section 1; the
uniform operations of laws provision of Article I, section 24; and the due process provision
of Article I, section 7.16 Id. This Court should decline to review defendants' state
constitutional claims because they did not adequately raise them below, and they do not
argue any exception to the preservation rule on appeal.
"As a general rule, claims not raised before the trial court may not be raised on
appeal." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ^ 11, 10 P.3d 346 (citing State v. Marvin, 964 P.2d
313, 318 (Utah 1998)); see also State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 114, U 13, 61 P.3d 1062. "[T]he
preservation rule applies to every claim, including constitutional questions." Holgate, 2000
UT 74, at K 11 (citing Monson v. Carver, 928 P.2d 1017, 1022 (Utah 1996)). For an issue
to be preserved for appeal, "'the record must clearly show that it was timely presented to the

1

defendants include a reference to their federal due process rights in arguing that
the statute should be deemed violative of their due process rights because it is
unconstitutionally vague on its face and as applied to them. Br. of Aplts. at 56-59. The
State's waiver argument applies to this claim as well inasmuch as defendant raised no
discernable due process argument below.
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trial court in a manner sufficient to obtain a ruling thereon.'" Hansen, 2002 UT 114, 1j 13
(quoting Buehner Block Co. v. UWCAssocs., 752 P.2d 892, 984 n.2 (Utah 1988)); see also
Brookside Mobile Home Park Ltd. v. Peebles, 2002 UT 48, ^ 14, 48 P.3d 968.
"The 'mere mention' [to the trial court] of an issue without introducing supporting
evidence or relevant legal authority does not preserve that issue for appeal

Rather, "'for

an issue to be sufficiently raised, even if indirectly, it must at least be raised to a level of
consciousness such that the trial judge can consider it.'" State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 361
(UtahApp. 1993) (citations omitted); see also Hansen, 2002 UT 114, f 13 (for the trial court
to have an opportunity to rule: "'(1) the issue must be raised in a timely fashion; (2) the issue
must be specifically raised; and (3) a party must introduce supporting evidence or relevant
legal authority.'") (quoting Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 966 P.2d 844, 847)(Utah 1998).
In this case, defendants mentioned the state constitution below, but they did not raise
the issue "to a level of consciousness" that permitted the trial judge to consider it. In their
opening memorandum in support of the motion to dismiss, defendants briefly mentioned the
state constitution only in the first argument (R. 170-69) (attached in Addendum E). After
arguing that the state statute incorporates the federal peyote exemption, defendants baldly
claimed that their argument was "consistent with the guarantees of religious freedom
proclaimed in Article I, Section 4 of the Constitution of the State of Utah

" (R. 171-70).

Add. E. They then included a block quote from that section of the state constitution, and
followed it with two sentences:
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The foregoing Utah constitution provision implements the mandate in
the Utah Enabling Act, that "Perfect tolerance of religious sentiment shall be
secured, and that no inhabitant of said State shall ever be molested in person
or property on account of his or her mode of religious worship." Additionally,
Article I, Section I of the Utah Constitution guarantees the right of Utah
residents "to worship according to the dictates of their own consciences" and
Article III provides for "perfect toleration of religious sentiment and
unmolested religious worship."
(R. 169). Add. E. Defendants then ended the argument with a summary claim that the State
necessarily failed to meet its burden of proof (id.). Add. E. These two paragraphs consisted
of three sentences relating to the state constitution and a block quote from that constitution.
They contained no claim of a state constitutional violation, no argument, and no supporting
authority to alert the trial court that defendants were seriously seeking a decision under the
state constitution, let alone a decision that would differ from that under the federal
constitution. No other specific claim or argument pursuant to the state constitution appeared
in the remainder of the opening memorandum.
The State's response to this state constitutional reference was: 1) to note that
defendants cited to the state constitution; and 2) to highlight the absence of any citation to
supportive authority (R.231). The State consequently urged the use of federal jurisprudence
to decide the matter (Id.).
In their reply memorandum, defendants' sole reference to the state constitution was
under the heading "The Utah Constitution Provides An Independent Basis For Dismissing
This Prosecution" (R. 248) (attached in Addendum E). The entire section consists of a
single sentence, free of any citation of authority, summarily stating that the state
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constitutional provisions cited in the opening memorandum provide equal or broader
protection than the First Amendment to the federal constitution, and required a favorable
decision for defendants (id.). Add. E.
The only mention of due process in either document is in the reply brief, where
defendants claim "it is a violation of due process" for Utah to grant an exception to NAC
members for religious use of peyote and to then criminally prosecute defendants for that
activity (R. 252). Add. E. There is no mention of whether the claim is one under the state
or the federal constitution, and there is no authority or argument presented to enlighten the
trial court.
Nothing more was added by defendants at oral argument. Defense counsel merely
mentioned the state constitution as follows (R. 286: 14):
In Utah we have the state constitution, which is even more stringent
than the federal constitution in protecting the rights of its citizens to worship
according to the dictates of their own conscience], free from molestation by
a government.
Here I think we have a constitutional argument, though I don't think the
Court has to get to the constitutional arguments in this case, but certainly it
shows that the State has no compelling interest in prosecuting people who are
properly and freely exercising their fundamental religious beliefs as members
of the Native American Church in light of the strong state constitutional
provisions providing for the full free exercise of religion
The minimal reference to the state constitution by defendants below amounts to a
"mere mention" without supporting argument or relevant legal authority. This "mention" is
insufficient to alert to trial judge to the need to consider the issue, let alone to preserve it for
appeal. This is demonstrated by the trial court's ruling, which sets forth and addresses
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defendants' arguments without reference to the state constitution (R. 267-62). Significantly,
the defendants did not seek to remedy this omission by asking for a rehearing, clarification,
or an amended ruling addressing a state constitutional claim. Consequently, this Court
should find that defendants failed to preserve the state constitutional claims for appeal and
should refuse to reach the merits of those claims.
An appellant may obtain review of an unpreserved claim by alleging plain error or
exceptional circumstances. Defendants, however, have not alleged plain error or exceptional
circumstances. This Court should therefore decline to review defendants' unpreserved state
constitutional claims. See State v. Calliham, 2002 UT 86, ^ 71, 55 P.3d 573Utah Adv. Rep.
25 (declining to review an unpreserved claim where the party failed to argue plain error or
exceptional circumstances); State v. Cramer, 2002 UT 9, ^f 33,44 P.3d 690 (same); State v.
Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 n.5 (Utah 1995) (same).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that this Court affirm the
district court's denial of defendant's motion to dismiss and remand this matter for further
proceedings.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / J

day of February, 2003.

MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Utah Attorney General

KRIS C. LEONARD
Assistant Attorney General
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UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED
1953

VOLUME 6A
1998 REPLACEMENT

Titles 58 and 58A

58-37-3. Substances considered controlled.
(1) All substances listed in Section 58-37-4 are considered controlled.
(2) All substances listed in the federal Controlled Substances Act, Title II,
PL. 91-513, are considered controlled.
History: L. 1971, c h . 145, § 3; 1979, c h . 12,
« 2; 1997, c h . 64, S 3 .
A m e n d m e n t N o t e s . — T h e 1997 amendment, effective May 5, 1997, in Subsections (1)
and (2) deleted "controlled* following "All" and
substituted "considered" for "hereby**; made stylistic changes in Subsection (2); and deleted

Subsection (3) relating to substances designated, rescheduled or deleted as controlled substances in schedules I through V of t h e federal
Controlled Substances Act.
F e d e r a l Law. — The federal Controlled Substances Act, cited in Subsections (2) and (3), is
codified primarily as 21 U.S.C. § 801 et seq.

58-37-4. Schedules of controlled substances — Schedules
I through V — Findings required — Specific
substances included in schedules.
(1) There are established five schedules of controlled substances known as
Schedules I, II, III, IV, and V which shall consist of substances listed in this
section.
(2) Schedules I, II, III, IV, and V consist of the following drugs or other
substances by the official name, common or usual name, chemical name, or
brand name designated:
(a) Schedule I:
(i) Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another schedule,
any of the following opiates, including their isomers, esters, ethers,
salts, and salts of isomers, esters, and ethers, when the existence of
the isomers, esters, ethers, and salts is possible within the specific
chemical designation:
(A) Acetyl-alphamethylfentanyl;
(B) Acetylmethadol;
(C) Allylprodine;
(D) Alphacetylmethadol (except levo-alphacetylmethadol also
known as alpha-acetylmethadol, levomethadyl acetate, or
LAAM);
(E) Alphameprodine;
(F) Alphamethadol;
(G) Alpha-methiofentanyl;
(H) Alpha-methylfentanyl;
(I) Benzethidine;
(J) Beta-hydroxy-3-methylfentanyl;
(K) Beta-hydroxyfentanyl;
(L) Betacetylmethadol;
(M) Betameprodine;
(N) Betamethadol;
(O) Betaprodine;
(P) Cathinone;
(Q) Clonitazene;
(R) Dextromoramide;
(S) Diampromide;
(T) Diethylthiambutene;
(U) Difenoxin;
(V) Dimenoxadol;
(W) Dimepheptanol;
(X) Dimethylthiambutene;
(Y) Dioxaphetyl butyrate;
(Z) Dipipanone;
(AA) Ethylmethylthiambutene;
(BB) Etonitazene;
(CC) Etoxeridine;
(DD) Furethidine;
(EE) Hydroxypethidine;
(FF) Ketobemidone;
(GG) Levomoramide;
(HH) Levophenacylmorphan;
(II) Methcathinone;
(JJ) Morpheridine;
(KK) Mppp (l-methyl-4-phenyl-4-propionoxpipiridine);
(LL) Noracymethadol;
(MM) Norlevorphanol;

r
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(OO) Norpipanone,
(PP) Para-fluorofentanyK
(QQ) PEPAP(l-( 2-phenethyl)-4-phenyl-4-acetoxypiperidine),
(RR) Phenadoxone,
(SS) Phenampromide,
(TT) Phenomorphan,
(UU) Phenopendme,
( W ) Pintramide,
(WW) Proheptazme,
(XX) Propendme,
(YY) Propiram,
(ZZ) Racemoramide,
(AAA) Thiofentanyl,
(BBB) Tihdine,
(CCC) Trimeperidine,
(DDD) 3-menthylthiofentanyl, and
(EEE) 3-methylfentanyl
(n) Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another schedule, any of the following opium derivatives, their salts, isomers, and
salts of isomers when the existence of the salts, isomers, and salts of
isomers is possible within the specific chemical designation
(A) Acetorphine,
(B) Acetyldihydrocodeme,
(C) Benzylmorphine,
(D) Codeine methylbromide,
(E) Codeine-N-Oxide,
(F) Cyprenorphme,
(G) Desomorphine,
(H) Dihydromorphine,
(I) Drotebanol,
(J) Etorphme (except hydrochloride salt),
(K) Heroin,
(L) Hydromorphmol,
(M) Methyldesorphine,
(N) Methylhydromorphme,
(O) Morphine methylbromide,
(P) Morphine methylsulfonate,
(Q) Morphme-N-Oxide,
(R) Myrophine,
(S) Nicocodeme,
(T) Nicomorphine,
(U) Normorphme,
(V) Pholcodine, and
(W) Thebacon
.
(111) Unless specifically excepted or unless listed m another schedule, any material, compound, mixture, or preparation which contains
any quantity of the following hallucinogenic substances, or w n l f n
contains any of their salts, isomers, and salts of isomers when the
existence of the salts isomers, and salts of isomers is possible within
the specific chemical designation, as used in this bubsection (in) only,
"isomer" includes the optical, position, and geometric isomers
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(A) 4-bromo-2,5-dimethoxy-amphetamine,
(B) 2,5-dimethoxyamphetamine,
(C) 3,4-methylenedioxy amphetamine,
(D) 3,4-methylenedioxy methamphetamme (MDMA),
(E) 5-methoxy-3,4-methylenedioxy amphetamine,
(F) 4-methoxyamphetamine,
(G) 3,4,5-tnmethoxy amphetamine,
(H) Bufotenine,
(I) Diethyltryptamine,
(J) Dimethyltryptamine,
(K) 4-methyl-2,5-dimethoxy-amphetamine;
(L) Ibogame,
(M) Lysergic acid diethylamide,
(N) Marijuana,
(O) Mescaline,
(P) Parahexyl,
(Q) Peyote,
(R) N-ethyl-3-pipendyl benzilate,
(S) N-methyl-3-pipendyl benzilate,
(T) Psilocybm;
(U) Psilocyn,
(V) Tetrahydrocannabinols,
(W) Ethylamine analog of phencychdme;
(X) Pyrrolidine analog of phencychdme,
(Y) l-l-(2-Thieny) Cyclohexyl Pyrrolidine, and
(Z) Thiophene analog of phencychdme
(IV) Unless specifically excepted or unless listed m another schedule, any material compound, mixture, or preparation which contains
any quantity of the following substances having a depressant effect on
the central nervous system, including its salts, isomers, and salts of
isomers when the existence of the salts, isomers, and salts of isomers
is possible within the specific chemical designation
(A) Mecloqualone, and
(B) Methaqualone
(v) Any material, compound, mixture, or preparation containing
any quantity of the following substances having a stimulant effect on
the central nervous system, including their salts, isomers, and salts of
isomers
(A) Fenethylhne,
(B) 4-Methylaminorex, and
(C) N-ethylamphetamme
(b) Schedule II
(I) Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another schedule,
any of the following substances whether produced directly or indirectly by extraction from substances of vegetable origin, or independently by means of chemical synthesis, or by a combination of
extraction and chemical synthesis
(A) Opium and opiate, and any salt, compound, derivative, or
preparation of opium or opiate excluding apomorphine,
dextrorphan, nalbuphine, naloxone, and naltrexone, and their
respective salts, but including
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(I) Raw opium;
(II) Opium extracts;
(III) Opium fluid extracts;
(IV) Powdered opium;
(V) Granulated opium;
(VI) Tincture of opium;
(VII) Codeine;
(VIII) Ethylmorphine;
(EX) Etorphine hydrochloride;
(X) Hydrocodone;
(XI) Hydromorphone;
(XII) Metopon;
(XIII) Morphine;
(XIV) Oxycodone;
(XV) Oxymorphone; and
(XVI) Thebaine;
(B) Any salt, compound, derivative, or preparation which is
chemically equivalent or identical with any of the substances
referred to in Subsection (2XbXiXA), except that these substances
may not include the isoquinoline alkaloids of opium;
(C) Opium poppy and poppy straw;
(D) Coca leaves and any salt, compound, derivative, or preparation of coca leaves, and any salt, compound, derivative, or
preparation which is chemically equivalent or identical with any
of these substances, and includes cocaine, its isomers and salts of
isomers, whether derived from the coca plant or synthetically
produced, except the substances may not include decocainized
coca leaves or extraction of coca leaves, which extractions do not
contain cocaine or ecgonine; and
(E) Concentrate of poppy straw, which means the crude extract
of poppy straw in either liquid, solid, or powder form which
contains the phenanthrine alkaloids of the opium poppy.
(ii) Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another schedule, any of the following opiates, including their isomers, esters,
ethers, salts, and salts of isomers, esters, and ethers, when the
existence of the isomers, esters, ethers, and salts is possible within the
specific chemical designation, except dextrorphan:
(A) Alphaprodine;
(B) Alfentanil;
(C) Anileridine;
(D) Bezitramide;
(E) Bulk dextropropoxyphene (nondosage forms);
(F) Carfentanil;
(G) Dihydrocodeine;
(H) Diphenoxylate;
(I) Fentanyl;
(J) Isomethadone;
(K) Levomethorphan;
(L) Levo-alphacetylmethadol (some other names: alphaacetylmethadol, levomethadyl acetate, or LAAM);
(M) Levorphanol;
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' (N) Metazocine;
(O) Methadone;
(P) Methadone-Intermediate, 4-cyano-2-dimethylamino-4, 4diphenyl butane;
(Q) Methyl-Fentanyl;
(R) Moramide-Intermediate, 2-methyl-3-morpholino-l, 1-diphenylpropane-carboxylic acid;
(S) Pethidine (meperidine);
(T) Pethidine-Intermediate-A,
4-cyano-l-methyl-4-phenylpiperidine;
(U) Pethidine-Intermediate-B, ethyl-4-phenylpiperidine-4-carboxylate;
(V) Pethidine-Intermediate-C, l-methyl-4-phenylpiperidine-4carboxylic acid;
(W) Phenazocine;
(X) Piminodine;
(Y) Racemethorphan;
(Z) Racemorphan; and
(AA) Sufentanil,
(iii) Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another schedule, any material, compound, mixture, or preparation which contains
any quantity of the following substances having a stimulant effect on
the central nervous system:
(A) Amphetamine, its salts, optical isomers, and salts of its
optical isomers;
(B) Methamphetamine, its salts, isomers, and salts of its
isomers;
(C) Phenmetrazine and its salts; and
(D) Methylphenidate.
(iv) Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another schedule, any material, compound, mixture, or preparation which contains
any quantity of the following substances having a depressant effect on
the central nervous system, including its salts, isomers, and salts of
isomers when the existence of the salts, isomers, and salts of isomers
is possible within the specific chemical designation:
(A) Amobarbital;
(B) N,N,Dimethylamphetamine;
(C) Glutethimide;
(D) Pentobarbital;
(E) Phencyclidine;
(F) Phencyclidine immediate precursors:
1-phenyl-cyclchexylamine and 1-piperidinocyclohexanecarbonitrile (PCC); and
(G) Secobarbital.
(v) Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another schedule, any material, compound, mixture, or preparation which contains
any quantity of Phenylacetone.
Some of these substances may be known by trade or other names:
phenyl-2-propanone, P2P; benzyl methyl ketone, methyl benzyl ketone.
(vi) (A) Dranabinol (synthetic) in sesame oil and encapsulated in a
soft gelatin capsule in a Fulnal Food and Drug Administration
approved drug product; and
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(B) Nabinol.
(c) Schedule III:
(i) Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another schedule
any material, compound, mixture, or preparation which contains any
quantity of the following substances having a stimulant effect on the
central nervous system, including its salts, isomers whether optical
position, or geometric, and salts of the isomers when the existence of
the salts, isomers, and salts of isomers is possible within the specific
chemical designation:
(A) Those compounds, mixtures, or preparations in dosage unit
form containing any stimulant substances listed in Schedule II
which compounds, mixtures, or preparations were listed on
August 25, 1971, as excepted compounds under Section 308.32 of
Title 21 of the Code of Federal Regulations, and any other drug of
the quantitive composition shown in t h a t list for those drugs or
which is the same except that it contains a lesser quantity of
controlled substances;
(B) Benzphetamine;
(C) Chlorphentermine;
(D) Clortermine;
(E) Mazindol; and
(F) Phendimetrazine.
(ii) Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another schedule, any material, compound, mixture, or preparation which contains
any quantity of the following substances having a depressant effect on
the central nervous system:
(A) Any compound, mixture, or preparation containing amobarbital, secobarbital, pentobarbital, or any salt of any of them,
and one or more other active medicinal ingredients which are not
listed in any schedule;
(B) Any suppository dosage form containing amobarbital, secobarbital, or pentobarbital, or any salt of any of these drugs which
is approved by the Food and Drug Administration for marketing
only as a suppository;
(C) Any substance which contains any quantity of a derivative
of barbituric acid or any salt of any of them;
(D) Chorhexadol;
(E) Lysergic acid;
(F) Lysergic acid amide;
(G) Methyprylon;
(H) Sulfondiethylmethane;
(I) Sulfonethylmethane;
(J) Sulfonmethane; and
(K) Tiletamine and zolazepam or any of their salts,
(iii) Nalorphine.
(iv) Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another schedule, any material, compound, mixture, or preparation containing
limited quantities of any of the following narcotic drugs, or any salts
KJI <xny CM t u r i u .

(A) Not more than 1.8 grams of codeine per 100 milliliters or
not more than 90 milligrams per dosage unit, with an equal or
greater quantity of an isoquinoline alkaloid of opium;
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(B) Not more than 1.8 grams of codeine per 100 milliliters or
not more than 90 milligrams per dosage unit, with one or more
active non-narcotic ingredients in recognized therapeutic
amounts;
(C) Not more than 300 milligrams of dihydrocodeinone per 100
milliliters or not more than 15 milligrams per dosage unit, with a
fourfold or greater quantity of an isoquinoline alkaloid of opium;
(D) Not more than 300 milligrams of dihydrocodeinone per 100
milliliters or not more than 15 milligrams per dosage unit, with
one or more active, non-narcotic ingredients in recognized therapeutic amounts;
(E) Not more t h a n 1.8 grams of dihydrocodeine per 100 milliliters or not more than 90 milligrams per dosage unit, with one or
more active non-narcotic ingredients in recognized therapeutic
amounts;
(F) Not more t h a n 300 milligrams of ethylmorphine per 100
milliliters or not more t h a n 15 milligrams per dosage unit, with
one or more active, non-narcotic ingredients in recognized therapeutic amounts;
(G) Not more than 500 milligrams of opium per 100 milliliters
or per 100 grams, or not more t h a n 25 milligrams per dosage unit,
with one or more active, non-narcotic ingredients in recognized
therapeutic amounts;
(H) Not more t h a n 50 milligrams of morphine per 100 milliliters or per 100 grams with one or more active, non-narcotic
ingredients in recognized therapeutic amounts.
(v) Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another schedule, anabolic steroids including any of the following or any isomer,
ester, salt, or derivative of the following t h a t acts in the same manner
on the h u m a n body:
(A) Clostebol;
(B) Chorionic gonadotropin;
(C) Dehydroclormethyltestosterone;
(D) Ethylestrenol;
(E) Fluxymesterone;
(F) Mesterolone;
(G) Methandrenone;
(H) Methandrostenolone;
(I) Methenolone;
(J) Methyltestosterone, except when combined with esterified
estrogens;
(K) Nandrolone decanoate;
(L) Nandrolone phenpropionate;
(M) Norethandrolone;
(N) Oxandrolone;
(O) Oxymesterone;
(P) Oxymetholone;
(Q) Stanozolol: and
(R) Testosterone propionate.
Anabolic steroids expressly intended for administration
through implants to cattle or other nonhuman species, and
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approved by the Food and Drug Administration for use, may not
be classified as a controlled substance,
(d) Schedule IV:
(i) Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another schedule,
any material, compound, mixture, or preparation containing not more
than 1 milligram of difenoxin and not less than 25 micrograms of
atropine sulfate per dosage unit, or any salts of any of them;
(ii) Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another schedule, any material, compound, mixture, or preparation which contains
any quantity of the following substances, including its salts, isomers,
and salts of isomers when the existence of the salts, isomers, and salts
of isomers is possible within the specific chemical designation:
(A) Alprazolam;
(B) Barbital;
(C) Bromazepam;
(D) Camazepam;
(E) Chloral betaine;
(F) Chloral hydrate;
(G) Chlordiazepoxide;
(H) Clobazam;
(I) Clonazepam;
(J) Clorazepate;
(K) Clonazepam;
(L) Cloxazolam;
(M) Delorazepam;
(N) Diazepam;
(O) Estazolam;
(P) Ethchlorvynol;
(Q) Ethinamate;
(R) Ethyl loflazepate;
(S) Fludiazepam;
(T) Flunitrazepam;
(U) Flurazepam;
(V) Halazepam;
(W) Haloxazolam;
(X) Ketazolam;
(Y) Loprazolam;
(Z) Lorazepam;
(AA) Mebutamate;
(BB) Medazepam;
( C O Medazolam;
(DD) Methohexital;
(EE) Meprobamate;
(FF) Methylphenobarbital (mephobarbital);
(GG) Nemetazepam;
(HH) Nitrazepam;
(II) Nordiazepam;
(JJ) Oxazepam;
(KK) Oxazolam;
(LL) Paraldehyde;
(MM) Penazepam;
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(NN) Pentazocine;
( 0 0 ) Petrichloral;
(PP) Phenobarbital;
(QQ) Prazepam;
(RR) Quazepam;
(SS) Tempazepam;
(TT) Tetrazepam; and
(UU) Treazolam.
(iii) Any material, compound, mixture, or preparation of
fenfluramine which contains any quantity of the following substances,
including its salts, isomers whether optical, position, or geometric,
and salts of the isomers when the existence of the salts, isomers, a n d
salts of isomers is possible.
(iv) Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another schedule, any material, compound, mixture, or preparation which contains
any quantity of the following substances having a stimulant effect on
the central nervous system, including its salts, isomers w h e t h e r
optical, position, or geometric isomers, and salts of the isomers w h e n
the existence of the salts, isomers, and salts of isomers is possible
within the specific chemical designation:
(A) Cathine;
(B) Diethylpropion;
(C) Fencamfamine;
(D) Fenproprex;
(E) Mazidole;
(F) Mefenorex;
(G) Phentermine;
(H) Pemoline, including organometallic complexes and
chelates thereof;
(1) Pipradrol; and
(J) SPA((-)-l-climethylamino-l,2 diphenylethane).
(v) Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another schedule, any material, compound, mixture, or preparation which contains
any quantity of dextropropoxyphene (alpha-(+)-4-dimethylamino-l,
2-diphenyl-3-methyl-2-propionoxybutane), including its salts,
(e) Schedule V: Any compound, mixture, or preparation containing any
of the following limited quantities of narcotic drugs, or salts of any of them,
which includes one or more non-narcotic active medicinal ingredients in
sufficient proportion to confer upon the compound, mixture, or preparation
valuable medicinal qualities other than those possessed by the narcotic
drug alone:
(i) not more than 200 milligrams of codeine per 100 milliliters or
per 100 grams;
(ii) not more than 100 milligrams of dihydrocodeine per 100 milliliters or per 100 grams;
(iii) not more than 100 milligrams of ethylmorphine per 100
milliliters or per 100 grams;
(iv) not more than 2.5 milligrams of diphenoxylate and not less
than 25 micrograms of atropine sulfate per dosage unit;
(v) not more than 100 milligrams of opium per 100 milliliters or per
100 grams;

58-37-5

OCCUPATIONS AND PROFESSIONS

(vi) not more than 0 5 milligram of difenoxm and not less than 25
micrograms of atropine sulfate per dosage unit, and
(vn) unless specifically exempted or excluded or unless listed m
another schedule, any material, compound, mixture, or preparation
which contains Pyrovalerone having a stimulant effect on the central
nervous system, including its salts, isomers, and salts of isomers
History: L. 1971, ch. 146, * 4; 1977, ch. 29,
§ 4, 1979, ch. 12, * 3; 1981, ch. 75, § 2; 1989,
ch. 263, * 1; 1990, ch. 101, * 2; 1991, ch. 198,
$ 2; 1993, ch. 39, $ 1; 1994, ch. 8, * 1; 1997,
ch. 64, < 4.
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58-37-8. Prohibited acts — Penalties.
(1) Prohibited acts A — Penalties:
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to
knowingly and intentionally:
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to
produce, manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit substance;
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree
consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit
substance;
(iii) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to
distribute; or
(iv) engage in a continuing criminal enterprise where:
(A) the person participates, directs, or engages in conduct
which results in any violation of any provision of Title 58,
Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d that is a felony; and
(B) the violation is a part of a continuing series of two or more
violations of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d on
separate occasions that are undertaken in concert with five or
more persons with respect to whom the person occupies a position
of organizer, supervisor, or any other position of management.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (lXa) with respect to:
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II or a controlled substance analog is guilty of a second degree felony and upon a second or
subsequent conviction is guilty of a first degree felony;
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or marijuana, is
guilty of a third degree felony, and upon a second or subsequent
conviction is guilty of a second degree felony; or
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of
a third degree felony.
(c) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (lXaXiv) is guilty of a
first degree felony punishable by imprisonment for an indeterminate term
of not less than seven years and which may be for life. Imposition or
execution of the sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not
eligible for probation.
(2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful:
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a
controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescription or order, directly from a practitioner while acting in the course of
his professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by this subsection;
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any
building, room, tenement, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place
knowingly and intentionally to permit them to be occupied by persons
unlawfully possessing, using, or distributing controlled substances in
any of those locations;
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an
altered or forged prescription or written order for a controlled substance.
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(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2Xa)(i) with respect to:
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, is guilty of a
second degree felony;
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, marijuana, if the
amount is more than 16 ounces, but less than 100 pounds, or a
controlled substance analog, is guilty of a third degree felony; or
(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form of an extracted
resin from any part of the plant, and the amount is more than one
ounce but less than 16 ounces, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
(c) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2XaXi) while inside
the exterior boundaries of property occupied by any correctional facility as
defined in Section 64-13-1 or any public jail or other place of confinement
shall be sentenced to a penalty one degree greater than provided in
Subsection (2Xb).
(d) Upon a second or subsequent conviction of possession of any
controlled substance by a person, that person shall be sentenced to a one
degree greater penalty than provided in this subsection.
(e) Any person who violates Subsection (2XaXi) with respect to all other
controlled substances not included in Subsection (2XbXi), (ii), or (iii),
including less than one ounce of marijuana, is guilty of a class B
misdemeanor. Upon a second conviction the person is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor, and upon a third or subsequent conviction the person is
guilty of a third degree felony.
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2XaXii) or (2XaXiii) is:
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor;
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanor; and
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a third degree
felony.
(3) Prohibited acts C — Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally:
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or distribution of a
controlled substance a license number which is fictitious, revoked,
suspended, or issued to another person or, for the purpose of obtaining
a controlled substance, to assume the title of, or represent himself to
be, a manufacturer, wholesaler, apothecary, physician, dentist, veterinarian, or other authorized person;
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or attempt to
procure the administration of, to obtain a prescription for, to prescribe
or dispense to any person known to be attempting to acquire or obtain
possession of, or to procure the administration of any controlled
substance by misrepresentation or failure by the person to disclose his
receiving any controlled substance from another source, fraud, forgery, deception, subterfuge, alteration of a prescription or written order
for a controlled substance, or the use of a false name or address;
(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or written order for a
controlled substance, or to utter the same, or to alter any prescription
or written order issued or written under the terms of this chapter; or
(iv) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, plate, stone, or
other thing designed to print, imprint, or reproduce the trademark,
trade name, or other identifying mark, imprint, or device of another or
any likeness of any of the foregoing upon any drug or container or
labeling so as to render any drug a counterfeit controlled substance.
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(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3Xa) is guilty of a
third degree felony.
(4) Prohibited acts D — Penalties:
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not
authorized under this chapter who commits any act declared to be
unlawful under this section, Title 58, Chapter 37a, Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act, or under Title 58, Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled Substances
Act, is upon conviction subject to the penalties and classifications under
Subsection (4Kb) if the act is committed:
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary school or on the
grounds of any of those schools;
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or post-secondary
institution or on the grounds of any of those schools or institutions;
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other
structure or grounds which are, at the time of the act, being used for
an activity sponsored by or through a school or institution under
Subsections (4Xa)(i) and (ii);
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care facility;
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation center;
(vi) in a church or synagogue;
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, arena, theater,
movie house, playhouse, or parking lot or structure adjacent thereto;
(viii) in a public parking lot or structure;
(ix) within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or grounds included
in Subsections (4XaXi) through (viii); or
(x) with a person younger than 18 years of age, regardless of where
the act occurs.
(b) A person convicted under this subsection is guilty of a first degree
felony and shall be imprisoned for a term of not less than five years if the
penalty that would otherwise have been established but for this subsection
would have been a first degree felony. Imposition or execution of the
sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not eligible for
probation.
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been established
would have been less than a first degree felony but for this subsection, a
person convicted under this subsection is guilty of one degree more than
the maximum penalty prescribed for that offense.
(d) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this subsection that the
actor mistakenly believed the individual to be 18 years of age or older at
the time of the offense or was unaware of the individual's true age; nor
that the actor mistakenly believed that the location where the act occurred
was not as described in Subsection (4Xa) or was unaware that the location
where the act occurred was as described in Subsection (4Xa).
(5) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is specified is a class
B misdemeanor.
(6) Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense unlawful
undpr this chapter is upon conviction guiltv of one deeree less than the
maximum penalty prescribed for that offense.
(7) (a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section is in addition to, and
not in lieu of, any civil or administrative penalty or sanction authorized by
law.
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(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal law or the law of
another state, conviction or acquittal under federal law or the law of
another state for the same act is a bar to prosecution in this state.
(8) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evidence or proof which
shows a person or persons produced, manufactured, possessed, distributed, or
dispensed a controlled substance or substances, is prima facie evidence that
the person or persons did so with knowledge of the character of the substance
or substances.
(9) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in good faith and in the
course of his professional practice only and not for humans, from prescribing,
dispensing, or administering controlled substances or from causing the substances to be administered by an assistant or orderly under his direction and
supervision.
(10) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on:
(a) any person registered under the Controlled Substances Act who
manufactures, distributes, or possesses an imitation controlled substance
for use as a placebo or investigational new drug by a registered practitioner in the ordinary course of professional practice or research; or
(b) any law enforcement officer acting in the course and legitimate
scope of his employment.
(11) If any provision of this chapter, or the application of any provision to
any person or circumstances, is held invalid, the remainder of this chapter
shall be given effect without the invalid provision or application.
History: L. 1971, ch. 146, § 8; 1972, ch. 22,
* 1; 1977, ch. 29, S 6; 1979, ch. 12, * 5; 1986,
ch. 146, § 1; 1986, ch. 196, * 1; 1987, ch. 92,
§ 100; 1987, ch. 190, § 3; 1988, ch. 96, $ 1;
1989, ch. 60, $ 2; 1989, ch. 66, $ 1; 1989, ch.
178,$ 1; 1989, ch. 187, * 2; 1989, ch. 201, $ 1;
1990, ch. 161, § 1; 1990, ch. 163, $ 2; 1990,
ch. 163, $ 3; 1991, ch. 80, $ 1; 1991, ch. 198,
$ 4; 1991, ch. 268, § 7; 1996, ch. 284, § 1;
1996, ch. 1, $ 8; 1997, ch. 64, $ 6.
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76-10-1603. Unlawful acts.
(1) It is unlawful for any person who has received any proceeds derived,
whether directly or indirectly, from a pattern of unlawful activity in which the
person has participated as a principal, to use or invest, directly or indirectly,
anv part of that income, or the proceeds of the income, or the proceeds derived
from the investment or use of those proceeds, in the acquisition of any interest
in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise.
(2) It is unlawful for any person through a pattern of unlawful activity to
acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any
enterprise.
(3) It is unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any
enterprise to conduct or participate, whether directly or indirectly, in the
conduct of that enterprise's affairs through a pattern of unlawful activity.
(4) It is unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any provision of
Subsection (IK (2), or (3).
History: C. 1953, 5 76-10-1603, enacted
by L. 1967, ch. 238, § 3.
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PART A—INTRODUCTORY PROVISIONS

§ 801 •

Congressional findings and declarations: controlled substances

The Congress makes the following findings and declarations
(1) Many of the drugs included within this subchapter have a
useful and legitimate medical purpose and are necessary to
maintain the health and general welfare of the American people
(2) The illegal importation, manufacture, distribution, and
possession and improper use of controlled substances have a
substantial and detrimental effect on the health and general
welfare of the American people
(3) A major portion of the traffic in controlled substances
flows through interstate and foreign commerce Incidents of the
traffic which are not an integral part of the interstate or foreign
flow, such as manufacture, local distribution, and possession,
nonetheless have a substantial and direct effect upon interstate
commerce because—
(A) after manufacture, many controlled substances are
tianspoitcd in interstate commerce,
(B) cont? oiled substances distributed locally usually have
been transported in mtei state commerce immediately before
thiMr HiOnhutirm

nnd
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(C) contioiled substances possessed commonly | ] O V v
thiough mtcistate commerce immediately prior to such p 0 s
session
(4) Local distnbution and possession of controlled substances
contribute to swelling the interstate traffic in such substances
(5) Controlled substances manufactured and distributed intra
state cannot be differentiated from controlled substances manu
lactured and distributed interstate Thus, it is not feasible to
distinguish, in terms of controls, between controlled substances
manufactured and distributed interstate and controlled sub
stances manufactured and distributed intrastate
(6) Federal control of the intrastate incidents of the traffic m
controlled substances is essential to the effective control of the
interstate incidents of such traffic
(7) The United States is a party to the Single Convention on
Narcotic Drugs, 1961, and other international conventions de
signed to establish effective control over international and do
mestic traffic in controlled substances
(PubL 91-513, Title II, § 101, Oct 27, 1970, 84 Stat 1242)

§ 801a.

Congressional flndings and declarations: psychotrophic
substances

The Congress makes the following findings and declarations:
(1) The Congress has long recognized the danger involved in
the manufacture, distribution, and use of certain psychotropic
substances for nonscientific and nonmedical purposes, and has
provided strong and effective legislation to control illicit trafficking a n d to regulate legitimate uses of psychotropic substances in
this country. Abuse of psychotropic substances has become a
phenomenon c o m m o n to many countries, however, and is not
confined to national borders. It is, therefore, essential that the
United States cooperate with other nations in establishing effective controls over international traffic in such substances.
(2) The United States has joined with other countries in executing an international treaty, entitled the Convention on Psychotropic Substances and signed at Vienna, Austria, on February
21, 1971, which is designed to establish suitable controls over
the manufacture, distribution, transfer, and use of certain psychotropic substances. The Convention is not self-executing, and
the obligations of the United States thereunder may only be
performed p u r s u a n t to appropriate legislation. It is the intent of
the Congress that the amendments made by this Act, together
with existing law, will enable the United States to meet all of its
obligations u n d e r the Convention and that no further legislation
will be necessary for that purpose.
(3) In implementing the Convention on Psychotropic Substances, the Congress intends that, consistent with the obligations of the United States under the Convention, control of
psychotropic substances in the United States should be accomplished within the framework of the procedures and criteria for
classification of substances provided in the Comprehensive Drn
Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 [21 U.S.C.A. § 801 Jt
seq.]. This will insure that (A) the availability of psychotropi
substances to manufacturers, distributors, dispensers, and re
searchers for useful and legitimate medical and scientific p U r ,
poses will not be unduly restricted; (B) nothing in the Convention will interfere with bona fide research activities; a n d ( Q
nothing in the Convention will interfere with ethical medical
practice in this country as determined by the Secretary of Health
and H u m a n Services on the basis of a consensus of the views of
the American medical and scientific community.
(Pub L. 95-633, Title I, § 101, Nov. 10, 1978, 92 Stat. 3768; Pub.L. 96-88
Title V, § 509(b), Oct. 17, 1979, 93 Stat. 695.)

§ 802.

Definitions

As used in this subchapter:
(1) The term " a d d i c t " m e a n s any individual w h o habitually
uses any narcotic drug so as to endanger the public m o r a l s ,
health, safety, or welfare, or w h o is so far addicted to t h e use of
narcotic drugs as to have lost the p o w e r of self-control with
reference to his addiction.
(2) The term " a d m i n i s t e r " refers to the direct application of a
controlled substance to the body of a patient or r e s e a r c h subject

by(A) a practitioner (or, in his presence, by his a u t h o r i z e d
agent), or
(B) the patient or research subject at the direction a n d in
the presence of the practitioner,
whether such application be by injection, inhalation, ingestion,
or any other means.
(3) The term " a g e n t " m e a n s an authorized person w h o acts on
behalf of o r at the direction of a manufacturer, distributor, o r
dispenser; except that such term does not include a c o m m o n o r
contract carrier, public warehouseman, or employee of the c a r r i er o r warehouseman, when acting in the usual and lawful c o u r s e
of the carrier's or w a r e h o u s e m a n ' s business.
(4) The term "Drug Enforcement Administration" m e a n s the
Drug Enforcement Administration in the Department of Justice.
(5) The term " c o n t r o l " m e a n s to add a drug or o t h e r substance, or immediate precursor, to a schedule u n d e r p a r t B of
this subchapter, whether by transfer from another s c h e d u l e or
otherwise.
(6) The term "controlled substance" m e a n s a d r u g o r o t h e r
substance, or immediate precursor, included in schedule I, II,
III, IV, or V of part B of this subchapter. The term does not
include distilled spirits, wine, malt beverages, or tobacco, as
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those terms are defined or used in subtitle E of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986.
(7) The term "counterfeit substance" means a controlled substance which, or the container or labeling of which, without
authorization, bears the trademark, trade name, or other identifying mark, imprint, number, or device, or any likeness thereof,
of a manufacturer, distributor, or dispenser other than the person or persons who in fact manufactured, distributed, or dispensed such substance and which thereby falsely purports or is
represented to be the product of, or to have been distributed by,
such other manufacturer, distributor, or dispenser.
(8) The terms "deliver" or "delivery" mean the actual, constructive, or attempted transfer of a controlled substance or a
listed chemical, whether or not there exists an agency relationship.
(9) The term "depressant or stimulant substance" means—
(A) a drug which contains any quantity of barbituric acid
or any of the salts of barbituric acid; or
(B) a drug which contains any quantity of (i) amphetamine or any of its optical isomers; (ii) any salt of amphetamine or any salt of an optical isomer of amphetamine; or
(iii) any substance which the Attorney General, after investigation, has found to be, and by regulation designated as,
habit forming because of its stimulant effect on the central
nervous system; or
(C) lysergic acid diethylamide; or
(D) any drug which contains any quantity of a substance
which the Attorney General, after investigation, has found to
have, and by regulation designated as having, a potential for
abuse because of its depressant or stimulant effect on the
central nervous system or its hallucinogenic effect.
(10) The term "dispense" means to deliver a controlled substance to an ultimate user or research subject by, or pursuant to
the lawful order of, a practitioner, including the prescribing and
administering of a controlled substance and the packaging, labeling or compounding necessary to prepare the substance for such
delivery. The term "dispenser" means a practitioner w h o so
delivers a controlled substance to an ultimate user or research
subject.
(11) The term "distribute" means to deliver (other than by
administering or dispensing) a controlled substance or a listed
chemical. The term "distributor" means a person who so delivcis a controlled substance oi a iisieu chemical.
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(12) The term "drug" has the meaning given that term by
section 321(g)(1) of this title.
(13) The term "felony" means any Federal or State offense
classified by applicable Federal or State law as a felony.
(14) The term "isomer" means the optical isomer, except as
used in schedule 1(c) and schedule 11(a)(4). As used in schedule
1(c), the term "isomer" means any optical, positional, or geometric isomer. As used in schedule 11(a)(4), the term "isomer"
means any optical or geometric isomer.
(15) The term "manufacture" means the production, preparation, propagation, compounding, or processing of a drug or
other substance, either directly or indirectly or by extraction
from substances of natural origin, or independently by means of
chemical synthesis or by a combination of extraction and chemical synthesis, and includes any packaging or repackaging of such
substance or labeling or relabeling of its container; except that
such term does not include the preparation, compounding, packaging, or labeling of a drug or other substance in conformity
with applicable State or local law by a practitioner as an incident to his administration or dispensing of such drug or substance in the course of his professional practice. The term
"manufacturer" means a person who manufactures a drug or
other substance.
(16) The term "marihuana" means all parts of the plant Cannabis sativa L., whether growing or not; the seeds thereof; the
resin extracted from any part of such plant; and every compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of
such plant, its seeds or resin. Such term does not include the
mature stalks of such plant, fiber produced from such stalks, oil
or cake made from the seeds of such plant, any other compound,
manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of such
mature stalks (except the resin extracted therefrom), fiber, oil, or
cake, or the sterilized seed of such plant which is incapable of
germination.
(17) The term "narcotic drug" means any of the following
whether produced directly or indirectly by extraction from substances of vegetable origin, or independently by means of chemical synthesis, or by a combination of extraction and chemical
synthesis:
(A) Opium, opiates, derivatives of opium and opiates, including their isomers, esters, ethers, salts, and salts of isomers, esters, and ethers, whenever the existence of such
is n m n r <
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ic chemical designation. Such term does not include the
isoquinoline alkaloids of opium.
(B) Poppy straw and concentrate of poppy straw.
(C) Coca leaves, except coca leaves and extracts of coca
leaves from which cocaine, ecgonine, and derivatives of
ecgonine or their salts have been removed.
(D) Cocaine, its salts, optical and geometric isomers, and
salts of isomers.
(E) Ecgonine, its derivatives, their salts, isomers, and salts
of isomers.
(F) Any compound, mixture, or preparation which contains any quantity of any of the substances referred to in
subparagraphs (A) through (E).
(18) The term "opiate" means any drug or other substance
having an addiction-forming or addiction-sustaining liability similar to morphine or being capable of conversion into a drug
having such addiction-forming or addiction-sustaining liability.
(19) The term "opium poppy" means the plant of the species
Papaver somniferum L., except the seed thereof.
(20) The term "poppy straw" means all parts, except the
seeds, of the opium poppy, after mowing.
(21) The term "practitioner" means a physician, dentist, veterinarian, scientific investigator, pharmacy, hospital, or other person licensed, registered, or otherwise permitted, by the United
States or the jurisdiction in which he practices or does research,
to distribute, dispense, conduct research with respect to, administer, or use in teaching or chemical analysis, a controlled
substance in the course of professional practice or research.
(22) The term "production" includes the manufacture, planting, cultivation, growing, or harvesting of a controlled substance.
(23) The term "immediate precursor" means a substance—
(A) which the Attorney General has found to be and by
regulation designated as being the principal compound used,
or produced primarily for use, in the manufacture of a
controlled substance;
(B) which is an immediate chemical intermediary used or
likely to be used in the manufacture of such controlled
substance; and
(C) the control of which is necessary to prevent, curtail
or limit the manufacture of such controlled substance.
(24) The term "Secretary", unless the context otherwise indicates, means the Secretary of Health and Human Services.
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(25) The term "serious bodily injury" means bodily injury
which involves—
(A) a substantial risk of death;
(B) protracted and obvious disfigurement; or
(C) protracted loss or impairment of the function of a
bodily member, organ, or mental faculty.
(26) The term "State" means a State of the United States, the
District of Columbia, and any commonwealth, territory, or possession of the United States.
(27) The term "ultimate user" means a person who has lawfully obtained, and who possess, a controlled substance for his
own use or for the use of a member of his household or for an
animal owned by him or by a member of his household.
(28) The term "United States", when used in a geographic
sense, means all places and waters, continental or insular, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.
(29) The term "maintenance treatment" means the dispensing, for a period in excess of twenty-one days, of a narcotic drug
in the treatment of an individual for dependence upon heroin or
other morphine-like drugs.
(30) The term "detoxification treatment" means the dispensing, for a period not in excess of one hundred and eighty days, of
a narcotic drug in decreasing doses to an individual in order to
alleviate adverse physiological or psychological effects incident
to withdrawal from the continuous or sustained use of a narcotic
drug and as a method of bringing the individual to a narcotic
drug-free state within such period.
(31) The term "Convention on Psychotropic Substances"
means the Convention on Psychotropic Substances signed at
Vienna, Austria, on February 21, 1971; and the term "Single
Convention on Narcotic Drugs" means the Single Convention on
Narcotic Drugs signed at New York, New York, on March 30,
1961.
(32)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the term
"controlled substance analogue" means a substance—
(i) the chemical structure of which is substantially similar
to the chemical structure of a controlled substance in schedule I or II;
(ii) which has a stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic
effect on the central nervous system that is substantially
similar to or greater than the stimulant, depressant, or
hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous system of a
controlled substance in schedule I or II; or
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(iii) with respect to a particular person, which such p e r .
son represents or intends to have a stimulant, depressant, 0 r
hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous system that i s
substantially similar to or greater than the stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous system
of a controlled substance in schedule I or II.
(B) Such term does not include—
(i) a controlled substance;
(ii) any substance for which there is an approved new
drug application;
(iii) with respect to a particular person any substance, if
an exemption is in effect for investigational use, for that
person, under section 505 of the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 355) to the extent conduct with
respect to such substance is pursuant to such exemption; or
(iv) any substance to the extent not intended for human
consumption before such an exemption takes effect with
respect to that substance.
(33) The term "listed chemical" means any list I chemical or
any list II chemical.
(34) The term "list I chemical" means a chemical specified by
regulation of the Attorney General as a chemical that is used in
manufacturing a controlled substance in violation of this subchapter and is important to the manufacture of the controlled
substances, and such term includes (until otherwise specified by
regulation of the Attorney General, as considered appropriate by
the Attorney General or upon petition to the Attorney General by
any person) the following:
(A) Anthranilic acid, its esters, and its salts.
(B) Benzyl cyanide.
(C) Ephedrine, its salts, optical isomers, and salts of optical isomers.
(D) Ergonovine and its salts.
(E) Ergotamine and its salts.
(F) N-Acetylanthranilic acid, its esters, and its salts.
(G) Norpseudoephedrine, its salts, optical isomers, and
salts of optical isomers.
(H) Phenylacetic acid, its esters, and its salts.
(I) Phenylpropanolamine, its salts, optical isomers, and
salts of optical isomers.
(J) Pipcridine and its salts.
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(K) Pseudoephedrine, its salts, optical isomers, and salts
of optical isomers.
(L) 3,4-Methylenedioxyphenyl-2-propanone.
(M) Methylamine.
(N) Ethylamine.
(O) Propionic anhydride.
(P) Isosafrole.
(Q) Safrole.
(R) Piperonal.
(S) N-Methylephedrine.
(T) N-methylpseudoephedrine.
(U) Hydriodic acid.
(V) Benzaldehyde.
(W) Nitroethane.
(X) Any salt, optical isomer, or salt of an optical isomer of
the chemicals listed in subparagraphs (M) through (U) of this
paragraph.
(35) The term "list II chemical" means a chemical (other than
a list I chemical) specified by regulation of the Attorney General
as a chemical that is used in manufacturing a controlled substance in violation of this subchapter, and such term includes
(until otherwise specified by regulation of the Attorney General,
as considered appropriate by the Attorney General or upon
petition to the Attorney General by any person) the following
chemicals:
(A)
(B)
(C)
(D)

Acetic anhydride.
Acetone.
Benzyl chloride.
Ethyl ether.

(E) Repealed. Pub.L. 101-647, Title XXIII, § 2301(b),
Nov. 29, 1990, 104 Stat. 4858
(F) Potassium permanganate.
(G) 2-Butanone (or Methyl Ethyl Ketone).
(H) Toluene.
(I) Iodine.
(J) Hydrochloric gas.
(36) The term "regular customer" means, with respect to a
regulated person, a customer with whom the regulated person
has an established business relationship that is reported to thr
Attorney Geneial.
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(37) The term "regular importer" means, with respect to
listed chemical, a person that has an established record as an
importer of that listed chemical that is reported to the Attorney
General.
(38) The term "regulated person" means a person w h o manufactures, distributes, imports, or exports a listed chemical, a
tableting machine, or an encapsulating machine or w h o acts as a
broker or trader for an international transaction involving a
listed chemical, a tableting machine, or an encapsulating machine.
(39) The term "regulated transaction" means—
(A) a distribution, receipt, sale, importation, or exportation of, or an international transaction involving shipment
of, a listed chemical, or if the Attorney General establishes a
threshold a m o u n t for a specific listed chemical, a threshold
amount, including a cumulative threshold amount for multiple transactions (as determined by the Attorney General, in
consultation with the chemical industry and taking into
consideration the quantities normally used for lawful purposes), of a listed chemical, except that such term does not
include—
(i) a domestic lawful distribution in the usual course
of business between agents or employees of a single
regulated person;
(ii) a delivery of a listed chemical to or by a c o m m o n
or contract carrier for carriage in the lawful and usual
course of the business of the common or contract carrier, or to or by a warehouseman for storage in the lawful
and usual course of the business of the w a r e h o u s e m a n ,
except that if the carriage or storage is in connection
with the distribution, importation, or exportation of a
listed chemical to a third person, this clause does not
relieve a distributor, importer, or exporter from compliance with section 830 of this title;
(iii) any category of transaction or any category of
transaction for a specific listed chemical or chemicals
specified by regulation of the Attorney General as excluded from this definition as unnecessary for enforcement of this subchapter or subchapter II of this chapter;
(iv) any transaction in a listed chemical that is contained in a drug that may be marketed or distributed
lawfully in the United States under the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U S C 301 et seq.) unless—

Ck

13

DRUG ABUSE PREVENTION

21 §802

(I)(aa) the drug contains ephedrine o r its salts,
optical isomers, or salts of optical isomers, pseudoephedrine or its salts, optical isomers, o r salts of
optical isomers, or phenylpropanolamine o r its
salts, optical isomers, or salts of optical isomers
unless otherwise provided by regulation of the Attorney General issued pursuant to section 814(e) of
this title, except that any sale of ordinary over-thecounter pseudoephedrine or p h e n y l p r o p a n o l a m i n e
products by retail distributors shall not be a regulated transaction (except as provided in section 401(d)
of the Comprehensive Methamphetamine Control
Act of 1996); or
(bb) the Attorney General has determined u n d e r
section 814 of this title that the drug o r g r o u p of
drugs is being diverted to obtain the listed chemical
for use in the illicit production of a controlled
substance; and
(II) the quantity of ephedrine, p s e u d o e p h e d r i n e ,
phenylpropanolamine, or other listed chemical contained in the drug included in the transaction or
multiple transactions equals or exceeds the threshold established for that chemical by the Attorney
General, except that the threshold for any sale of
products containing pseudoephedrine or p h e n y l p r o panolamine products by retail distributors o r by
distributors required to submit reports by section
830(b)(3) of this title shall be 24 g r a m s of pseudoephedrine or 24 grams of p h e n y l p r o p a n o l a m i n e
in a single transaction; or
(v) any transaction in a chemical mixture w h i c h the
Attorney General has by regulation designated as exempt from the application of this subchapter a n d subchapter II of this chapter based on a finding t h a t the
mixture is formulated in such a way that it c a n n o t be
easily used in the illicit production of a controlled substance and that the listed chemical or chemicals contained in the mixture cannot be readily recovered; and
(B) a distribution, importation, or exportation of a tableting machine or encapsulating machine.
(40) The term "chemical mixture" means a combination of
two or more chemical substances, at least one of which is not a .
list I chemical or a list II chemical, except that such t e r m does
not include any combination of a list I chemical or a list II
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chemical with another chemical that is present solely as an
impurity.
(41)(A) The term "anabolic steroid" means any d r u g or hormonal substance, chemically and pharmacologically related to
testosterone (other than estrogens, progestins, and corticosteroids) that promotes muscle growth, and includes—
(i) boldenone,
(ii) chlorotestosterone,
(iii) clostebol,
(iv) dehydrochlormethyltestosterone,
(v) dihydrotestosterone,
(vi) drostanolone,
(vii) ethylestrenol,
(viii)
fluoxymesterone,
(ix) formebulone,
(x) mesterolone,
(xi) methandienone,
(xii) m e t h a n d r a n o n e ,
(xiii) methandriol,
(xiv) methandrostenolone,
(xv) methenolone,
(xvi) methyl testosterone,
(xvii) mibolerone,
(xvlii) nandrolone,
(xix) norethandrolone,
(xx) oxandrolone,
(xxi) oxymesterone,
(xxii) oxymetholone,
(xxiii) stanolone,
(xxiv) stanozolol,
(xxv) testolactone,
(xxvi) testosterone,
(xxvii) trenbolone, and
(xxviii) any salt, ester, or isomer of a drug or substance
described or listed in this paragraph, if that salt, ester, or
isomer promotes muscle growth.
(B)(i) Except as provided in clause (ii), such term does not
include an anabolic steroid which is c x p ^ ^ l y intended ioi
administration through implants to cattle or other n o n h u m a n
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species and which has been approved by the Secretary of Health
and H u m a n Services for such administration.
(ii) If any person prescribes, dispenses, or distributes such
steroid for h u m a n use, such person shall be considered to have
prescribed, dispensed, or distributed an anabolic steroid within
the meaning of s u b p a r a g r a p h (A).
(42) The term "international transaction" means a transaction
involving the shipment of a listed chemical across an international border (other than a United States border) in which a broker
or trader located in the United States participates.
(43) The terms " b r o k e r " and " t r a d e r " mean a person that
assists in arranging an international transaction in a listed chemical by—
(A) negotiating contracts;
(B) serving as an agent or intermediary; o r
(C) bringing together a buyer and seller, a buyer and
transporter, or a seller and transporter.
(44) The term "felony drug offense" means an offense that is
punishable by imprisonment for more than one year under any
law of the United States or of a State or foreign country that
prohibits or restricts conduct relating to narcotic drugs, marihuana, or depressant or stimulant substances.
(45) The term "ordinary over-the-counter pseudoephedrine or
phenylpropanolamine p r o d u c t " means any product containing
pseudoephedrine or phenylpropanolamine that is—
(A) regulated pursuant to this subchapter; and
(B)(i) except for liquids, sold in package sizes of not m o r e
than 3.0 g r a m s of pseudoephedrine base or 3.0 g r a m s of
phenylpropanolamine base, and that is packaged in blister
packs, each blister containing not more than two dosage
units, or where the use of blister packs is technically infeasible, that is packaged in unit dose packets or pouches; and
(ii) for liquids, sold in package sizes of not more than 3.0
grams of pseudoephedrine base or 3.0 grams of phenylpropanolamine base.
(46)(A) The term "retail distributor" means a grocery store,
general merchandise store, drug store, or other entity or person
whose activities as a distributor relating to pseudoephedrine or
phenylpropanolamine products are limited almost exclusively to
sales for personal use, both in number of sales and volume ol
sales, either directly to walk-in customers or in face-to-fai c
transactions bv direct sales.
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(B) For purposes of this paragraph, sale for personal U s
means the sale of below-threshold quantities in a single transac
tion to an individual for legitimate medical use.
(C) For purposes of this paragraph, entities are defined by
reference to the S t a n d a r d Industrial Classification (SIC) code, as
follows:
(i) A grocery store is an entity within SIC code 5 4 1 1 .
(ii) A general merchandise store is an entity within SIC
codes 5300 t h r o u g h 5399 and 5499.
(Hi) A d r u g store is an entity within SIC code 5912.
(Pub.L. 91-513, Title II, § 102, Oct. 27, 1970, 84 Stat. 1242; Pub.L. 93-281
§ 2, May 14, 1974, 88 Stat. 124; Pub.L. 95-633, Tide I, § 102(b), Nov lo'
1978, 92 Stat. 3772; Pub.L. 96-88, Title V, § 509(b), Oct. 17, 1979, 93 Stat'
695, Pub.L. 96-132, § 16(a), Nov. 30, 1979, 93 Stat. 1049; Pub.L. 98^»73*
Title II, § 507(a), (b), Oct. 12, 1984, 98 Stat. 2071; Pub.L. 98-509, Title III'
§ 301(a), Oct. 19, 1984, 98 Stat. 2364; Pub.L. 99-570, Title I, §§ 1003(b)'
1203, 1870, Oct. 27, 1986, 100 Stat. 3207-6, 3207-13, 3207-56; Pub L '
99-646, § 83, Nov. 10, 1986, 100 Stat. 3619; Pub.L. 100-690, Title VI
§ 6054, Nov. 18, 1988, 102 Stat. 4316; Pub.L. 101-647, Title XIX, § 1902(b)'
Title XXIII, § 2301, Title XXXV, § 35991, Nov. 29, 1990, 104 Stat. 4852'
4858, 4932; Pub.L. 103-200, §§ 2(a), 7 to 9(a), Dec. 17, 1993, 107 Stat'
2333, 2340, Pub.L. 103-322, Title IX, § 90105(d), Title XXXIII, § 330024(a)
(b), (d)(1), Sept. 13, 1994, 108 Stat. 1988, 2150; Pub.L. 104-237, Title Ii'
§§ 204(a), 209, Title IV, § 401(a), (b), Oct. 3, 1996, 110 Stat. 3102, 3104'
3106, 3107; Pub.L. 104-294, Title VI, §§ 604(b)(4), 607(j), Oct. 11, 1996, 110
Slat. 3506, 3512; Pub.L. 105-115, Title I, § 126(c)(3), Nov. 21, 1997 111
Stat. 2328.)

§
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Repealed.
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Pub.L. 95-137, § 1(b), Oct. 18, 1977, 91 Stat.

HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES
Section, Pub.L. 95-513, Title II, § 103,
Oct. 27, 1970, 84 Stat. 1245, authorized
the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous
Drugs to add, during the fiscal year 1971,

300 agents, together with necessary supporting personnel, and provided for appropriations of $6,000,000 to carry out
such addition.

PART B—AUTHORITY TO CONTROL; STANDARDS AND SCHEDULES

§

811.

Authority a n d criteria for classification of substances

(a) Rules and regulations of Attorney General; hearing
The Attorney General shall apply the provisions of this subchapter
to the controlled substances listed in the schedules established by
section 812 of this title a n d to any other drug or other substance
added to such schedules under this subchapter. Except as provided
in subsections (d) and (e) of this section, the Attorney General may by
uilc—
(1) add to such a schedule or transfer between such schedules
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(A) finds that such drug or other substance has a potential
for abuse, and
(B) makes with respect to such drug or other s u b s t a n c e
the findings prescribed by subsection (b) of section 812 of
this title for the schedule in which such drug is to be placed;
or
(2) remove any drug or other substance from the schedules if
he finds that the d r u g or other substance does not meet the
requirements for inclusion in any schedule.
Rules of the Attorney General u n d e r this subsection shall be m a d e on
the record after opportunity for a hearing pursuant to the r u l e m a k i n g
procedures prescribed by subchapter II of chapter 5 of Title 5.
Proceedings for the issuance, amendment, or repeal of such rules
may be initiated by the Attorney General (1) on his own motion, (2)
at the request of the Secretary, or (3) on the petition of any interested
party.
(b) Evaluation of d r u g s a n d o t h e r substances
The Attorney General shall, before initiating proceedings u n d e r
subsection (a) of this section to control a drug or other substance o r
to remove a d r u g or other substance entirely from the schedules, and
after gathering the necessary data, request from the Secretary a
scientific and medical evaluation, and his recommendations, as to
whether such d r u g or other substance should be so controlled or
removed as a controlled substance. In making such evaluation and
recommendations, the Secretary shall consider the factors listed in
paragraphs (2), (3), (6), (7), and (8) of subsection (c) of this section
and any scientific or medical considerations involved in p a r a g r a p h s
(1), (4), and (5) of such subsection. The recommendations of the
Secretary shall include recommendations with respect to the a p p r o priate schedule, if any, u n d e r which such drug or other s u b s t a n c e
should be listed. The evaluation and the recommendations of the
Secretary shall be m a d e in writing and submitted to the Attorney
General within a reasonable time. The recommendations of the
Secretary to the Attorney General shall be binding on the Attorney
General as to such scientific and medical matters, and if the Secretary r e c o m m e n d s that a d r u g or other substance not be controlled,
the Attorney General shall not control the drug or other substance.
If the Attorney General determines that these facts and all o t h e r
relevant data constitute substantial evidence of potential for a b u s e
such as to w a r r a n t control or substantial evidence that the d r u g or
other substance should be removed entirely Irom the schedules, he
shall initiate proceedings for control or removal, as the case may be,
under subsection (a) of this section.
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(c) Factors determinative of control or removal from schedules
In making any finding under subsection (a) of this section o r under
subsection (b) of section 812 of this title, the Attorney General shall
consider the following factors with respect to each d r u g o r other
substance proposed to be controlled or removed from the schedules(1) Its actual or relative potential for abuse.
(2) Scientific evidence of its pharmacological effect, if known.
(3) The state of c u r r e n t scientific knowledge regarding the
drug o r other substance.
(4) Its history and current pattern of abuse.
(5) The scope, duration, and significance of abuse.
(6) What, if any, risk there is to the public health.
(7) Its psychic o r physiological dependence liability.
(8) Whether the substance is an immediate p r e c u r s o r of a
substance already controlled under this subchapter.
(d) International treaties, conventions, and protocols requiring control; p r o c e d u r e s respecting changes in drug schedules of Convention on Psychotropic Substances
(1) If control is required by United States obligations u n d e r international treaties, conventions, or protocols in effect on October 27,
1970, the Attorney General shall issue an order controlling such drug
under the schedule he d e e m s most appropriate to carry out such
obligations, without regard to the findings required by subsection (a)
of this section o r section 812(b) of this title and without regard to the
procedures prescribed by subsections (a) and (b) of this section.
(2)(A) Whenever the Secretary of State receives notification from
the Secretary-General of the United Nations that information has
been transmitted by or to the World Health Organization, p u r s u a n t to
article 2 of the Convention on Psychotropic Substances, which may
justify adding a d r u g or other substance to one of the schedules of the
Convention, transferring a d r u g or substance from one schedule to
another, or deleting it from the schedules, the Secretary of State shall
immediately transmit the notice to the Secretary of Health and
Human Services w h o shall publish it in the Federal Register and
provide opportunity to interested persons to submit to him c o m m e n t s
respecting the scientific and medical evaluations which he is to
prepare respecting such drug or substance. The Secretary of Health
and Human Services shall prepare for transmission through the
Secretary of State to the World Health Organization such medical
and scientific evaluations as may be appropriate regarding the possible action that could be proposed by the World Health Organization
r<>M>e<*fing thr drug or substance with respect to which a notice was
transmitted under this subparagraph.
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(B) Whenever the Secretary of State receives information that the
Commission on Narcotic Drugs of the United Nations proposes to
Jecide whether to add a drug or other substance to one of the
sC hedules of the Convention, transfer a drug or substance from one
schedule to another, o r delete it from the schedules, the Secretary of
State shall transmit timely notice to the Secretary of Health and
Human Services of such information who shall publish a summary ol
such information in the Federal Register and provide opportunity to
interested persons to submit to him comments respecting the recommendation which he is to furnish, pursuant to this subparagraph,
respecting such proposal. The Secretary of Health and H u m a n
Services shall evaluate the proposal and furnish a recommendation
to the Secretary of State which shall be binding on the representative
of the United States in discussions and negotiations relating to the
proposal.
(3) When the United States receives notification of a scheduling
decision p u r s u a n t to article 2 of the Convention on Psychotropic
Substances that a d r u g or other substance has been added or transferred to a schedule specified in the notification or receives notification (referred to in this subsection as a "schedule notice") that
existing legal controls applicable u n d e r this subchapter to a drug or
substance and the controls required by the Federal Food, Drug, a n d
Cosmetic Act [21 U.S.C.A. § 301 et seq.] do not meet the requirements of the schedule of the Convention in which such drug or
substance has been placed, the Secretary of Health and H u m a n
Services, after consultation with the Attorney General, shall first
determine w h e t h e r existing legal controls u n d e r this subchapter
applicable to the d r u g or substance and the controls required by the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, meet the requirements of the
schedule specified in the notification or schedule notice and shall
take the following action:
(A) If such requirements are met by such existing controls but
the Secretary of Health and H u m a n Services nonetheless believes that m o r e stringent controls should be applied to the drug
or substance, the Secretary shall recommend to the Attorney
General that he initiate proceedings for scheduling the drug or
substance, p u r s u a n t to subsections (a) and (b) of this section, to
apply to such controls.
(B) If such requirements are not met by such existing controls
and the Secretary of Health and H u m a n Services concurs in the
scheduling decision or schedule notice transmitted by the notification, the Secretary shall recommend to the Attorney Geneial
that he initiate proceedings for scheduling the drug oi substance
under the appropriate schedule pursuant to sub,vUion^» (a) uhd
(b) of this section.
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(C) If such requirements are not met by such existing controk
and the Secretary of Health and Human Services does not
concur in the scheduling decision or schedule notice transmitted
by the notification, the Secretary shall—
(i) if he deems that additional controls are necessary to
protect the public health and safety, recommend to th e
Attorney General that he initiate proceedings for scheduling
the drug or substance pursuant to subsections (a) and (b) of
this section, to apply such additional controls;
(ii) request the Secretary of State to transmit a notice of
qualified acceptance, within the period specified in the Convention, pursuant to paragraph 7 of article 2 of the Convention, to the Secretary-General of the United Nations;
(Hi) request the Secretary of State to transmit a notice of
qualified acceptance as prescribed in clause (ii) and request
the Secretary of State to ask for a review by the Economic
and Social Council of the United Nations, in accordance
with paragraph 8 of article 2 of the Convention, of the
scheduling decision; or
(iv) in the case of a schedule notice, request the Secretary
of State to take appropriate action under the Convention to
initiate proceedings to remove the drug or substance from
the schedules under the Convention or to transfer the drug
or substance to a schedule under the Convention different
from the one specified in the schedule notice.
(4)(A) If the Attorney General determines, after consultation with
the Secretary of Health and Human Services, that proceedings initiated under recommendations made under paragraph (B) or (C)(i) of
paragraph (3) will not be completed within the time period required
by paragraph 7 of article 2 of the Convention, the Attorney General,
after consultation with the Secretary and after providing interested
persons opportunity to submit comments respecting the requirements
of the temporary order to be issued under this sentence, shall issue a
temporary order controlling the drug or substance under schedule IV
or V, whichever is most appropriate to carry out the minimum
United States obligations under paragraph 7 of article 2 of the
Convention. As a part of such order, the Attorney General shall,
after consultation with the Secretary, except such drug or substance
In »ni the application of any provision of part C of this subchapter
which he finds is not required to carry out the United States obligations under paragraph 7 of article 2 of the Convention. In the case
ol proceedings initiated under subparagraph (B) of paragraph (3), the
Attorney General, concurrently with the issuance of such order, shall
i<«jiust the Secietary ol State to transmit a notice ol qualified
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acceptance to the Secretary-General of the United Nations pursuant
A temporary order
(0 paragraph 7 of article 2 of the Convention.
|SSued under this subparagraph controlling a drug or other substance
subject to proceedings initiated under subsections (a) and (b) of this
section shall expire upon the effective date of the application to the
drug or substance of the controls resulting from such proceedings.
(B) After a notice of qualified acceptance of a scheduling decision
with respect to a drug or other substance is transmitted to the
Secretary-General of the United Nations in accordance with clause
(ii) or (iii) of paragraph (3)(C) or after a request has been made under
clause (iv) of such paragraph with respect to a drug or substance
described in a schedule notice, the Attorney General, after consultation with the Secretary of Health and Human Services and after
providing interested persons opportunity to submit comments respecting the requirements of the order to be issued under this
sentence, shall issue an order controlling the drug or substance
under schedule IV or V, whichever is most appropriate to carry out
the minimum United States obligations under paragraph 7 of article
2 of the Convention in the case of a drug or substance for which a
notice of qualified acceptance was transmitted or whichever the
Attorney General determines is appropriate in the case of a drug or
substance described in a schedule notice. As a part of such order,
the Attorney General shall, after consultation with the Secretary,
except such drug or substance from the application of any provision
of part C of this subchapter which he finds is not required to carry
out the United States obligations under paragraph 7 of article 2 of
the Convention. If, as a result of a review under paragraph 8 of
article 2 of the Convention of the scheduling decision with respect to
which a notice of qualified acceptance was transmitted in accordance
with clause (ii) or (iii) of paragraph (3)(C)—
(i) the decision is reversed, and
(ii) the drug or substance subject to such decision is not
required to be controlled under schedule IV or V to carry out the
minimum United States obligations under paragraph 7 of article
2 of the Convention,
the order issued under this subparagraph with respect to such drug
or substance shall expire upon receipt by the United States of the
review decision. If, as a result of action taken pursuant to action
initiated under a request transmitted under clause (iv) of paragraph
(3)(C), the drug or substance with respect to which such action was
taken is not required to be controlled under schedule IV or V, the
nider issued under this paragraph with respect to such drug or
substance shall expire upon receipt by the United Slates of a notice ol
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the action taken with respect to such drug or substance under tk
Convention.
(C) An order issued u n d e r subparagraph (A) or (B) may be issued
without regard to the findings required by subsection (a) of thi
section or by section 812(b) of this title and without regard to th
procedures prescribed by subsection (a) or (b) of this section.
(5) Nothing in the a m e n d m e n t s made by the Psychotropic Substances Act of 1978 or the regulations or orders promulgated thereunder shall be construed to preclude requests by the Secretary of
Health and H u m a n Services or the Attorney General through the
Secretary of State, p u r s u a n t to article 2 or other applicable provisions of the Convention, for review of scheduling decisions under
such Convention, based on new or additional information.
(e) Immediate p r e c u r s o r s
The Attorney General may, without regard to the findings required
by subsection (a) of this section or section 812(b) of this title and
without regard to the procedures prescribed by subsections (a) and
(b) of this section, place a n immediate precursor in the s a m e schedule in which the controlled substance of which it is a n immediate
precursor is placed or in any other schedule with a higher numerical
designation. If the Attorney General designates a substance as an
immediate p r e c u r s o r and places it in a schedule, other substances
shall not be placed in a schedule solely because they a r e its precursors.
( 0 Abuse potential
If, at the time a new-drug application is submitted to the Secretary
for any drug having a stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic effect
on the central nervous system, it appears that such drug has a n abuse
potential, such information shall be forwarded by the Secretary to
the Attorney General.
(g) Exclusion of non-narcotic substances sold over counter without a
prescription; dextromethorphan; exemption of substances
lacking abuse potential
(1) The Attorney General shall by regulation exclude any nonnarcotic substance from a schedule if such substance may, u n d e r the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act [21 U.S.C.A. § 301 et seq.], be
lawfully sold over the counter without a prescription.
(2) Dextromethorphan shall not be deemed to be included in any
schedule bv reason of enactment ol this subchapter unless controlled
after October 27, 1970 pursuant to the foregoing provisions ol this
section
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(3) The Attorney General may, by regulation, exempt any compound, mixture, or preparation containing a controlled substance
from the application of all or any part of this subchapter if he finds
such compound, mixture, or preparation meets the requirements of
on e of the following categories:
(A) A mixture, or preparation containing a nonnarcotic controlled substance, which mixture or preparation is approved lor
prescription use, and which contains one or more other active
ingredients which are not listed in any schedule and which a r e
included therein in such combinations, quantity, proportion, or
concentration as to vitiate the potential for abuse.
(B) A compound, mixture, or preparation which contains any
controlled substance, which is not for administration to a h u m a n
being or animal, and which is packaged in such form or concentration, or with adulterants or denaturants, so that as packaged it
does not present any significant potential for abuse.
(h) Temporary scheduling to avoid imminent h a z a r d s to public
safety
(1) If the Attorney General finds that the scheduling of a substance
in schedule I on a temporary basis is necessary to avoid an imminent
hazard to the public safety, he may, by o r d e r and without regard to
the requirements of subsection (b) of this section relating to the
Secretary of Health and H u m a n Services, schedule such substance in
schedule I if the substance is not listed in any other schedule in
section 812 of this title or if no exemption or approval is in effect for
the substance u n d e r section 505 of the Federal Food, Drug, a n d
Cosmetic Act [21 U.S.C.A. § 355]. Such an order may not be issued
before the expiration of thirty days from—
(A) the date of the publication by the Attorney General of a
notice in the Federal Register of the intention to issue such o r d e r
and the grounds upon which such order is to be issued, and
(B) the date the Attorney General has transmitted the notice
required by p a r a g r a p h (4).
(2) The scheduling of a substance u n d e r this subsection shall
expire at the end of one year from the date of the issuance of the
order scheduling such substance, except that the Attorney General
may, during the pendency of proceedings u n d e r subsection (a)(1) of
this section with respect to the substance, extend the temporary
scheduling for up to six months.
(3) When issuing an order under p a r a g r a p h (1), the Attorney
General shall be required to consider, with respect to the finding M
an imminent h a / a r d to the public safety, only those factors set forth
in p a i a g r a p h s (4), (5), and (6) ol subsection (c) o( thib section,

21 §811

FOOD AND DRUGS

Ch.

including actual abuse, diversion from legitimate channels, and clar
destine importation, manufacture, or distribution.
(4) The Attorney General shall transmit notice of an o r d e r p r o .
posed to be issued under paragraph (1) to the Secretary of Health
and H u m a n Services. In issuing an order under p a r a g r a p h (1), the
Attorney General shall take into consideration any comments submitted by the Secretary in response to a notice transmitted p u r s u a n t to
this paragraph.
(5) An order issued under paragraph (1) with respect to a substance shall be vacated upon the conclusion of a subsequent rulemaking proceeding initiated under subsection (a) of this section with
respect to such substance.
(6) An order issued under paragraph (1) is not subject to judicial
review.
(Pub.L. 91-513, Title II, § 201, Oct. 27, 1970, 84 Stat. 1245; Pub.L. 95-633,
Title I, § 102(a), Nov. 10, 1978, 92 Stat. 3769; Pub.L. 96-88, Title V,
§ 509(b), Oct. 17, 1979, 93 Stat. 695; Pub.L. 98-473, Title II, §§ 508, 509(a),
Oct. 12, 1984, 98 Stat. 2071, 2072.)

§ 812.

Schedules of controlled substances

(a) Establishment
There are established five schedules of controlled substances, to be
known as schedules I, II, III, IV, and V. Such schedules shall
initially consist of the substances listed in this section. The s c h e d u l e s
established by this section shall be updated and republished on a
semiannual basis during the two-year period beginning one y e a r after
October 27, 1970 and shall be updated and republished on an a n n u a l
basis thereafter.
(b) Placement on schedules; findings required
Except where control is required by United States obligations
under an international treaty, convention, or protocol, in effect on
October 27, 1970, and except in the case of an immediate p r e c u r s o r ,
a drug or other substance may not be placed in any schedule unless
the findings required for such schedule are made with respect to
such drug or other substance. The findings required for e a c h of the
schedules are as follows:
(1) Schedule I.—
(A) The d r u g or other substance has a high potential for
abuse.
(B) The drug or other substance has no currently accepted
medical use in treatment in the United States.
(C) There is a lack of accepted safety for use of the d r u g o r
other substance u n d e r medical supervision.
(2) Schedule II.—
(A) The drug or other substance has a high potential for
abuse.
(B) The drug or other substance has a currently a c c e p t e d
medical use in treatment in the United States or a c u r r e n t l y
accepted medical use with severe restrictions.
(C) Abuse of the d r u g or other substances may lead to severe
psychological or physical dependence.
(3) Schedule III.—
(A) The drug or other substance has a potential for abuse less
than the drugs or other substances in schedules I and II.
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(B) The drug or other substance has a currently accepted
medical use in treatment in the United States.
(C) Abuse of the drug or other substance may lead to moderate or low physical dependence or high psychological dependence.
(4) Schedule IV.—
(A) The drug or other substance has a low potential for abuse
relative to the drugs or other substances in schedule III.
(B) The d r u g o r other substance has a currently accepted
medical use in treatment in the United States.
(C) Abuse of the d r u g o r other substance may lead to limited
physical d e p e n d e n c e or psychological dependence relative to the
drugs or other substances in schedule III.
(5) Schedule V.—
(A) The d r u g or other substance has a low potential for abuse
relative to the drugs or other substances in schedule IV.
(B) The d r u g or other substance has a currently accepted
medical use in treatment in the United States.
(C) Abuse of the d r u g or other substance may lead to limited
physical d e p e n d e n c e o r psychological dependence relative to the
drugs or other substances in schedule IV.
(c) Initial schedules of controlled substances
Schedules I, II, III, IV, and V shall, unless and until a m e n d e d '
pursuant to section 811 of this title, consist of the following d r u g s or
other substances, by whatever official name, c o m m o n or usual name,
chemical n a m e , or b r a n d n a m e designated:
Schedule I
(a) Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another schedule, any of the following opiates, including their isomers, esters,
ethers, salts, and salts of isomers, esters, and ethers, whenever the
existence of such isomers, esters, ethers, and salts is possible within
the specific chemical designation:
(1) Acetylmethadol.
(2) Allylprodine.
(3) Alphacetylmathadol. 2
(4) Alphameprodine.
(5) Alphamethadol.
(6) Ben/ethidinc.
(7) Brtacetvlmethadol
(8) Betameprodine

C h.

13

DRUG ABUSE PREVENTION

21 §812

(9) Betamethadol.
(10) Betaprodine.
(11) Clonitazene.
(12) Dextromoramide.
(13) Dextrorphan.
(14) Diampromide.
(15) Diethylthiambutene.
(16) Dimenoxadol.
(17) Dimepheptanol.
(18) Dimethyithiambutene.
(19) Dioxaphetyl butyrate.
(20) Dipipanone.
(21) Ethylmethylthiambutene.
(22) Etonitazene.
(23) Etoxeridine.
(24) Furethidine.
(25) Hydroxypethidine.
(26) Ketobemidone.
(27) Levomoramide.
(28) Levophenacylmorphan.
(29) Morpheridine.
(30) Noracymethadol.
(31) Norlevorphanol.
(32) N o r m e t h a d o n e .
(33) Norpipanone.
(34) Phenadoxone.
(35) P h e n a m p r o m i d e .
(36) P h e n o m o r p h a n .
(37) Phenoperidine.
(38) Piritramide.
(39) Proheptazine.
(40) Properidine.
(41) Racemoramide.
(42) Trimeperidine.
(b) Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another schedule, any of the following opium derivatives, their salts, isomers, and
salts of isomers whenever the existence of such salts, isomers, and
saltb u[ i^nici-> i^» pu^>iblc within the specific chemical designation
(1) Acetorphme.
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(2) Acetyldihydrocodeine.
(3) Benzylmorphine.
(4) Codeine methylbromide.
(5) Codeine-N-Oxide.
(6) Cyprenorphine.
(7) Desomorphine.
(8) Dihydromorphine.
(9) Etorphine.
(10) Heroin.
(11) Hydromorphinol.
(12) Methyldesorphine.
(13) Methylhydromorphine.
(14) Morphine methylbromide.
(15) Morphine methylsulfonate.
(16) Morphine-N-Oxide.
(17) Myrophine.
(18) Nicocodeine.
(19) Nicomorphine.
(20) N o r m o r p h i n e .
(21) Pholcodine.
(22) Thebacon.
(c) Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another schedule, any material, compound, mixture, or preparation, which contains any quantity of the following hallucinogenic substances, or
which contains any of their salts, isomers, and salts of isomers
whenever the existence of such salts, isomers, and salts of isomers is
possible within the specific chemical designation:
(1) 3,4-methylenedioxy amphetamine.
(2) 5-methoxy-3,4-methylenedioxy amphetamine.
(3) 3,4,5-trimethoxy amphetamine.
(4) Bufotenine.
(5) Diethyltryptamine.
(6) Dimethyltryptamine.
(7) 4-methyl-2,5-dimethoxyamphetamine.
(8) Ibogaine.
(9) Lysergic acid diethylamide.
(10) Marihuana.
(11) Mescaline.
(12) Peyote.
(13) N-ethyl-3-piperidyl ben/ilale.
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(14) N-methyl-3-piperidyl benzilate.
(15) Psilocybin.
(16) Psilocyn.
(17) Tetrahydrocannabinols.
Schedule II
(a) Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in a n o t h e r schedule, any of the following substances whether produced directly or
indirectly by extraction from substances of vegetable origin, o r independently by m e a n s of chemical synthesis, or by a combination of
extraction and chemical synthesis:
(1) Opium and opiate, and any salt, compound, derivative, or
preparation of opium or opiate.
(2) Any salt, compound, derivative, or preparation thereof
which is chemically equivalent or identical with any of the
substances referred to in clause (1), except that these substances
shall not include the isoquinoline alkaloids of opium.
(3) Opium poppy and poppy straw.
(4) Coca leaves except coca leaves and extracts of coca leaves
from which cocaine, ecgonine, and derivatives of ecgonine o r
their salts have been removed; cocaine, its salts, optical a n d
geometric isomers, and salts of isomers; ecgonine, its derivatives, their salts, isomers, and salts of isomers; o r any compound, mixture, or preparation which contains any quantity of
any of the substances referred to in this paragraph.
(b) Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in a n o t h e r schedule, any of the following opiates, including their isomers, esters,
ethers, salts, and salts of isomers, esters and ethers, w h e n e v e r the
existence of such isomers, esters, ethers, and salts is possible within
the specific chemical designation:
(1) Alphaprodine.
(2) Anileridine.
(3) Bezitramide.
(4) Dihydrocodeine.
(5) Diphenoxylate.
(6) Fentanyl.
(7) Isomethadone.
(8) Levomethorphan.
(9) Levorphanol.
(10) Metazocine.
(11) Methadone.

21 §812

FOOD AND DRUGS

Ch. j

3

(12) Methadone-Intermediate,
4-cyano-2-dimethylamino-4
4-diphenyl butane.
(13) Moramide-Intermediate, 2-methyl-3-morpholino-l, l.^iphenylpropane-carboxylic acid.
(14) Pethidine.
(15) Pethidine-Intermediate-A,
4-cyano-1 -methyl-4-phenylpi.
peridine.
(16) Pethidine-Intermediate-B, ethyl-4-phenylpiperidine-4-carboxy late.
(17) Pethidine-Intermediate-C,
1 -methyl-4-phenylpiperidine-4-carboxylic acid.
(18) Phenazocine.
(19) Piminodine.
(20) R a c e m e t h o r p h a n .
(21) R a c e m o r p h a n .
(c) Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in a n o t h e r schedule, any injectable liquid which contains any quantity of m e t h a m phetamine, including its salts, isomers, and salts of isomers.
Schedule III
(a) Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in a n o t h e r schedule, any material, compound, mixture, or preparation which contains
any quantity of the following substances having a stimulant effect on
the central nervous system:
(1) Amphetamine, its salts, optical isomers, and salts of its
optical isomers.
(2) Phenmetrazine and its salts.
(3) Any substance (except an injectable liquid) which contains
any quantity of methamphetamine, including its salts, isomers,
and salts of isomers.
(4) Methylphenidate.
(b) Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in a n o t h e r schedule, any material, compound, mixture, or preparation which contains
any quantity of the following substances having a depressant effect
on the central nervous system:
(1) Any substance which contains any quantity of a derivative
of barbituric acid, or any salt of a derivative of barbituric acid.
(2) Chorhexadol.
(3) Glutethimide.
(4) Lyscigic acal.
(5) Lysergic acid amide.
(6) Mcthvprylon.
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(7) Phencyclidine.
(8) Sulfondiethylmethane.
(9) Sulfonethylmethane.
(10) Sulfonmethane.
(c) Nalorphine.
(d) Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another schedule, any material, compound, mixture, or preparation containing
limited quantities of any of the following narcotic drugs, or any salts
thereof:
(1) Not m o r e than 1.8 g r a m s of codeine per 100 milliliters or
not more than 90 milligrams per dosage unit, with an equal or
greater quantity of a n isoquinoline alkaloid of opium.
(2) Not more than 1.8 grams of codeine per 100 milliliters or
not more than 90 milligrams per dosage unit, with one or more
active, nonnarcotic ingredients in recognized therapeutic
amounts.
(3) Not m o r e t h a n 300 milligrams of dihydrocodeinone p e r
100 milliliters or not more than 15 milligrams p e r dosage unit,
with a fourfold or greater quantity of an isoquinoline alkaloid of
opium.
(4) Not m o r e than 300 milligrams of dihydrocodeinone p e r
100 milliliters or not more than 15 milligrams per dosage unit,
with one or m o r e active, nonnarcotic ingredients in recognized
therapeutic a m o u n t s .
(5) Not m o r e than 1.8 g r a m s of dihydrocodeine per 100 milliliters or not m o r e than 90 milligrams per dosage unit, with one o r
more active, nonnarcotic ingredients in recognized therapeutic
amounts.
(6) Not m o r e than 300 milligrams of ethylmorphine per 100
milliliters or not m o r e than 15 milligrams per dosage unit, with
one or more active, nonnarcotic ingredients in recognized therapeutic amounts.
(7) Not more than 500 milligrams of opium per 100 milliliters
or per 100 grams, or not more than 25 milligrams per dosage
unit, with one or m o r e active, nonnarcotic ingredients in recognized therapeutic amounts.
(8) Not m o r e than 50 milligrams of morphine per 100 millilit e r oi p^.i 100 g i a m s with one or more active, nonnarcotic
ingredients in recognized therapeutic amounts.
(e) Anabolic steroids
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Schedule IV
(1) Barbital.
(2) Chloral betaine.
(3) Chloral hydrate.
(4) Ethchlorvynol.
(5) Ethinamate.
(6) Methohexital.
(7) Meprobamate.
(8) Methylphenobarbital.
(9) Paraldehyde.
(10) Petrichloral.
(11) Phenobarbital.
Schedule V
Any compound, mixture, or preparation containing any of the
following limited quantities of narcotic drugs, which shall include
one or more nonnarcotic active medicinal ingredients in sufficient
proportion to confer upon the compound, mixture, or preparation
valuable medicinal qualities other than those possessed by the narcotic drug alone:
(1) Not more than 200 milligrams of codeine per 100 milliliters or per 100 grams.
(2) Not more than 100 milligrams of dihydrocodeine per 100
milliliters or per 100 grams.
(3) Not more than 100 milligrams of ethylmorphine per 100
milliliters or per 100 grams.
(4) Not more than 2.5 milligrams of diphenoxylate and not
less than 25 micrograms of atropine sulfate per dosage unit.
(5) Not more than 100 milligrams of opium per 100 milliliters
or per 100 grams.
(Pub.L. 9 1 - 5 1 3 , Title II, § 202, Oct. 27, 1970, 84 Stat. 1247; Pub.L. 9 5 - 6 3 3 ,
Title I, § 103, Nov. 10, 1978, 92 Stat. 3772; Pub.L. 9 8 - 4 7 3 , Title II.
§§ 507(c), 509(b), Oct. 12, 1984, 98 Stat. 2071, 2072; Pub.L. 9 9 - 5 7 0 . Title I.
§ 1867, Oct. 27, 1986, 100 Stat. 3207-55; Pub.L. 9 9 - 6 4 6 , § 84, Nov. 10,
1986, 100 Stat. 3619; Pub.L. 101-647, Title XIX, § 1902(a), Nov. 29, 1990,
104 Stat. 4851.)
1
Revised schedules a r e published in the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 1308 ol
I it It* 2 1 , Food and Drugs
2
So in original Probably should be "Alphacetylmethadol"
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH

RULING ON DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO DISMISS

Plaintiff,

vs.

CASE NO. 001404536
DATE: SEPTEMBER 15, 2001

JAMES MOONEY,
LINDA MOONEY,
OKLEVUEHA EARTHWALKS NATIVE
AMERICAN CHURCH OF UTAH, INC.

JUDGE: GARY D. STOTT
CLERK: LG

Defendants.

1.

On May 16, 2001, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss and Memorandum in

Support of Motion to Dismiss.
2.

On May 17, 2001 a Preliminary Hearing was conducted in this matter.

3.

On June 4, 2001, Defendant filed a Supplemental Memorandum in Support of

Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Information.
4.

On June 8, 2001, Defendant filed an Affidavit in Support of Supplemental

Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Information.
5.

On June 25, 2001, the State filed their Opposition to Defendant's Motion to

Dismiss.
6.

On July 11, 2001, Defendant filed a Reply Memorandum in Support of

Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.
7.

On August 1, 2001, Oral Arguments were heard before this Court.
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The Court, having carefully reviewed the memoranda of the parties, now enters the
following findings and ruling:
I
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS
Defendants, in their Memorandum in Support of a Motion to Dismiss, recites no facts
The State of Utah, in its Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, sets forth facts which
have not been disputed by Defendants. Accordingly, the Court adopts the following facts:
1.

On May 17, 2001, this Court conducted a preliminary hearing for James and

Linda Mooney and the Oklevueha Earthwalks Native American Church (OENAC), for
multiple charges of engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise to distribute drugs, in
violation of U.C.A. § 58-37-8(l)(iv), as well as engaging in a pattern of unlawful activity.
2.

At the preliminary hearing, it was established (at least to a standard of probable

cause) that James and Linda Mooney, acting in their capacity as principals in OENAC,
repeatedly met with groups averaging about 10-15 people and distributed peyote, a Schedule
One controlled substance, to those groups of people.
3.

It is undisputed that these meetings took place in Utah County on or about the

dates indicated in the Information.

n
LEGAL ANALYSIS
Defendants argue that both James and Linda Mooney are members and spiritual
leaders of the Okelvueha Earthwalks Native American Church of Utah, Inc., and have been
since the creation of the Church in April 1997. Furthermore, that Defendant Okelvueha
Earthwalks Native American Church of Utah, Inc., is a domestic, non-profit corporation in
good standing and is authorized by the Utah Department of Commerce since April 1997 to
conduct business in the State of Utah. As members of a Native American Church,
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Defendants argue that they are exempt from criminal prosecution for their possession, use or
distribution of peyote medicine for bonafide religious purposes and ceremonies under federal
and state constitution and laws.
Defendants assert that Utah law incorporates the specific exception in the Federal
Controlled Substance Act for the use of peyote for religious purposes by members of the
Native American Church (NAC). Defendants further argue that any interpretation of the laws
restricting therightsof Native American Indians who are not members of a federally
recognized tribe, or restricting the right of members of the NAC who are not members of a
federally recognized tribe, to use peyote for religious purposes, violates the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
Defendants also contend that their possession and use of peyote in conjunction with
bona fide religious ceremonies of the NAC is an activity protected under the free exercise
clause of the First Amendment and that the State must justify an encroachment on such
religious liberty by showing it is the least restrictive means of achieving some compelling state
interest.
A. IncprppratWH Of Vtflfa Iflw as tQ fog Spwifit Excgptipp "* fog Feforal Controlled

Substance Act.
Defendants cite the language of § 58-37-4(2)(a)(iii) in support of their proposition
that the federal exception, listed in 21 C.F.R. § 1307.31 is applicable to the State. However,
Utah law forbids the possession of controlled substances, which are any substance listed in
U.C.A. §58-37-4 or in the Federal Controlled Substance Act listed in U.C.A. § 58-37-3.
Peyote is specifically listed as a controlled substance under U.C.A. § 58-37-4(2)(a)(iii)(V).
This section of the code provides that peyote is considered controlled unless "specifically
excepted or unless listed on another schedule.-U.C.A. § 58-37-4(2)(iii) (2000 Supp.). This
Court agrees with the State that the extension of protection listed in 21 C.F.R. § 1307.31 from
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prosecution does not apply to non-Indian members of the NAC. It is clear to this court that
the protection from prosecution of non-Indians, regardless of whether they are members of the
NAC, is not a "specific exception" within the meaning of § 58-37-4.
B. Free Exercise Claim and the Firtf Amfrnflflient
Defendants cite that their possession, use and distribution of peyote in conjunction
with bona fide religious ceremonies of the NAC is an activity protected under the free exercise
clause of the First Amendment. The State must justify an inroad on religious liberty by
showing it is the least restrictive means of achieving some compelling state interest. Thomas
v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division, 450 U.S. 707, 718, 101 S. Ct.
1425, 1432, 67 L. Ed. 2d 624 (1980). This Court must first determine whether the State's
action does in fact create a burden on the Defendants' religion and if so, is there a compelling
reason for the government's action in this case.
In considering the first step of the analysis, from the limited information provided to
date it appears to this Court that the NAC is an established religion with a significant history
of sacramental peyote use. In addition, this Court also concedes that the use of peyote as a
sacramental ritual is a significant process in the religious practices of the NAC. Consequently,
the State's prosecution of Defendants for their use and possession of distribution of peyote may
create an imposition or burden on the Defendants as members of the NAC. However, the
main issue of fact in this case is whether Defendants distributed peyote to individuals who
were non-Indian members of Oklevueha Earth walks Native American Church.
The burden, if any, on the Defendants must be balanced by showing that the State
has used the least restrictive means of achieving some compelling interest. 450 U.S. at 718.
The conduct or actions in accord with religious convictions that have been regulated have
invariably posed some substantial threat to public safety, peace, or order. Sherbert v. Verner,
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374 U.S. at 402-03, 83 S. Ct. at 1792-93. Subsequently, the State's interests in prosecuting
the Defendants must be examined.
The State has a legitimate interest in protecting society from illegal drug use. They
also have an interest in preventing abuse of peyote by non-exempted individuals. When
examining the promulgation of 21 C.F.R. § 1307.31, the legislative history clearly does not
support a finding that Congress was interested in a broad exemption for religious use of peyote
by non-NAC members or non-Indians. Upon examination of the Hearings before the
Subcommittee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, it is clear that officials of the Bureau of
Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD) informed Congress of the fact that the administrative
exemption in effect at the time the Controlled Substances Act was passed applied only to the
NAC and that they were about to deny an exemption to a non-Indian church. The BNDD
distinguished the non-Indian church from the NAC because of the unique history and tradition
of the NAC was such that there was no question that the NAC regarded peyote as a deity.
Hearings on H.R. 11701 and H.R. 13743 before the Subcomm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce 117-18 (1970), citing United States v. Warner, 595 F. Supp. 595, 598-99 (D.N.D.
1984).
Furthermore, the legislative history of the Controlled Substance Act of 1970 asserts
that the main objective is to deal in a comprehensive manner with the growing menace of drug
abuse in the United States, See H.R. Rep. No. 91-1444, 91* Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in
1970 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 4566, 4567. See also Warner, 595 F. Supp. 598-99.
It is clear that Congress has firmly expressed its intent to protect the American public
from the obvious clangers of drugs. See 21 U.S.C. § 801(2). Congress has determined that
the illegal distribution, possession and improper use of controlled substances has a substantial
and detrimental effect on the health and general welfare of the American people. Id.
Consequently, the State's interests in prohibiting the possession and distribution of peyote is
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indeed a compelling one, in that illegal use of peyote clearly poses a "substantial threat to
public health, safety, and welfare."
Courts have recognized that Congress has a compelling interest in controlling the use
of drugs that it determines to be dangerous, such as peyote, and that Congress can
constitutionally control the use of such drugs even if those drugs are deemed to be used for
religious purposes. United States v. Middleton, 690 F.2d 820, 825 (11th Cir. 1982), cert,
denied, 460 U.S.1051, 103 S. Ct. 1492, 75 L. Ed. 2d 929 (1983), citing United States v.
Hudson, 431 F.2d 468, 469 (5th Cir. 1970), cert, denied, 400 U.S. 1011, 91 S. Ct. 577, 27 L.
Ed. 2d 577 (1971) (the use of drugs as part of religious practice is not constitutionally
privileged).
It is obvious from the above analysis that the State has a strong compelling interest in
controlling the use of peyote and that this interest is not served by allowing an unlimited
amount of exemptions for the bona fide use of peyote in religious ceremonies. Consequently,
the State's compelling interest overrides the Defendants' first amendment rights to the free
exercise of religion.

C.

EQVAh PROTECTION CLAM
The State argues that the American Indian Religious Freedom Act Amendments of

1994 (AIRFA) limits the federal exception from prosecution for members of the NAC to
members of federally recognized Indian tribes. Defendants argue that AIRFA is inclusive and
not exclusive and therefore does not exclude or prohibit members of non-federally recognized
Indian tribes from using peyote in religious ceremonies, nor does it prohibit members of NAC
from using peyote in religious ceremonies.
Additionally, Defendants assert that there is nothing in the legislative history of
AIRFA that evidences an indication of Congress to limit the breadth of the exception from
prosecution for NAC members granted under 28 U.S.C. 1307.31. Defendants contend that
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any interpretation of AIRFA restricting the rights of Native American Indians who are not
members of a federally recognized tribe, or restricting therightof members of the NAC who
are not members of a federally recognized tribe, to use peyote for religious purposes, clearly
violates the equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States.
This Court is not persuaded by the Defendants' arguments concerning the exceptions
as determined by AIRFA. The preference given to Indian H members" of the NAC is clearly
not racial in nature, but political in nature. Peyote Way Church of God, Inc. v. Smith, 556 F.
Supp. 632, 638 (N.D. Tex. 1983). Congress has a power or a duty to the Indians to preserve
their dependent nations as a cohesive culture until such time as they become so assimilated in
the mainstream of American culture so as not to be "a people apart." Id. at 639. Congress has
recognized this duty in AIRFA. The government furthers this policy with the exemption for
the use of peyote in the rituals of the NAC. Id.
Applying the rational basis test to the Defendants' equal protection claim, it is clear
from the legislative history that religion is an integral part of the Indian culture and use of
peyote is necessary to the survival of the Indian religion. Peyote Way, 556 F. Supp. at 637,
citing 1978 U.S. Code Cong & Ad. News 1262 (the legislative history of the American
Religious Freedom Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1996). The United States is following the policy of
preserving the Indians' dependent nation and culture by granting an exemption to Indians for
the use of peyote in the religious ceremonies of the NAC. See 556 F. Supp. at 639.
Therefore, the preference given to Indians in the application of 21 C.F.R. § 1307.31 is tied
rationally to the fulfillment of the State's unique obligation toward the Indians and does not
violate Defendants' rights to equal protection.
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The Defendants' argument that the purpose of preserving Native American culture
that underlies ADFRA is in no way at odds with the goal of protecting members of the NAC
using peyote for religious purposes from criminal prosecution is unavailing to this Court.
As stated above, the United States has a vested interest and duty in preserving the Indians'
dependent nature and culture by granting an exemption to Indians for the use of peyote in
religious ceremonies. The United States has no such obligation to preserve the culture of nonIndians by granting them such an exemption.
Upon examination of the legislative history, as well as the United States' historical
relationship with Indians, it is clear that all laws dealing with Indians have been explicitly
designed to help them maintain and cultivate their heritage and culture. Subsequently, it
would seem obvious that given the origin of the NAC, ordinary people would be on notice that
an exemption to the NAC may only be an exemption for Indians. For this Court to interpret
the exemption as to so broadly encompass any individual who is a member of a NAC,
regardless of their heritage, would not only open the floodgates of individuals touting religious
freedom as an exemption from prosecution for use of an illegal substance, but it would
diminish and weaken the very purpose that the United States and Congress initially intended by
granting such exemptions. That purpose is for the protection and furtherance of the Indian
culture.
It seems that the Defendants would like this Court to believe that the crux of the
exemption for use of peyote in bona fide religious ceremonies is simply to uphold and protect
thefreedomsguaranteed to all individuals in the First Amendment of the Constitution.
However, upon careful examination of the historical layers of this exemption, this Court is
unwilling to do that. In the eyes of this Court, it is clear that the exemption from prosecution
for use of peyote in bona fide religious ceremonies is limited to those individuals who are of
Indian descent. To date, there has been no official evidence presented to this Court to show
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that the Defendants are legitimately of Indian heritage. Nor, after presiding over the
Preliminary Hearing in this matter, was any evidence presented to this Court that any of the
individuals that the Defendants' were supplying peyote to had any Indian ancestry whatsoever.

m
RULING
This Court denies the Defendants Motion for Dismissal in this case.
Dated this / 2-day of September, 2001.
BY THE/tOl

cc:

David H. T. Wayment
Kathryn Collard
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The listing of peyote as a controlled substance in
Schedule I does not apply to the nondrug use of
peyote in bona fide religious ceremonies of the
Native American Church, and members of the Native
American Church so using peyote are exempt from
registration. Any person who manufactures peyote
for or distributes peyote to the Native American
Church, however, is required to obtain registration
annually and to comply with all other requirements of
law.
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Addendum D

1996a.
§ 1996*

Protection and preservation of traditional religions of
Native Americans

On and after August 11, 1978, it shall be the policy of the United
States to protect and preserve for American Indians their inherent
right of freedom to believe, express, and exercise the traditional
religions of the American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut, and Native Hawaiians, including but not limited to access to sites, use and possession
ot sacred objects, and the freedom to worship through ceremonials
and traditional rites.
(Pub.L. 95-341, § 1, Aug. 11, 1978, 92 Stat. 469.)
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES
Revision Notes and Legislative Reports
1978 Acts. House Report No. 95-1308,
see 1978 U.S. Code Cong, and Adm.
News, p. 1262.
Short Title
1994 Amendments. Pub.L. 103-344,
§ I, Oct. 6, 1994, 108 Stat. 3125, provided that: "This Act [enacting section
1996a of this title] may be cited as the
American Indian Religious Freedom Act
Amendments of 1994'."
1978 Acts. Pub.L. 95-341 [enacting
this section and the note set out under
this section] is popularly known as the
American Indian Religious Freedom
Act".

Federal Implementation of Protective
and Preservation Functions Relating to
Native American Religious Cultural
Rights and Practices; Presidential Report to Congress
Section 2 of Pub.L. 95-341 provided
that the President direct the various Federal departments, agencies, and other instrumentalities responsible for administering relevant laws to evaluate their policies and procedures in consultation with
native traditional religious leaders to determine changes necessary to preserve
Native American religious cultural rights
and practices and report to the Congress
12 months after Aug. 11, 1978.

Traditional Indian religious use of peyote

(a) Congressional findings and declarations
The Congress finds and declares that—
(1) for many Indian people, the traditional ceremonial use of
the peyote cactus as a religious s a c r a m e n t has for centuries been
integral to a way of life, and significant in perpetuating Indian
tribes and cultures;
(2) since 1965, this ceremonial use of peyote by I n d i a n s has
been protected by Federal regulation;
(3) while at least 28 States have enacted laws w h i c h are
similar to, or are in conformance with, the Federal regulation
which protects the ceremonial use of peyote by Indian religious
practitioners, 22 States have not d o n e so, and this lack of
uniformity has created hardship for Indian people w h o partici
pate in such religious ceremonies;
(4) the S u p r e m e Court of the United States, in the case of
Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), held that
the First Amendment does not protect Indian practitioners who
use peyote in Indian religious ceremonies, and also raised uncer
tainty w h e t h e r this religious practice would be protected under
the compelling State interest standard; and
(5) the lack of adequate and clear legal protection for the
religious use of peyote by Indians may serve to stigmatize a n d
marginalize Indian tribes and cultures, and increase the risk t h a t
they will be exposed to discriminatory treatment.
fo) Use, possession, or transportation of peyote
(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the use, possession, or transportation of peyote by an Indian for b o n a fide traditional ceremonial purposes in connection with the practice of a traditional Indian religion is lawful, and shall not be prohibited by the United
States or any State. No Indian shall be penalized or d i s c r i m i n a t e d
against on the basis of such use, possession or transportation, including, but not limited to, denial of otherwise applicable benefits u n d e r
public assistance p r o g r a m s .
(2) This section does not prohibit such reasonable regulation a n d
registration by the Drug Enforcement Administration of those persons who cultivate, harvest, or distribute peyote as may be consistent
with the purposes of this section and section 1996 of this title.
(3) This section does not prohibit application of the provisions of
section 481.111(a) of Vernon's Texas Health and Safety Code Annotated, in effect on October 6, 1994, insofar as those provisions pertain
to the cultivation, harvest, and distribution of peyote.

(4) Nothing in this section shall prohibit any Federal department
or agency, in carrying out its statutory responsibilities and functions,
from promulgating regulations establishing reasonable limitations on
the use or ingestion of peyote prior to or during the performance of
duties by sworn law enforcement officers or personnel directly involved in public transportation or any other safety-sensitive positions
where the performance of such duties may be adversely affected by
such use or ingestion. Such regulations shall be adopted only after
consultation with representatives of traditional Indian religions for
which the sacramental use of peyote is integral to their practice.
Any regulation promulgated p u r s u a n t to this section shall be subject
to the balancing test set forth in section 3 of the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (Public Law 103-141; 42 U.S.C. 2 0 0 0 b b - l ) .
(5) This section
ties to permit, nor
from permitting,
within Federal or

shall not be construed as requiring prison authorishall it be construed to prohibit prison authorities
access to peyote by Indians while incarcerated
State prison facilities.

(6) Subject to the provisions of the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act (Public Law 103-141; 42 U.S.C. 2 0 0 0 b b - l ) [42 U.S.C.A.
& 2000bb et seq.], this section shall not be construed to prohibit
States from enacting or enforcing reasonable traffic safety laws 0 r
regulations.
(7) Subject to the provisions of the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act (Public Law 103-141; 42 U.S.C. 2 0 0 0 b b - l ) [42 U.S.C.A
§ 2000bb et seq.], this section does not prohibit the Secretary Qf
Defense from promulgating regulations establishing reasonable limi.
tations on the use, possession, transportation, or distribution of
peyote to p r o m o t e military readiness, safety, or compliance with
international law or laws of other countries. Such regulations shall
be adopted only after consultation with representatives of traditional
Indian religions for which the sacramental use of peyote is integral to
their practice.

(c) Definitions
For purposes of this section—
(1) the term " I n d i a n " means a m e m b e r of an Indian tribe;
(2) the term "Indian tribe" m e a n s any tribe, band, nation,
pueblo, or other organized group or community of Indians,
including any Alaska Native village (as defined in, or established
pursuant to, the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (43 U.S.C.
1601 et seq.)), which is recognized as eligible for the special
p r o g r a m s and services provided by the United States to Indians
because of their status as Indians;
(3) the term " I n d i a n religion" m e a n s any religion—
(A) which is practiced by Indians, and
(B) the origin and interpretation of which is from within a
traditional Indian culture or community; and
(4) the term " S t a t e " m e a n s any State of the United States, and
any political subdivision thereof.
(d) Protection of rights of Indians and Indian tribes
Nothing in this section jhall be construed as abrogating, diminishing, or otherwise affecting—
(1) the inherent rights of any Indian tribe;
(2) the rights, express or implicit, of any Indian tribe which
exist u n d e r treaties, Executive orders, and laws of the United
States;
(3) the inherent right of Indians to practice their religions;
and
(4) the right of Indians to practice their religions u n d e r any
Federal or State law.
(Pub.L. 95-341, § 3, as added Pub.L. 103-344, § 2, Oct. 6, 1994, 108 Stat
3125.)
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H.R. REP. 103-675
H.R. Rep. No. 675, 103RD Cong., 2ND Sess. 1994, 1994 WL 440338 (Leg.Hist.)
(Cite as: H.R. REP. 103-675, 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2404)
*1 P.L. 103-344, **2404 AMERICAN INDIAN RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ACT
AMENDMENTS OF 1994
DATES OF CONSIDERATION AND PASSAGE
House: August 8, 1994
Senate: September 27, 1994
Cong. Record Vol. 140 (1994)
House Report (Natural Resources Committee) No. 103-675
Aug. 5, 1994 (To accompany H.R. 4230)
HOUSE REPORT NO. 103-675
August 5, 1994
[To accompany H.R. 4230]
The Committee on Natural Resources, to whom was referred the bill (H.R. 4230) to
amend the American Indian Religious Freedom Act to provide for the traditional use
of peyote by Indians for religious purposes, and for other purposes, having
considered the same, report favorably thereon with an amendment and recommend that
the bill as amended do pass.
The amendment is as follows:
Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert in lieu thereof the
following:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the "American Indian Religious Freedom Act Amendments
of 1994".
SEC. 2. TRADITIONAL INDIAN RELIGIOUS USE OF THE PEYOTE SACRAMENT.
The Act of August 11, 1978 (42 U.S.C. 1996), commonly referred to as the
"American Indian Religious Freedom Act", is amended by adding at the end thereof the
following new section:
"Sec. 3. (a) The Congress finds and declares that'll) for many Indian people, the traditional ceremonial use of the peyote cactus
as a religious sacrament has for centuries been integral to a way of life, and
significant in perpetuating Indian tribes and cultures;
"(2) since 1965, this ceremonial use of peyote by Indians has been protected by
Federal regulation;
"(3) while at least 28 States have enacted laws which are similar to, or are in
conformance with, the Federal regulation which protects the ceremonial use of peyote
by Indian religious practitioners, 22 States have not done so, and this lack of
uniformity has created hardship for Indian people who participate in such religious
ceremonies;
*2 "(4) the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of Employment
Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), held that the First Amendment does not
protect Indian practitioners who use peyote in Indian religious ceremonies, and also
raised uncertainty whether this religious practice would be protected under the
compelling State interest standard; and
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"(5) the lack of adequate and clear legal protection for the religious use of
peyote by Indians may serve to stigmatize and marginalize Indian tribes and
cultures, and increase the risk that they will be exposed to discriminatory
treatment.
"(b)(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the use, possession, or
transportation of peyote by an Indian for bona fide traditional ceremonial purposes
in connection with the practice of a traditional Indian religion is lawful, and
shall not be prohibited by the United States or any State. No Indian shall be
penalized or discriminated against on the basis of such use, possession or
transportation, including, but not limited to, denial of otherwise applicable
benefits under public assistance programs.
"(2) This sect ion does not prohibit such reasonable regulation and registration
by the Drug Enforcement Administration of those persons who cultivate, harvest, or
distribute peyote as may be consistent with the purposes of this Act.
"(3) This section does not prohibit application of the provisions of section
481.111(a) of Vernon's Texas Health and Safety Code Annotated, in effect on the date
of enactment of this section, insofar as those provisions pertain to the
cultivation, harvest, and distribution of peyote.
"(4) Nothing in this section shall prohibit any Federal department or agency, in
carrying out its statutory responsibilities and functions, from promulgating
regulations establishing reasonable time limitations on the use or ingestion of
peyote prior to performance of official duties by active duty military personnel,
sworn law enforcement officers, or personnel directly involved in public
transportation or any other safety-sensitive positions where the performance of such
duties may be adversely affected by such use or ingestion, nor shall this section
prohibit affected departments or agencies from establishing reasonable limitations
on the transportation of peyote on military bases or overseas. Such regulations
shall be adopted only after consultation with representatives of traditional Indian
religions for which the sacramental use of peyote is integral to their practice. Any
regulation promulgated pursuant to this section shall be subject to the balancing
test set forth in section 3 of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (Public Law 103141; 42 U.S.C. 2000bb-l).
"(c) For purposes of this section"(1) the term 'Indian' means a member of an Indian tribe;
"(2) the term 'Indian tribe' means any tribe, band, nation, pueblo, or other
organized group or community of Indians, including any Alaska Native village {as
defined in, or established pursuant to, the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (43
U.S.C. 1601 et seq.)), which is recognized as eligible for the special programs and
services provided by the United States to Indians because of their status as
Indians;
"(3) the term 'Indian religion' means any religion"(A) which is practiced by Indians, and
"(B) the origin and interpretation of which is from within a traditional Indian
culture or community; and
"(4) the term 'State' means any State of the United States, and any political
subdivision thereof.
"(d) Nothing in this section shall be construed as abrogating, diminishing, or
otherwise affecting"(1) the inherent rights of any Indian tribe;
"(2) the rights, express or implicit, of any Indian tribe which exist under
treaties, executive orders, and laws of the United States;
"(3) the inherent right of Indians to practice their religions; and
"(4) the right of Indians to practice their religions under any Federal or State
law.".
••2404 PURPOSE
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The purpose of H.R. 4230 is to amend the American Indian Religious Freedom Act to
provide for the traditional use of peyote by Indians for religious purposes, and for
other purposes.
*3 BACKGROUND AND NEED
Peyote, the scientific name of which is Lophophora williamsii, is a small,
spineless cactus that grows only in the Rio Grande valley of southern Texas and
northern Mexico. Anthropologists date the sacramental use of the peyote cactus among
indigenous peoples back 10,000 years. Native American religious use of peyote was
discovered by Spanish explorers in the 1600's and has continued to the present. Such
use exists today, largely through the Native American Church (NAC), among more than
50 Indian tribes in the United States. The NAC is the present-day embodiment of one
of the oldest religious traditions in the western hemisphere. The contemporary NAC
was first incorporated in Oklahoma in 1918, and **2405 now has chapters in 25
States. Approximately 250,000 American Indians are affiliated with the NAC.
The Federal District Court in New Mexico, in the 1986 case of Toledo v. NobelSysco, Inc., 651 F.Supp. 483 (D.N.M. 1986) held that the religious use of peyote was
not illegal. The court found that:
Church peyote users believe that peyote is a sacred and powerful plant. Peyote
is seen as a medicine, a protector, and a teacher. In terms used by other religions,
peyote can be called a sacrament, something which when eaten gives awareness of God.
The use of peyote is central to the Native American peyote religion. The religion
teaches that those who use peyote must not use alcohol. It encourages love of
parents and obedience to parents, fidelity to a spouse, and charity towards others.
The peyote religion does not prohibit members from also practicing other religions.
Medical evidence, based on scientific studies and opinions of scientific and other
experts, including medical doctors, former directors of the Indian Health Service
and Enthropologists, clearly demonstrates peyote is not injurious to the Indian
religious user, and, in fact, is often helpful in controlling alcoholism and alcohol
abuse among Indian people. Ingested as a solid or tea in strictly prescribed and
controlled religious ceremonies, the sacrament is neither addictive nor habit
forming. Courts which have made factual findings regarding the religious use of
peyote by Indians have concluded that such use is not harmful.
While the First Amendment right of Indian practitioners of the peyote religion is
endangered by the Smith decision, its religious use is basically non-controversial.
Attempts by the Congress to recognize and protect this right have a long history.
When the House of Representatives passed H.R. 2, which became the "Drug Abuse
Control Amendments of 1965", it protected the right of Indians to use peyote in
connection with the ceremonies of a certified religious organization. The Senate
omitted that specific protection, preferring that substances be included on such a
list on a case-by-case basis. Congressman Harris assured House members that such
omissions would not prevent bona fide religious use because courts had already
upheld peyote use as a First Amendment right. The Administration then added peyote
to Schedule I by administrative *4 regulation in 1966, but provided an exemption for
non-drug use of peyote in religious ceremonies of the Native American Church.
When Congress passed the Controlled Substance Act of 1970, it enacted Schedule I
into law. During hearings on the legislation, Congressman Satterfield expressed
concern that the religious use of peyote by Indian practitioners be protected. The
Administration assured him that this would be taken care of by regulation. The
regulations, adopted in 1971 to implement the Act, provide at 21 CFR S 1307.31:
The listing of peyote as a controlled substance in Schedule I does not apply to
the nondrug use of peyote in bona fide religious ceremonies of the Native American
Church.
**2406 Since that time, Native American Church use of peyote as a religious
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sacrament has had the limited protection of Federal regulation. Officials of the
Drug Enforcement Administration of the Department of Justice testified at House
hearings in 1993 and 1994 that the religious use of peyote by Indians has nothing to
do with the vast and violent traffic in illegal narcotics that plagues this country.
The DEA further testified that it is unaware of the diversion of peyote to any
illicit market. The NAC has a good, cooperative relationship with the DEA in
ensuring that peyote is lawfully harvested and distributed solely for American
Indian religious use. The distribution of peyote is strictly controlled by Federal
regulations, and by the laws and regulations of the State of Texas, the only State
in which the sacrament grows in significant quantities.
In addition to the Federal regulatory exemption of the DEA, 28 States provide some
degree of legal protection for the religious use of peyote by Indians. However,
neither the Federal regulation nor the State laws provide the full range of
protection needed for the unhindered religious use of peyote by Indians, and 22
States still have no legal protection at all. In some States, the legal protection
for Indians is limited to the opportunity to assert the religious use of peyote as
an affirmative defense in the context of felony prosecution. Thus, bona fide NAC
members can be arrested, finger-printed, incarcerated and subjected to all the
indignities of a felony prosecution before they can be vindicated and set free. Even
then, they will have a criminal record-simply for practicing a bona fide religion
that predates the founding of this country by some 10,000 years.
As a result of the diverse State laws governing the use of peyote, Indians in
different tribes from different States, as well as from different tribes within some
States, are treated differently regarding the traditional religious use of peyote.
[FN1] NAC members who have *5 lawfully acquired the sacrament in Texas can still be
arrested and subjected to felony prosecution and imprisonment in 22 States, States
in which they may live or through which they must travel on their way home from
Texas after lawfully acquiring the sacrament. This current State-by-State patchwork
of laws has a chilling effect on the freedom of many Indian people to travel in this
country and to practice their religion. Legislation is therefore needed to assure
comprehensive, equal and uniform protection of the religious use of peyote by
Indians throughout the United States, without regard to the State or reservation of
residence, or tribal affiliation.
**2407 While 28 States do provide varying legal protections for the religious use
of peyote by Indians, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in 1990 in the Smith case that it
is constitutionally permissible for States to prohibit such use. This legislation is
made necessary by the Smith ruling.
THE SMITH DECISION AND RESTORATION OF THE COMPELLING GOVERNMENT INTEREST TEST
The Smith case began as an unemployment compensation dispute involving Alfred
Smith, a Native American employee of a private drug and alcohol rehabilitation
facility. Smith was fired and denied unemployment benefits after acknowledging he
had ingested the peyote sacrament during a traditional religious ceremony of the
Native American Church. The Oregon Employment Division believed that the State had a
compelling interest in proscribing the use of certain drugs pursuant to a controlled
substance law.
Smith filed a case disputing the denial of unemployment benefits and questioning
the constitutionality of the controlled substance law as it applied to his religious
practice. Following protracted litigation, the Oregon Supreme Court ruled that the
prohibition on the sacramental use of peyote violated the free exercise clause of
the First Amendment.
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding that the free exercise clause of the
First Amendment did not prohibit the State of Oregon from banning the sacramental
use of peyote through its general criminal prohibition laws, or from denying
unemployment benefits to persons dismissed from their jobs for such religiously
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inspired use. In an opinion written by Justice Scalia (joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices White, Stevens, and Kennedy), the Court discarded the longstanding compelling interest test, holding that facially neutral laws of general
applicability that burden the free exercise of religion require no special
justification to satisfy free exercise scrutiny.
Finally, the Court asserted that the free exercise of religion may be protected
through the political process. According to the majority, its inability to find
constitutional protection for religiously inspired action burdened by generally
applicable laws does not mean statutory exemptions to such laws are not permitted or
even desired. However, the majority noted:
It may fairly be said that leaving accommodation to the political process will
place at a relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely
engaged in; but that *6 unavoidable consequence of democratic government must be
preferred to a system in which each conscience is a law unto itself or in which
judges weight the social importance of all laws against the centrality of all
religious beliefs. [FN2]
To reach its decision, the majority had to strain its reading of the First
Amendment and ignore years of precedent in which the compelling government interest
test was applied in a variety of circumstances. In a strongly worded concurrence,
Justice O'Connor took sharp issue with the Court's abandonment of the compelling
government interest test. Justice O'Connor reviewed the Court's **2408 precedents
and found that they confirmed that the compelling interest standard is the
appropriate means to protect the religious liberty guaranteed by the First
Amendment:
To say that a person's right to free exercise has been burdened, of course, does
not mean that he has an absolute right to engage in the conduct. Under our
established First Amendment jurisprudence, we have recognized that the freedom to
act, unlike the freedom to believe, cannot be absolute. Instead, we have respected
both the First Amendment's express textual mandate and the governmental interest in
regulation of conduct by requiring the government to justify any substantial burden
on religiously motivated conduct by a compelling state interest and by means
narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. [FN3]
This controversial decision by a divided Court has been heavily criticized by
constitutional law scholars, religious leaders, and civil libertarians. In 1993,
Congress overturned portions of the Smith decision by enacting the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), Pub. L. 103-141, 107 Stat 1488 (42 U.S.C. S S 2000bb
et seq.,). However, RFRA left open the question of whether the reinstated compelling
government interest test would provide adequate legal protection for the traditional
religious use of peyote by American Indians-the precise religious practice at issue
in Smith. As President Clinton emphasized when he signed the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act on November 16, 1993:
The agenda for restoration of religious freedom in America will not be complete
until traditional Native American religious practices have received the protection
they deserve. My Administration has been and will continue to work actively with
Native Americans and the Congress on legislation to address these concerns.
NEED FOR H.R. 4230 NOTWITHSTANDING THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT OF
1993
The Committee recognizes that H.R. 4230 remains necessary notwithstanding the
recent enactment of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993. Justice O'Connor
agreed with the judgment of the majority in Smith that Oregon's prohibition of the
sacramental use of peyote was constitutionally permissible. However, she thought it
unnecessary to discard the compelling government interest *7 test in order to reach
this result. Instead, Justice O'Connor would have retained and applied the
traditional test to rule that the religious use of peyote by Indians is not
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protected by the first Amendment, since in her view the "State in this case has a
compelling interest in regulating peyote use by its citizens- + + *" [FN4] In Justice
O'Connor's view, Oregon would have met the compelling government interest test
solely on the judgment of the State legislature to list peyote as a Class 1
controlled substance, and notwithstanding factual considerations.
**2409 The Supreme Court's reliance on Oregon's position in Smith that the State
has an interest in protecting the health and safety of its citizens from the
"dangers" of peyote is highly questionable. As pointed out by Justice Blackmun in
his dissent in Smith, Oregon's position "rests on no evidentiary foundation at all,"
and is therefore "entirely speculative". [FN5J
As underscored by the dissent, the
majority agreed with Oregon's assertion, notwithstanding that Oregon failed to offer
any "evidence that the religious use of peyote has ever harmed anyone." [FN6] To
the contrary, the record in Smith amply showed that: [FN7]
(1) Factual findings of other courts contradict Oregon's assumption that the
religious use of peyote is harmful;
(2) Medical evidence, based on the opinion of scientists and other experts,
including medical doctors and anthropologists, is that peyote is not injurious;
(3) The distribution and use of peyote has nothing to do with the vast and
violent traffic in illegal narcotics that plagues this country;
(4) There is virtually no illegal trafficking in peyote-Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) data indicates that between 1980 and 1987, only 19.4 pounds of
peyote was confiscated, while during the same period the DEA seized over 15 million
pounds of marijuana;
(5) The distribution of peyote is strictly controlled by Federal and Texas State
regulations-the only State where peyote grows in significant quantities;
(6) The carefully circumscribed religious context in which peyote is used by
Indians is far removed from the irresponsible and unrestricted recreational use of
unlawful drugs, and is similar to the sacramental use of wine by the Roman Catholic
Church, which was exempted from the general statutory ban on possession and use of
alcohol during Prohibition;
(7) The Federal Government and 23 States [now 28] provide an exemption from
respective drug laws for the religious use of peyote by American Indians;
(8) Native American Church doctrine forbids the non-religious use of peyote, and
also advocates self-reliance, familial responsibility and abstinence from alcohol;
(9) Spiritual and social support provided by the Native American Church has been
effective in combatting the tragic effects of alcoholism among the Native American
population;
*8 (10) Oregon's assertion that granting a religious exemption for the use of
peyote would open the floodgates to claims for the religious use of controlled
substances by other religious denominations is not an issue because the Supreme
Court and lower courts over the years have consistently rejected similar arguments
in past free exercise cases,
having held that the religious use of peyote by
American Indians is the sole circumstance**2410 warranting claims for a religious
exemption for any controlled substance; and
(11) granting a religious exemption solely for the sacramental use of peyote by
American Indians presents no equal protection problems.
Notwithstanding the above-referenced record in Smith, Justice O'Connor felt Oregon
had a compelling interest to prohibit the religious use of peyote, even though
Oregon had never evinced a concrete interest in enforcing its drug laws against
religious users of peyote-including Al Smith, the plaintiff in the Smith case. The
committee recognizes that traditional Indian religions, including the peyote
religion, are highly unique in nature and are little understood by the courts and
other government officials. Given this backdrop, the Committee believes that the
traditional religious use of the peyote sacrament by Indians requires statutory
protection. H.R. 4230 responds to the Supreme Court's invitation in Smith to
accommodate this ancient religious practice through the political process.
Absent Federal legislation, the question of whether a given State has a compelling
interest to prohibit the religious use of peyote by Indians is one that would
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necessarily be determined by the courts on a State-by-State basis. The Committee
recognizes that such determination could require numerous State supreme court
decisions and a corresponding number of U.S. Supreme Court opinions-with varying
results possible, as well as numerous lower State and Federal court decisions. Such
piecemeal judicial resolution to this issue is not likely to produce uniform, just
or equal results, and would be unduly burdensome, costly and time consuming. The
Committee recognizes that uniform and equal protection of Indians without regard to
State or reservation of residence, or tribal affiliation, can only be accomplished
by Congress through comprehensive legislation.
CONSTITUTIONALITY
Since the creation of the United States, the treaty relationship between Indian
tribes and the United States government has engendered a long-standing political
relationship under the Constitution. This relationship includes a Federal trust
responsibility for Indian tribes which has resulted in hundreds of separate Federal
statutes dealing with all aspects of Indian life, including health, education,
religion, economic development, children, employment, language and culture, gaming,
and a host of other subject matter areas. An entire title of the United States Code
(25 U.S.C.) is devoted exclusively to Indian legislation.
Because Indians and Indian tribes occupy a sui generis legal status in Federal law
under the U.S. Constitution and enjoy a special political relationship with the
United States Government, separate *9 Indian legislation has consistently been
upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court under the legal principles set forth in Morton v.
Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551-55 (1974). At the urging of the U.S. Department of
Justice, the long-standing rationale for special Indian treatment by the Federal
Government was recently applied by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals regarding the
religious use of peyote in Peyote Way Church of God v. Thornburgh, 922 F.2d 1210
(5th Cir. 1991). Finding that the Native American Church (NAC) members were also
members of federally recognized tribes,**2411 the Fifth Circuit upheld the
constitutionality of the DEA's protective regulation against an equal protection
challenge:
We hold that the federal NAC exemption allowing tribal Native Americans to
continue their centuries-old tradition of peyote use is rationally related to the
legitimate governmental objective of preserving Native American culture. Such
preservation is fundamental to the Federal Government's trust relationship with
tribal Native Americans. Under Morton, [non-Indians] are not similarly situated toNAC [members] for purposes of cultural preservation and thus, the Federal Government
may exempt NAC members from statutes prohibiting possession of peyote without
extending the exemption to [non- Indians]. [FN8]
The Fifth Circuit also ruled that the DEA exemption for NAC members did not
violate the establishment clause of the First Amendment:
The unique guardian-ward relationship between the Federal Government and Native
American Indian tribes precludes the degree of separation of church and state
ordinarily required by the First Amendment. The Federal Government cannot at once
fulfill its constitutional role as protector of tribal Native Americans and apply
conventional separatist understandings of the establishment clause to that
relationship.
***Thus, we hold that the Federal NAC exemption represents the Government's
protection of the culture of quasi-sovereign Native American tribes and as such,
does not represent an establishment of religion in contravention of the First
Amendment. [FN9]
Based on the special relationship between the United States and federally
recognized tribes, and on Peyote Way Church of God, the U.S. Department of Justice
testified that Congress has the requisite authority to enact H.R. 4230, and that it
is constitutionally sound. Accordingly, the Committee is confident that the granting
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of a statutory religious exemption for the sacramental use of peyote solely by
American Indians presents no equal protection or establishment clause problems, and
therefore stands on a solid constitutional footing.
*10 COMMITTEE AMENDMENT
The Committee Amendment to H.R. 4230 provides that Federal departments or agencies
are not prohibited from promulgating regulations establishing reasonable time
limitations on the use or ingestion **2412 of peyote prior to performance of
official duties by active military personnel, sworn law enforcement officers, or
personnel directly involved in public safety or safety-sensitive positions where the
performance of such duties may be adversely affected by such use or ingestion. While
the committee is unaware of any such problems in the past, it intends to accommodate
prospective concerns articulated principally by the Department of Transportation and
Department of Defense.
An official of the Native American Church testified at the June 10, 1994 hearing
of the Native American Affairs Subcommittee that the effects of peyote do not
persist more than 6 hours. The Committee recognizes the medical literature and
related studies indicate that mescaline, the psychoactive component of peyote, may
persist in the brain for up to 9 to 10 hours, [FN10] and that the physiological
effects of peyote can last up to 12 hours. [FN11] The committee therefore deems a
period of 6 to 24 hours to be "reasonable" as to authorized time limitations
regarding the use or ingestion of peyote, pursuant to regulations the departments or
agencies may promulgate under H.R. 4230. The committee further believes that, where
an agency proposes a time limitation exceeding 24 hours, it should be prepared to
show such limitation meets the balancing test set forth in the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act. The Committee is confident that the bill and the 6 to 24 hour range
for time limitations will adequately and amply meet the needs of affected
departments, and will not adversely impact the ability of U.S. military personnel,
law enforcement officers or persons directly involved in positions related to public
safety to maintain good order, discipline, security and safety.
The Committee does not intend the act to impose requirements that would exacerbate
the difficult and complex challenges of operating the Nation's prisons and jails in
a safe and secure manner. Accordingly, the Committee does not intend the Act to
require prison officials to either prescribe or proscribe the religious use of
peyote by Indian inmates. Rather, the Committee expects that these matters will be
addressed under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, and that the courts
will continue the tradition of giving due deference to the experience and expertise
of prison and jail administrators in establishing necessary rules and procedures to
maintain good order, security and discipline.
SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE
Section 1 provides that the Act may be cited as the "American Indian Religious
Freedom Act Amendments of 1994".
**2413 *11 SECTION 2. TRADITIONAL INDIAN RELIGIOUS USE OF THE PEYOTE
SACRAMENT
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Section 2 amends the American Indian Religious Freedom Act of 1978 by adding a new
"Section 3" as follows:
Subsection (a) provides the findings of the Congress.
Subsection (b)(1) provides that the use, possession or transportation of peyote by
an Indian for ceremonial purposes is lawful and is not to be prohibited by the
United States or any State Government. It further provides that no Indian is to be
penalized or discriminated against on the basis of the use, possession or
transportation of peyote and benefits under public assistance programs are not to be
denied.
Subection (b)(2) provides that this section does not prohibit the regulation and
registration by the Drug Enforcement Administration of persons who cultivate,
harvest or distribute peyote under this Act.
Subsection (b)(3) provides that this section is not to impact a Texas law
governing the growing and distribution of peyote.
Subsection (b)(4) provides that departments or agencies are not prohibited from
promulgating regulations establishing reasonable time limitations on the use or
ingestion of peyote prior to the performance of official duties by certain
personnel. This subsection also provides that affected departments or agencies are
not prohibited from establishing reasonable limitations on the transportation of
peyote on military bases or overseas. The regulations are to be adopted only after
consultation with representatives of traditional Indian religions for which the
sacramental use of peyote is integral.
Subsection (c) provides for definitions for terms used in this section.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
H.R. 4230 was introduced by Representatives Richardson on April 14, 1994. The
Subcommittee on Native American Affairs held a hearing on H.R. 4230 on June 10,
1994. The Subcommittee considered and unanimously passed a substitute amendment to
H.R. 4230, which was reported to the Committee on Natural Resources. On July 27,
1994, the Committee on Natural Resources considered H.R. 4230 and ordered it to be
reported to the House with an amendment.
COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS
The Committee on Natural Resources, by voice vote, approved the bill with
amendments and recommends its enactment by the House.
CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW MADE BY THE BILL, AS REPORTED
In compliance with clause 3 of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of
Representatives, changes in existing law made by the bill, as reported, are shown as
follows (existing law proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new
matter is printed in italics, existing law in which no change is proposed is shown
in roman):
•12 SECTION 3 OF THE ACT OF AUGUST 11, 1978
(POPULARLY KNOWN AS THE AMERICAN INDIAN RELIGIOUS FREEEDOM ACT)
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Sec.
3. (a) The Congress finds and declares that(1) for many Indian people, the traditional ceremonial use of the peyote cactus
as a religious sacrament has for centuries been integral to a way of life, and
significant in perpetuating Indian tribes and cultures;
(2) since 1965, this ceremonial use of peyote by Indians has been protected by
Federal regulation;
(3) while at least 28 States have enacted laws which are similar to, or are in
conformance with, the Federal regulation which protects the ceremonial use of peyote
by Indian religious practitioners, 22 States have not done so, and this lack of
uniformity has created hardship for Indian people who participate in such religious
ceremonies;
(4) the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of Employment Division
v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), held that the First Amendment does not protect Indian
practitioners who use peyote in Indian religious ceremonies, and also raised
uncertainty whether this religious practice would be protected under the compelling
State interest standard; and
(5) the lack of adequate and clear legal protection for the religious use of
peyote by Indians may serve to stigmatize and marginalize Indian tribes and
cultures, and increase the risk that they will be exposed to discriminatory
treatment.
(b)(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the use, possession, or
transportation of peyote by an Indian for bona fide traditional ceremonial purposes
in connection with the practice of a traditional Indian religion is lawful, and
shall not be prohibited by the United States or any State. No Indian shall be
penalized or discriminated against on the basis of such use, possession or
transportation, including, but not limited to, denial of otherwise applicable
benefits under public assistance programs.
(2) This section does not prohibit such reasonable regulation and registration
by the Drug Enforcement Administration of those persons who cultivate, harvest, or
distribute peyote as may be consistent with the purposes of this Act.
(3) This section does not prohibit application of the provisions of section
481.111(a) of Vernon's Texas Health and Safety Code Annotated, in effect on the date
of enactment of this section, insofar as those provisions pertain to the
cultivation, harvest, and distribution of peyote.
(4) Nothing in this section shall prohibit any Federal department or agency, in
carrying out its statutory responsibilities and functions, from promulgating
regulations establishing reasonable time limitations on the use or ingestion of
peyote prior to performance of official duties by active duty military personnel,
sworn law enforcement officers, or personnel directly involved in public
transportation or any other safety-sensitive positions where the performance of such
duties may be adversely affected by such use or ingestion, nor shall this section
prohibit affected departments or agencies from establishing reasonable limitations
on the transportation of peyote on *13 military bases or overseas. Such regulations
shall be adopted only after consultation with representatives of traditional Indian
religions for which the sacramental use of peyote is integral to their practice. Any
regulation promulgated pursuant to this section shall be subject to the balancing
test set forth in section 3 of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (Public Law 103141; 42 U.S.C. 2000bb-l).
(c) For purposes of this section(1) the term "Indian" means a member of an Indian tribe;
(2) the term "Indian tribe" means any tribe, band, nation, pueblo, or other
organized group or community of Indians, including any Alaska Native village (as
defined in, or established pursuant to, the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (43
U.S.C. 1601 et seq.)), which is recognized as eligible for the special programs and
services provided by the United States to Indians because of their status as
Indians;
(3) the term "Indian religion" means any religion-
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(A) which is practiced by Indians, and
(B) the origin and interpretation of which is from within a traditional Indian
culture or community; and
(4) the term "State" means any State of the United States, and any political
subdivision thereof.
(d) Nothing in this section shall be construed as abrogating, diminishing, or
otherwise affecting(1) the inherent rights of any Indian tribe;
(2) the rights, express or implicit, of any Indian tribe which exist under
treaties, executive orders, and laws of the United States;
(3) the inherent right of Indians to practice their religions; and
(4) the right of Indians to practice their religions under any Federal or State
law.

**2414 OVERSIGHT STATEMENT

The Committee on Natural Resources will have continuing responsibility for
oversight of the implementation of H.R. 4230 after enactment. No reports or
recommendations were received pursuant to rule X, clause 2 of the rules of the House
of Representatives.

INFLATIONARY IMPACT STATEMENT
Enactment of H.R. 4230 will have no inflationary impact.

COST AND BUDGET ACT COMPLIANCE

The cost and budgetary analysis of H.R. 4230, as evaluated by the Congressional
Budget Office is set forth below:
*14 U.S. Congress,
Congressional Budget Office,
Washington, DC, August 3, 1994.
Hon. George Miller,
Chairman, Committee on Natural Resources,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has reviewed H.R. 4230, the
American Indian Religious Freedom Act Amendments of 1994, as ordered reported by the
House Committee on Natural Resources on July 27, 1994. We estimate the
implementation of the bill would have no effect on the Federal budget or on the
budgets of State or local governments. Enactment of H.R. 4230 would not affect
direct spending or receipts. Therefore, pay-as-you-go procedures would not apply to
this bill.
H.R. 4230 would amend the American Indian Religious Freedom Act of 1978 by adding
a new section that would permit the use, possession, or transportation of peyote by
Indians for sacramental purposes. However, the bill would not prohibit the Drug
Enforcement Administration from regulating peyote cultivation or distribution, nor
would it prohibit Federal agencies from regulating peyote use by certain types of
Federal personnel prior to performing their official duties.
If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be pleased to provide them.

Copr. © West 2003 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works

Page 12
The CBO staffcontact is Rachel A. Robertson.
Sincerely,
James T. Blum,
(For Robert D. Reischauer) .
U.S. Department of Justice,
Drug Enforcement Administration,
Washington, DC, August 3, 1994.
Mr. Tadd Johnson,
Chief Counsel, Subcommittee on Native American Affairs, House of
Representatives, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Johnson: It is my understanding that H.R. 4230, "American Indian
Religious Freedom Act of 1994", is nearing floor **2415 consideration in the House.
You will recall that while the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) was unable to
have a witness at your hearing regarding this matter on June 10, 1994, that we did
submit a statement for the record. That statement succinctly puts forth the history
of DEA's regulation of peyote and the exemption for its use in traditional Native
American ceremonies. DEA has encountered no problems with the use of peyote in these
traditional ceremonies nor has diversion of peyote been a problem.
DEA has had a long and cooperative association with the Native American Church,
working with them since the early 1970's to assure that our mutual concerns
relating to peyote are met. We have worked with its representatives to assure that
the bill language effectively addresses these matters. DEA supports the passage of
H.R. 4230 as it was reported by the Committee on Natural Resources with the
amendments that address public safety concerns.
*15 If I can provide you with any other information pertaining to DEA's experience
regarding peyote, please let me know.
Sincerely,
David A. Melocik,
DEA, Congressional Affairs.
STATEMENT OF GENE R. HAISLIP, DEPUTY ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, OFFICE OF
DIVERSION CONTROL, DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION
Chairman Richardson and Members of the Subcommittee:
The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) appreciates the opportunity to comment
regarding H.R. 4230 "American Indian Religious Freedom Act of 1994." This bill seeks
to statutorily provide for the traditional use of peyote by Indians for religious
purposes.
Almost 25 years ago when Congress began hearings pertaining to the Controlled
Substances Act (CSA) they decided that the traditional, historic use of peyote by
members of the Native American Church (NAC) as a sacrament in traditional religious
ceremonies warranted a specific exemption. Congress determined, to be consistent
with past Federal practice, this exemption should be specified in regulation rather
in law. Consequently, an exception was created for the NAC to use peyote for
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religious purposes. Although the NAC is not defined in the subject regulations, the
members of this church are required to be Native American.
The regulation has worked very well for both DEA and the NAC with only minor
difficulties from time to time concerning the natural supply of the drug and the
difficulties obtaining peyote outside of the area where it grows locally. In fact,
our experience over the years in enforcing this regulation has revealed no
particular problems of abuse of this substance by the NAC or its members.
Unfortunately there will always be individuals who seek to circumvent the
regulations for their own purposes and on occasion, DEA has dealt with groups who
have attempted to expand the exemption to authorize the use of peyote or other
controlled substances in what they claimed to be religious ceremonies.
**2416 On occasion, peyote, who primary active ingredient is mescaline, a
hallucinogen similar to LSD, has been found in the illicit traffic. It has not been
reported by DEA, State or local enforcement agencies to be anything other than a
sporadic problem. Despite the fact that the regulation allows for the legal use of
the drug and the registration of legitimate distributors, DEA at this time is not
aware of the diversion of the drug to any illicit market.
Although we at DEA feel that the regulation that has been in place for almost 25
years has worked well, we would prefer a statutory exemption over an administrative
exemption. We have reviewed H.R. 4230 and could support the bill if amended to: (1)
restrict the use, possession, or transportation of peyote to bona fide traditional
ceremonial purposes only; and (2) to make clarifying amendments to address public
safety concerns.
DEA and the NAC have maintained a close working relationship to allow the use of
peyote for religious ceremony without diversion or abuse. DEA believes the passage
of this legislation will serve to *16 strengthen the uniform application throughout
all of the states without reprisal to NAC members of this religious exception.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I will be pleased to answer any
questions that you may have.
FN1 For example, there are three Indian reservations in Nebraska where Native
Americans reside: the Winnebago, Omaha and Santee Sioux. Nebraska state law does not
provide for an exemption for the religious use of peyote by Indians. Therefore,
Native American Church members transporting the sacrament to any of the three
Nebraska reservations could be arrested, prosecuted and incarcerated if caught in
possession of the sacrament anywhere in the state before they enter the reservation.
As a result of Federal Indian policy and related jurisdictional matters, the State
of Nebraska does not have criminal jurisdiction over the Winnebago or Omaha
reservations, but does have such authority over the Santee Sioux Reservation. Thus,
Omaha and Winnebago Indians may lawfully use peyote for religious purposes on their
own reservations, because state law is not applicable there and such use is
protected by the federal exemption of the DEA. However, Indians using the sacrament
on the Santee Sioux Reservation could be prosecuted under state law since Nebraska
criminal law is applicable at Santee and there is no state law exemption for the
religious use of the sacrament. Such anomalous situations are not uncommon and
underscore the need for a uniform national law that will provide American Indians
with equal protection throughout the nation.
FN2 494 U.S. at 890.
FN3 Id. at 894 (citations omitted).
FN4 494 U.S. at 907.
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FN5 494 U.S. at 911.
FN6 494 U.S. at 911-12.
FN7 494 U.S. at 911-18 for precise citations of the enumerated paragraphs.
FN8 Id. at 1216.
FN9 Id. at 1217.
FN10 See e.g., Oakley and Ksir, "Drugs, Society and Human Behavior," Times
Mirror/Mosby, St. Louis, 1990, pp. 309-311.
FN11 See e.g., Dorrance, Janiger, and Teplitz, "Effect of Peyote on Human
Chromosomes-Cytogenetic Study of the Huichol Indians of Northern Mexico," "Journal
of the American Medical Association," Vol. 234, No. 3, October 20, 1975, pp. 299302.
H.R. REP. 103-675, H.R. Rep. No. 675, 103RDCong., 2ND Sess. 1994, 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2404, 1994 WL 440338 (Leg.Hist.)
END OF DOCUMENT
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Defendants, by and through counsel, hereby submit the following Memorandum
In Support Of Defendants' Motion To Dismiss Information in the above referenced
actions.
UNDISPUTED FACTS
1.

Defendants James and Linda Mooney are members and spiritual leaders of

the Oklevueha Earthwalks Native American Church of Utah, Inc. and have been since the
creation of the Church in April, 1997.
2.

Defendant Oklevueha Earthwalks Native American Church of Utah, Inc.,

is a domestic, non-profit corporation in good standing and authorized to conduct business
in the State of Utah, by the Utah Department of Commerce. The Church was incorporated
on April 11, 1997. See, Defendants1 Exhibit 11, attached. The Church issues cards to its
members stating the principles of the Church. See, Defendants' Exhibit 12, attached.
3.

The defendants are being charged in the Informations in the above-

entitled actions with criminal activity based upon their possession, use and distribution of
peyote medicine for bona fide religious purposes as members of the defendant Native
American Church.
4.

James and Linda Mooney have been dedicated to bringing to Native

American religion to inmates at the Central Utah Correctional Facility as volunteers.
5.

James Mooney began volunteering his services as a Seminole medicine

man at CUCF beginning in 1991. He has received commendations for CUCF officials for
his services to that institution. See, Defendants* Exhibit 2, attached.
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6.

In recognition of his outstanding volunteer services in providing Native
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oney was authorized by the Principal Chief of the

Oklevueha Band of Seminole Indians to work for the Tribe by conducting swo.ti 1< - UM*
and counseling in drug and alcohol, and also as a pipe carrier, for inmates in the Utah
State Prison System. See, Defendants' Exhibit 4, attache!
8.

For several years prior to October "
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with the Hurricane City Police T^
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in this capacity. See, Defendants1 Exhibit 5, attached.
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religious services to inmates at CUCF, defendant James Mooney was recruited by prison
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..*-.* ..o; Program", a program which -

was highly successful in reducing recid-Ai^rr among c\ i r p inmates. Defendant James
:\ ,i! .mi win
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;> succes^iu; .Laau_>rup m this position. See,
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iiiivji ^n as a police officer through the
State of Tf **h Department of Public Safety Peace Officers Standards and Training. w 1 id ,
he completed in September, 1994. See, Defendants' Exhibit 6, attached.
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11.

On July 25, 1994, defendant James Mooney was honored as a member of

the CUCF transition team with an award of the Medal of Merit by 0. Lane McCotter,
Executive Director, Utah Department of Corrections. See, Defendants' Exhibit 7,
attached.
12.

Linda Mooney also served as a volunteer in the Native American services

program to inmates at the CUCF facility. See. Defendants' Exhibit 10, attached.
13.

Prior to April, 1997, when he founded the defendant Oklevueha

Earthwalks Native American Church, defendant James Mooney was a member of the
Defendant James Mooney has previously been a member of the Native American Church
of North America. See, Defendants' Exhibit 6, attached.
14.

The defendant Oklevueha Earthwalks Native American Church, Inc., and

defendant James Mooney are recognized by the Texas Department of Public Safety as
having a right to receive peyote for bona fide religious purposes. See, Defendants'
Exhibit 13, attached.
15.

For several years, prior to the subject criminal prosecutions, defendant

James Mooney has been legally authorized to receive peyote from Salvadore Johnson, an
individual licensed to distribute peyote to Native American Churches and their medicine
men and all such sales are shown by receipts issued by the Department of Public Safety
Narcotics Services. See, Defendants' Exhibit 14, attached.
16.

The Code of Federal Regulations, 21 CFR 1307.31 contains an exemption

from criminal prosecution for the nondrug use of peyote in bona fide religious
ceremonies of the Native American Church and members of the Native American Church
are exempt from registration. See, Defendants' Exhibit 15, attached.
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17.
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Church Is Incorporated in 1 Itah law, specifically Chapter 37, Section 58-37-! et ">CM| S I \
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ARGUMENT
DEFENDANTS HAVE A RIGHT TO POSSESS, USE AND DISTRIBUTE
PEYOTE FOR BONA FIDE RELIGIOUS PURPOSES AS MEMBERS OF THE
DEFENDANT NATIVE AMERICAN CHURCH UNDER THE CONSTITUTION
AND I AWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE STATE OF UTAH
I.

ian Law incorporates The Federal Exemption For
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^e Of Peyote By

Members Of the Native American Church
Section. 58-37-1.1: tteji n. * tah t 'ode Ann. (1953), as amended 1.997, provides that
,
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controlled substance analog """,
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(V) peyote, meaning all parts of the plant presently c
classified botanically as Lophorophora williamsii Lei: _
whether growing or not, the seeds thereof, any extrac;
i
any part of such plant, and every compound. ma-.ufactuR
salts, derivative, mixture, or preparation of such - x~\
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1 he Drug Enforcement Regulation pertaining to the listing of peyote as a
controlled substance under Scheiliih I nl llu1
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C.F.R. 1307.31, provides a special exception to prosecution for possession or use of
peyote by members of the Native American Church:

"SPECIAL EXEMPT PERSONS".
Native American Church. The listing of peyote as a controlled substance
under federal law does not apply to the nondrug use of peyote in bona fide
religious ceremonies of the Native American Church, and members of the
Native American Church so using peyote are exempt from registration.
Because the use of peyote for bona fide religious purposes by members of the
Native American Church is "specifically excepted" from prosecution under Schedule I of
the federal Controlled Substances Act, pursuant to 21 C.F.R. 1307.31", and Schedule 1
of the federal Controlled Substances Act is incorporated under the definition of
"controlled substances" in 58-37-3, Utah Code Ann. (1953), as amended 1997, Utah law
incorporates and recognizes the federal exception for the use of peyote for bona fide
religious purposes by members of the Native American Church.
Utah's incorporation of the federal peyote exemption is also consistent with the
guarantees of religious freedom proclaimed in Article I, Section 4 of the Constitution of
the State of Utah, which provides
Religious Liberty — The right of conscience shall never be
infringed. The State shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; no religious test
shall be required as a qualification for any office of public trust or
for any vote any election; nor shall any person be incompetent as a
witness or juror on account of religious belief or the absence thereof.
There shall be no union of Church and State, nor shall any church
dominate the State or interfere with its functions. No public money
or property shall be appropriated for or applied to any religious
worship, exercise or instruction, or for the support of any ecclesiastical
establishment. No property qualification shall be required of any person
to vote, or hold office, except as provided in this constitution.
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guarantees the right of Utah residents ' to worship according to the dictates of their own
consciences" aim] \ n n l r III |u

n11-«, lm "iintni t Iruii mi

I religious sentiment and

unmolested religious worship."
RaMil ii|inii ilu in nil L'uiiii ilu

ii,HL njjniii! demonstrate any "compelling state

interest" in enforcing Utah criminal laws against the Defendants where such laws
t'lnl'iai t® ilu

IINII'I.II

ri'leiii|MnHi limn criminal prosecution for peyote use by members of

:v rlaintir: Native American Church, regardless of their race. Churcn <

• 1QQ" (holding that an interest served by statute 15
statutory framework permits derogation of that interest )
II.

Vny Racially Restrictive Application Of'I he Federal Peyote Exemption
Incorporated in the Utah Statute Violates The First Amendment
Basv

. ;w«w.ut peyote exemption, the court in I J.S.

v. BoyiL 7 "Go v: .. • • •

^
:. r

American Church

I'D \t*\\ M-*»ir.

1 ^ ), the court; specifically rejected fk

. it that the exemption applied only to Indian members of the Native
I :v . ^rt ^^wv**^- the legislative history ot in *

.:
...;.. *& ;:.u; >t supported the court's racially neutral interpretation of the
exemption o;*:.r.;
Had th<
m to exclude non-Indian members,
T
as the
— -><?, the language of the exemption
would nave >u *.__
ided Indeed, the ^ i - .' - -\
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'
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exemption makes no reference whatsoever to a racial
exclusion,
A* at 1388.
In Boyll, the court specifically also held that 21 C.F.R. 1307.31 is "specifically
directed to religious practices" and therefore not within the ambit of the Supreme Court's
decision in Employment Division, Dept. of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 1603, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990) ("Smith"), which
elected to abandon the compelling interest test in cases
involving a "neutral, generally applicable criminal law"
reasoning that the application of such a statute does not
implicate First Amendment concerns.
Boyll supra, at 1341.
The court in Boyll held that because the federal peyote exemption, "unlike the
statute in Smith, "is neither neutral nor generally applicable" in that "the plain language of
the exemption speaks directly to "bona fide religious ceremonies of the Native American
Church," the Court would apply the "compelling interest" test. Id,
With respect to the first step of the "compelling interest" test, the Court in Boyll
found that it was uncontradicted that the racially restrictive interpretation of 21 C.F.R.
1307.31 would impose a "substantial burden" on the free exercise of religion by nonIndian members of the Native American Church, stating
An examination of the record as to the nature of peyote
and its role in the religion practiced by defendants as
(Indian and non-Indian) members of the Native American
Church . . . compels the conclusion that the (racially
restrictive) prohibition most seriously infringes upon
the observance of the religion.
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The record, thus establishes that the in (indictment for) '
" . . . the use of peyote results in a virtual inhibition of the
•' practice of defend^*"'-? ,: ~ ; ~~
M at 1341, quoting People v. Woody, 61 Cal.2d 716 W P .; 81 ^ x > , ><u .
o:i.pC;.4ng :iitL.c:sl te^t ;he COL-* :r
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• -w compelling (governmental' »rWerest
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p.-11

. . . justifies
Id.

Acknowledging that drug abuse is "one of the greatest problems aflVctiru1 !h«/
health and weir^c vt our population" arid "one of the most serious problems confronting
.our society to v

-»c court held 'that "this amorphru

pr u l n m

ill

1 M

justify this serious infringement on the observance of religion " Id.
In Boyll, the court held tli.it tin Jinn,1 iriiiinnii li.iri f, ml nil' in pir-niif • 111

iJnk v m

a compelling interest in a racially restrictive interpretation of the exemption as applied to
t)
"In the absence of evidence, we cannot simply assume that the
fis' rhedelic is so baneful that its use must be prohibited to a,
l\ up of (non-Indian) members but poses no equal threat when
used bv (Indian) members of the Native American Church."
la at 13-^ citations omitted).
The Boyll court also held tlwl the \ n v eMsiemr of M \ I F I m ' <
' l IIM'II
negates the existence of a, compelling interest in prosecuting non-Indian, members of the
Native American Church ftn fhi'ii idii'iuiis usr nl IHM mlf

' ' In IIT 1

mi I nillir i mi i: t,

"the federal exemption explicitly establishes a governmental interest in preserving the
• an
members of the Native American Church " Id.
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Based upon the foregoing and numerous other legal authorities cited in its
opinion, the court in Boyll held that "the classification of peyote as a Schedule I
controlled substance, see 21 U.S.C. 812(c), Schedule (1) (c)(12), does not apply to the
importation, possession or use of peyote for bona fide ceremonial use by members of the
Native American Church, regardless of race" and dismissed the indictment against the
defendant Robert Boyll. Id.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the defendants have a federal and state constitutional
and statutory rights to possess, use and distribute peyote for religious purposes as
members of the defendant Native American Church and cannot be lawfully prosecuted
under Utah law for such conduct because Utah incorporates the federal peyote exemption
as explained above, and because any racially restrictive interpretation of the exemption
would violate the First Amendment.
Accordingly, defendants respectfully request the Court to dismiss the pending
Informations the above entitled actions.
DATED AND RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 17th day of May, 2001.
rYNtOttARD J
Attorney and Co-CounseTfbrDefentiants

10

^TIFICATE OF SFRVICF
s'ici;, 1\)\)\, 1 hand delivered a true

I 1IKKLBY i/'ER T

and corre-: ^or\ of the ^NUP ,nid foregoing Memorandum In Support <
Motion

>

:

Tis. to Mr. David Waym.ent, Assistant Liar. County

Attorney, at the Fourth Judicial District Court, in Pjovo, Utah

COLLARD
''for Defendants

li

ORIGINAL
KATHRYN COLLARD, St. Bar No. 0697
THE LAW FIRM OF KATHRYN COLLARD, LC
Attorney and Co-Counsel for Defendants
9 Exchange Place, Suite 1111
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Tel: (801) 537-5625

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,

REPLY MEMORANDUM
IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANTS' MOTION
TO DISMISS

Plaintiff.
v.
JAMES W. MOONEY
aka: James W.F.E. Mooney
7592 South 3200 West
Benjamin, UT 84660
DOB: 01/03/19444

Case No. 001404536
Judge Harding Sr.
OTN

and
LINDA T. MOONEY
aka: Linda B.H.W. Mooney
7295 South 3200 West
Benjamin, UT 84660

Case No. 00140537
Judge Harding Sr.
OTN

and
OKLEVUEHA EARTHWALKS
NATIVE AMERICAN CHURCH
OF UTAH, INC.,
Defendants.

Case No. 001404538
Judge Harding Sr.

OTN

I.

PROSECUTORIAL BIAS AGAINST DEFENDANTS' RELIGION PERMEATES
THE PROSECUTION OF THE DEFENDANTS
Defendants strongly dispute the prosecutors' obvious attempt to decontextualize the

facts of this case and portray the Defendants as illicit drug dealers. See, Opposition To Motion
To Dismiss, hereinafter " Pltf. Mem. 1-3. Defendant James Warren Flaming Eagle Mooney is
an individual of Native American Indian descent who founded the Oklevueha Earth Walks
Native American Church under the Laws of the State of Utah in April, 1997. Prior to that
time, defendant James Mooney had a longstanding history of sincere belief and practice as a
member and medicine man of the Native American Church. He and his wife, Linda, are not
"principals in OENAC", Pltf. Mem. 2, but are spiritual leaders of the Oklevueha Earth Walks
Native American Church of Utah. James and Linda Mooney did not repeatedly meet with
"groups averaging about 10-15 people and distributed peyote, a Schedule One controlled
substance", nor did they engage "in a pattern of unlawful activity" as the prosecutors
maliciously contend. Pltf. Mem. 1-2. Moreover, all of the sworn testimony adduced at the
Preliminary Hearing in the consolidated criminal actions by witnesses called by the
prosecution, uniformly indicated that James and Linda Mooney provided peyote as a
sacrament to members of the Oklevueha Earth Walks Native American Church of Utah, Inc.,
for religious purposes in religious ceremonies.
Defendants engaged in the foregoing religious activities based upon a reasonable
belief that their conduct was protected under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution and Utah law incorporating the federal exception from prosecution
for Native American Church members using peyote for religious purposes as interpreted by
the federal court in United States v. BoylU 774 F. Supp. 1333 (D. N.M. 1991). Defendants had

no intent to violate the criminal law of the State of Utah by their use of peyote for religious
purposes as members of the Native American Church and this malicious and unconstitutional
prosecution of Defendants should be immediately dismissed. See, Affidavits of James and
Linda Mooney, Defs. Exhibits 1 and 2, attached hereto and incorporated by reference herein
Moreover, the prosecutors' decision to quote sources to the effect that "at its heart, the
NAC is no more than a mechanism to justify legal institutionalization of an otherwise illegal
drug" and their statement to that "whatever one may think of the merits of peyote or the
NAC", Pltf. Mem. 22, belies the prosecutors' obvious personal animosity against the
Defendants because of their deeply held religious beliefs and practices as members of the
Native American Church. Although the prosecutors believe that members of the Native
American Church should not have a legal right to use peyote, their sworn duty is to uphold the
Utah law giving Defendants the right to do so, whether or not the prosecutors agree with the
law. Thus, although Defendants refer to the "Plaintiff' in their memoranda, Defendants do
not believe that the personal views of the prosecutors in this case accurately reflect the legal
position of the State of Utah or Utah County in this case, since the prosecutors' position is
directly contrary to applicable state and federal law.
I

UTAH

LAW

SPECIFICALLY

INCORPORATES

THE

FEDERAL

SCHEDULES OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES
The Plaintiff concedes that under Utah law, "a controlled substance is any substance
listed in Utah Code Ann. 58-37-4 (2000 Supp.) or in the schedules contained in the federal
Controlled Substances Act. See, Utah Code Ann., Section 58-37-3." Pltf. Mem.at 3 (emphasis
supplied.)

II

UTAH
LAW SPECIFICALLY
INCORPORATES
THE SPECIFIC
EXCEPTION IN THE FEDERAL CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT FOR
THE USE OF PEYOTE FOR RELIGIOUS PURPOSES BY MEMBERS OF
THE NATIVE AMERICAN CHURCH
The Plaintiff also concedes that "Utah Code Ann., Section 58-37-4 provides that a

listed substance, here peyote, is considered controlled unless 'specifically excepted or unless
listed on another schedule.' 58-37-4(2)(a)(iii), (2000 Supp.) (Emphasis supplied)." See, Pltf.
Mem. 4.
Notwithstanding the Plaintiffs erroneous argument that peyote is "absenf from the
list of federally controlled substances by virtue of the regulatory exception for use of peyote
by members of the Native American Church for religious purposes, Pltf. Mem. 5, Plaintiff
concedes that peyote is specifically listed as a controlled substance under federal law. See,
Pltf. Mem. 2-3. Hence, the need for the well-recognized federal exception for the use of
peyote by members of the Native American Church contained in 21 C.F.R. 1307.31. See.
United States v. Boyll, 114 F.Supp.1333 (D.N.M. 1991) at 1338-1339.
Similarly, Plaintiffs fallacious argument that Utah law does not incorporate the
federal exception, Pltf. Mem. 4, ignores the plain words of the Utah Controlled Substances
Act and the fact that Utah has maintained the statutory exception for religious use of peyote
by Native American Church members in one form or another since 1986. As the federal
district court noted in United States v. Boyll, 114 F. Supp. 1333 (D.N.M. 1991), Utah is one of
at least twenty-three states recognizing the exception, /rf. at 1338.
Contrary to the Plaintiffs next unsupported argument, this is not a case where the
federal courts or the State of Utah are "compelled to give (federal) administrative regulations
controlling weight." Pltf. Mem. 5-6. The Utah Legislature freely chose to incorporate the
federal exception for peyote use by members of the Native American Church in Utah law.

Because Utah law specifically incorporates the federal exception for use of peyote by Native
American Church members, the exception is also Utah law. Hence, there is no issue of
"federal preemption" as the prosecutors vainly attempt to suggest. Pltf. Mem. 5-6.
Ill

BECAUSE UTAH LAW RECOGNIZES AN EXCEPTION FROM CRIMINAL
PROSECUTION FOR MEMBERS OF THE NATIVE AMERICAN CHURCH
USING PEYOTE, THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN SMITH DOES
NOT APPLY
Although the Plaintiff argues that in Employment Division, Dept. of Human Resources

of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 8872 (1990), the United States Supreme Court has held "that a
state may criminalize the religious use of peyote without offending the First Amendment,,,
Pltf. Mem. 7-8, the Plaintiff fails to recognize that Smith has no application in this case
because the State of Utah has chosen not to criminal the use of peyote by members of the
Native American Church using peyote for religious purposes by incorporating the federal
exception into Utah law. By contrast, in Smith, the State of Oregon did not recognize such an
exception. Thus, the Plaintiffs discussion of Smith is an irrelevant segue that need not be
traversed.
Precisely because the State of Utah law recognizes an exception from criminal
prosecution for members of the Native American Church using peyote for religious purposes,
the State of Utah has no compelling or any other interest in prosecuting those persons to
whom it has statutorily granted an exception from such criminal prosecution. Thus, it is a
violation of due process for the State of Utah to grant members of the Native American
Church an exception from criminal prosecution for their use of peyote for religious purposes
and then, as here, criminally prosecute Defendants for engaging in the very activity protected
under Utah law.

IV

THE UTAH EXCEPTION FOR THE USE OF PEYOTE BY MEMBERS OF
THE NATIVE AMERICAN CHURCH IS NOT RACIALLY OR OTHERWISE
RESTRICTIVE
The Plaintiffs argument that the federal exception for the use of peyote for religious

purposes by Native American Church members incorporated in Utah law is restricted to
Native American Indians, finds no support in the plain words of the regulation, which refers
only to "members of the Native American Church." Even assuming that Plaintiffs argument
were correct, which Defendants deny, Defendant James Mooney cannot be criminally
prosecuted under the exception because he is an individual of Native American Indian
descent.
In United States v. Boyll, supra, the only decision interpreting the federal exception in
the Tenth Circuit, the federal district court of New Mexico held that the plain words of the
regulatory exception and the legislative history of the regulation, did not support a "racially"
restrictive reading of the exception, limiting its application to Native American Indian
members of the N.A.C., when Congp^ss could have easily specified such a limitation but
chose not to do so. See, Boyll, supra, at 1337-1339. l
Because Utah law incorporates the federal exception for use of peyote for religious
purposes by Native American Church members, and Boyll is the only decision in the Tenth
Circuit considering the exception and concluding that the exception is not limited to Native
American Indians, the Defendants were legally justified in relying on the Utah exception and
the court's decision in Boyll as a reasonable basis for their belief that their use of peyote as

1

Although the Plaintiff claims that "Boyll is easily criticized for its lack of meaningful legal analysis",
Pltf Mem. 7-8, Plaintiff concedes that "Congress too strong exception to the Court's decision in Smith",
Pltf Mem. 3, as did Court in Boyll, and as Plaintiffs own authorities recite, for many of the same reasons.
Compare, "American Indian Religious Freedom Act Amendments of 1994", 2404-2406, Pltf Mem
(Attachment) and United States v. Boyll, supra, at 1338-1342.

members of the Native American Church, was not in violation of any criminal law of the State
of Utah.
Similarly, the State's argument that the federal exception for use of peyote by Native
American Church members, that the American Indian Religious Freedom Act Amendments of
1994, ("AIRFA"), limits the federal exception from prosecution for members of the Native
American Church to members of federally recognized Indian Tribes, Pltf. Mem. 6, is
erroneous.
Although AIRFA protects the right of members of federally recognized Tribes to use
peyote in religious ceremonies, AIRFA is inclusive, not exclusive. AIFRA does not exclude
or prohibit members of non-federally recognized Indian Tribes from using peyote in religious
ceremonies, nor does it prohibit members of the Native American Church from using peyote
in religious ceremonies, nor does it criminalize the use of peyote for religious purposes by
these groups. Additionally, there is nothing in AIRFA or its legislative history, evidencing any
indication of Congressional intent to limit the breadth of the exception from prosecution for
Native American Church members granted under 28 U.S.C. 1307.31. See, Pltf. Mem.,
attachment: "American Indian Religious Freedom Act Amendments of 1994."
Defendants contend that any interpretation of AIRFA restricting the right of Native
American Indians who are not members of a federally recognized tribe, or restricting the right
of members of the Native American Church who are not members of a federally recognized
tribe, to use peyote for religious purposes, clearly violates the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
Finally, the laudable purpose of preserving Native American culture that underlies
AIRFA is in no way at odds with the goal of protecting members of the Native American

Church using peyote for religious purposes from criminal prosecution underlying the
regulatory exception from prosecution contained in 28 U.S.C. 1307.31 as incorporated in Utah
law. In fact, permitting the Native American Church to define its own membership will better
serve the Government's espoused goal of preserving Native American culture by allowing the
Native American Church to expand the base of its worshippers. The restrictive interpretation
of the exception advocated by the Plaintiff in this case, as in Boyll, would only have the
undesirable effect of marginalizing the Native American Church by decreasing the number of
individuals who can legally participate in its fundamentally central peyote ceremonies because
of the fear of criminal prosecution. See, Boyll, supra, at 1339-1340.
V

THE RACIALLY OR OTHERWISE RESTRICTIVE INTERPRETATION OF
THE FEDERAL EXCEPTION ADVOCATED BY THE PLAINTIFF
VIOLATES THE FIRST AMENDMENT
In this case, the Plaintiff seeks an even more restrictive reading of the exception than

advanced by the government in Boyll. There, the Government argued that the exception
should be interpreted to apply to only Native American Indians, whereas here, the Plaintiff is
arguing that the exemption should only apply to Native American Indians who are members
of federally recognized Tribes under AIRFA. As the court recognized in Boyll, the use of
peyote is central to the beliefs of the Native American Church. Thus, any attempt by the
federal government or the courts to criminalize the religious use of peyote by members of the
Native American Church based upon their race or their membership in a federally recognized
tribe, would run afoul of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. See, Boyll, supra,
at 1339-1342.

VII

THE UTAH CONSTITUTION PROVIDES AN INDEPENDENT BASIS
FOR DISMISSING THIS PROSECUTION
Because the protection for individual exercise of religious beliefs from

government interference under the Utah constitutional provisions cited in Defendants'
opening Memorandum is at least as broad, if not broader, than that provided in the First
Amendment to the federal Constitution, the Court should also dismiss the criminal
actions against Defendants as violative of their rights to the free exercise of religion
under Utah law.
CONCLUSION
Utah law incorporating the federal regulatory exception from criminal prosecution for
members of the Native American Church using peyote for religious purposes incorporated
under Utah law, protects James Mooney, a descendent of Native American Indians, and his
wife, Linda Mooney, and the Oklevueha Earth Walks Native American Church, from criminal
prosecution The evidence adduced at the Preliminary Hearing in this matter demonstrates that
the Defendants' use of peyote falls within the statutory exception. Moreover, the Affidavits of
the Defendants demonstrate that they had a reasonable belief that their religious use of peyote
as members of the Native American Church was in conformity with state and federal laws and
that they had no intent to violate such laws, such that it would be a violation of Defendants'
rights to due process of law, equal protection of law and the free exercise of their fundamental
religious beliefs as members of the Native American Church, for this prosecution to proceed.
Accordingly, the Defendants pray that the Court dismiss the prosecutions against the
Defendants without further delay.

DATED this 4th day of July, 2001. ^
)LLARD
morne^ahd Co-Counsel for
Defendants

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 11th day of July, 2001, I delivered a true and
correct copy of the above and foregoing Reply Memorandum In Support of Defendants'
Motion To Dismiss, to Kay Bryson and David Wayment, Utah County Attorney's Office,
100 East Center, Suite 2100, Provo, Utah, %4606
^THR^
(ttorney &fr Defendants

